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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis conducts three different empirical studies and finds that some of the pre-2007 
risk assessment model could underestimate the systemic risk of the banking sector and 
justifies an overhaul.  First, it simulates the contagion impact of the UK interbank market.  
Subject to a number of assumptions (netting agreement, seniority, etc), it finds that the 
contagion is much severer if the simulation uses consolidated data than using 
unconsolidated data.  Second, the thesis tests whether the riskiness of banks can be 
mitigated by peer interbank monitoring.  Applying to UK market, the thesis finds little 
evidence of market discipline.  The results are attributed to the lenders’ assumption of “too-
big-to-fail” and the shortness of loan maturity.  Last, the thesis investigates whether banking 
sector difficulties are preceded by macroeconomic distress.  In contrast to most existing 
studies, the thesis finds that economy still thrives in the “pre-crisis” in terms of increasing 
GDP growth and the recession is generally associated with the “post-crisis” period.  The 
inconsistency of results is very likely due to imprecise crisis identification of earlier studies 
which identify crises too late on the basis of “event studies”. 
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CHAPTER ONE   
INTRODUCTION 
 2 
 
 
The importance of a stable and well-functioning banking sector has never been so manifest 
since the outbreak of the global credit crisis in 2008.  Huge efforts have been made by the 
world’s central banks to curb the adverse feedback loop between the banking system and 
the real economy.  The aftershock of the banking crises is immense, not only because credit 
is extremely difficult to obtain, but in the sense that increasing pressure is exerted on 
taxpayers, employment and market sovereigns (following large-scale nationalization).  It 
therefore becomes imperative for regulators and policy makers to assess the key risks facing 
the financial system and develop tools to detect systemic risk.   
 
The thesis investigates empirically three different topics in managing systemic risk in the 
banking sector.  First, it simulates the contagion effect of the UK interbank market.  Second, 
it evaluates the interbank market discipline.  Last, the thesis evaluates whether a systemic 
distresses is normally proceeded by macroeconomic downturns.   
 
The first two topics are developed in Chapters Two and Three, which originate from two 
schools of thought on the implication of interbank linkages.  On the one hand, Allen and 
Gale (2000) and Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) regard the interbank exposure or the 
credit linkage between banks as a source of contagion.  Default of any banks in the netting 
system is likely to trigger a chain reaction of defaults, resembling the fall of dominoes.  The 
assessment of such an event is categorized by the IMF Global Financial Stability Report 
(2009) as the network approach to “track the reverberation of a credit event or liquidity 
squeeze throughout the banking system via direct linkage in the interbank market”.  On the 
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other hand, Rochet and Tirole (1996) argue that, by generating incentives for lending banks 
to monitor borrowing banks, interbank exposures may also contribute to prudent market 
behaviour and reduce the risk of bank failures and systemic distress.  This thesis tests these 
two theories empirically in the UK interbank market during the period before the current 
credit crisis.  The results suggest wide-scale contagion impact in the worst scenario when a 
systemically important institution or group defaults.  Moreover, the impact cannot be 
mitigated by peer monitoring incentives offered by the lending banks because the results 
indicate little evidence of market discipline in the UK interbank market.   
 
The last topic on the macroeconomic indicators of systemic banking distress is evaluated in 
Chapter Four.  Previous empirical studies argue that banking crises are most often caused 
by economic downturns as their results suggest that banking crises are often preceded by 
macroeconomic distress especially GDP falls (Gorton 1988, Kaminsky & Reinhart 1999, 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache 1998, and Hardy & Pazarbasioglu 1998).  Therefore, 
macroeconomic figures can be used as early warning indicators to prevent crises.  In 
contrast, the thesis finds that the pre-crisis period is associated with an economic boom, 
which then bursts sharply following crises.  Hence, the results indicate that it is misleading 
to regard an economic slowdown as an indicator of systemic crises. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, section 1.1 explains the original contribution of the thesis 
from the perspective of the current global credit crisis. Section 1.2 summarizes some of the 
statistical facts about the UK interbank market, which will be studied in Chapters Two and 
Three. 
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1.1 Lessons from the Current Credit Crisis  
 
The outbreak of the current credit crisis has once again shed light on the disadvantages of 
financial innovation.  Sub-prime loans and mortgage-backed securities, once promoted as 
the solutions to low-cost access to credit, are now usually perceived to be the source of the 
problem.  A wide range of banking or nonbanking financial institutions that have these 
assets on their balance sheets have come under strain during the crisis.  To break the 
downward spiral between the financial sector and the real economy, trillions of pounds 
have been committed or spent by the world’s economic leaders in the form of loans, asset 
purchases, guarantees, and direct spending. 
 
However, while financial innovation “can misfire,” it is possible that the benefits may more 
often outweigh the disadvantages.  The root of the question, however, lies in whether, 
during the market upswings, banks have kept an eye on the downside effects and have 
provided enough capital buffers to reflect the risks accumulated through the cycle in order 
to absorb losses during the downswings.  Unfortunately, sound risk-based decision making 
often gives way to short-termism.  Such myopia builds up “excessive leverage” which 
eventually contributes to systemic banking crises such as the Asian or Nordic banking crisis 
in the 90s, the Latin American debt crisis in the 80s, and world-wide turmoil in the 1930s.  
The fact that the current banking crisis features the same problem was shown by the 
admission by former US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan during October 2008 
that the modern paradigm of risk assessment and management has essentially collapsed.  It 
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seems that the risk models that have been used either by investors or regulators are deeply 
misleading, both in terms of forecasting the future and implicitly guiding policy responses.  
They depended, perhaps unconsciously, too much on the assumption of market efficiency, 
i.e. that all investors behave rationally in assessing risk.  Kurz (1997) showed that, when 
there is a wide consensus of investors who believe in market efficiency, the average riskless 
rate is high and the average risk premium is too low.  In another word, the hypothetical low 
risk environment justifies a state where all investors choose an optimal level of leverage 
which is higher than when they have a normal degree of risk aversion; and financial 
regulators believe that no action needs to be taken for prudential reasons.  In the end, the 
consensus jeopardized the entire global financial framework.   
 
The investigation result of this thesis casts serious doubts on the pre-2007 risk assessment 
literature.  In particular, it discovered that the existing literature has flaws in either 
assumptions or modelling, which could give false “safe” signals to regulators, although the 
contents and sample of this thesis were chosen before the outbreak of the current crisis. 
 
In Chapter Two, the thesis examines the systemic implication of the interbank linkages in 
the UK.  Previous studies simulated on European countries find only limited or low 
contagion impact.  However, their results are crucially subject to various assumptions such 
as the evolution of market structures, the choice of data and default rate, as well as the 
number of banks who trigger defaults.  In particular, the thesis compares the simulation 
using consolidated data to those using unconsolidated data in other studies.  By using 
consolidated data, interbank exposures are selected from group consolidated balance sheets, 
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rather than from subsidiaries’ accounts.  This means that, unlike the previous studies, the 
thesis assumes that the subsidiaries and their headquarters stand or fall together.  The 
author’s results show that the contagion impact is much severe if the simulation uses 
consolidated data than otherwise.  Hence, data choices of this kind are very important for 
stress testing and a caveat is suggested to regulators in interpreting results from previous 
studies.     
 
In Chapter Three, the thesis tests the interbank market discipline in the UK.  It redefines 
the condition of interbank market efficiency and stresses it should satisfy in order: 1) risk 
sensitivity of interbank lenders; 2) effective risk control through interbank borrowing.  Most 
existing studies only test the risk sensitivity without considering effective risk control.  
Others associate a reduction in bank risk with an increase in interbank borrowing, without 
first confirming if there is any monitoring incentive among investors.  The results of either 
approach are subject to caveat to implicate that “market disciplines”.  Applying to UK 
market, the thesis finds little evidence to support the hypothesis of market discipline.  This 
is explained by two elements: low risk sensitivity and the ineffectiveness of risk control.  
Investors in the UK market show little incentive to monitor their loans because most of the 
interbank borrowers are large institutions and are expected to be too-big-to-fail; the 
maturity of UK interbank loans is too short to allow for lender accountability.  Moreover, 
as demonstrated in a theoretical model, the chapter shows that, even given incentives of 
peer monitoring, banks could choose a riskier investment portfolio to maximize their net 
expected return. 
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In Chapter Four, the thesis examines whether wide-scale banking distresses are preceded by 
deteriorating macroeconomic conditions such as a falling growth rate.  As suggested in 
previous empirical studies, these indicators might serve as an early warning to regulators 
who can therefore choose responsive policies to prevent crises in advance.  However, 
empirical studies in this thesis find that the economy still thrives in the “pre-crisis” period, 
although it deteriorates after the outbreak of the crisis.  This inconsistency in results is very 
likely attributed to the imprecise identification of crises which identify crises too late on the 
basis of indirect symptoms.  To accurately identify crises, this thesis uses stock market 
indices of banking industries as direct indicators of bank asset quality.  The stock market 
data was largely unavailable for the underlying sample period in previous studies, so indirect 
indicators such as bail-outs, bank runs, mergers and acquisitions, and government liquidity 
injections are used.  Moreover, the previous studies fail to address either the “pre-crisis 
bias” or the “post-crisis bias”: the economic indicators or the explanatory variables during 
pre-crisis and post-crisis period may differ from those in tranquil times.  Ignorance of this 
can lead to insignificance of variables.  This thesis solves the bias by classifying a responsive 
variable into four categories and makes the estimation in the multinomial logit model.   
 
1.2 The UK Interbank Market 
 
The empirical studies conducted in the next two chapters are applied to the UK interbank 
market.  Similar to other countries, the UK interbank market is a wholesale money market 
for the offering of deposits between commercial banks in a range of currencies.  The 
market is based in London and is highly concentrated: over 70% of total lending between 
banks operating in the UK is accounted for by only 15 institutions, compared to 719 in the 
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U.S. (a comparison with other countries can be found in Table 2.1, Chapter 2).  Wells (2004) 
points out that the structure of the interbank market is formed by “tiering”.  A small 
number of large banks transact with each other and a greater number of smaller institutions 
place excess funds with the larger banks. 
 
Regarding the market instruments, the majority of the interbank transactions are in the 
form of loans, deposits and CDs, while less than 0.2% are in the form of commercial paper 
and bank bills.  About 80% of the transactions are unsecured, accounting for around 27% 
of UK-resident banks’ total assets.  Foreign banks have a significant involvement in the UK 
interbank market due to London’s position as an international financial centre.  Only 36% 
of unsecured transactions are to a UK-resident bank.  Furthermore, only around 2% to 3% 
of the total interbank assets or liabilities recorded in balance sheets have a duration of over 
five years, while more than 80% are for less than three months, of which around a quarter 
are on demand.   
 
Limited data is available on the UK interbank market.  Individual bilateral time series’ on 
actual interbank rates and quantities are not released to public.   Even at the supervisory and 
regulatory levels, the Financial Service Authority (FSA) only obtains the large exposures, i.e. 
the size and counterparty for each bank’s 20 largest exposures and any other exposures 
exceeding 10% of its Tier 1 capital.  However, many banks, mostly large in size, do release 
their balance sheets showing the quantity of the aggregate lending and borrowing in the 
interbank market annually or in 6 month time.  The data limitation problem at bilateral level 
leads the author to use entropy maximization method as to be specified in next Chapter.  
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CHAPTER TWO   
ASSESSING INTERBANK CONTAGION 
RISK USING CONSOLIDATED DATA 
 10 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The benefit of the interbank market gives an optimal allocation of resources.  Funds are 
distributed efficiently from banks that have a comparative advantage in terms of deposit 
collecting, but are less skilled in investing capital, to banks that are experts in growing assets, 
but suffer from a lack of funding.  However, while such credit linkage between banks 
provides a risk sharing mechanism, it is also an important source of contagion.  Since the 
late 1990s, the contagion risk in the interbank market has been assessed by researchers at 
many central banks.  Many of them resort to a conditional simulation that starts by 
assuming that a bank, or a group of banks, is not able to repay their borrowings.  
Contagious defaults occur if the losses on the exposure to the defaulting bank exceed the 
capital of a creditor; the losses at the creditor banks are then computed.  As each default 
weakens the surviving banks, it may end up causing a chain reaction of defaults, resembling 
the fall of domino pieces.  The existing empirical studies indicate that the scope of 
contagion varies dramatically across countries.  For countries such as Germany and 
Denmark, the contagious assets, as a percentage of the total assets, amount to 88% and 
72% respectively, while the scope is quite limited in Switzerland and Austria whereby the 
affected assets never exceed 1% of the total industry assets.   
 
However, as the simulation is “conditional” owing to a number of assumptions regarding 
various issues including research focuses and data restrictions, etc., the results are subject to 
important caveats and biases.  For example, as the interbank data are aggregated and do not 
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contain specific information on the counterparty that a bank lends to or borrows from, the 
complete interbank positions, where each bank symmetrically holds claims on all other 
banks in the systems, have to be estimated.  The incompleteness in data also prevents most 
authors from including the entire lines of interbank business.  Besides, studies are 
inconsistent in choosing sample dates and defining contagion mechanisms, as well as 
assuming the loss given default.  All these factors could result in bias in either direction and, 
as a result, the interpretations of the simulation results are not directly comparable across 
countries. 
 
Among the various sources of bias, the issue of estimating consolidated exposure using 
unconsolidated data is mostly ignored by researchers.  Great divergence may arise between 
the two types of data.  Consolidated financial statements present financial information 
about a parent’s undertakings and its subsidiary undertakings as a single economic unit, 
while unconsolidated statements present them as separate units.  As the banking industry 
becomes increasingly integrated and concentrated, large banks usually own a significant 
number of subsidiaries, which are most likely to stand or fall together.  Using 
unconsolidated data in the contagion simulation could seriously affect the robustness of 
results.   
 
The chapter analyzes this issue by simulating the contagion effect in the 2004 UK interbank 
market comprising 16 UK-owned banks and five foreign groups, using consolidated data.  
To facilitate the simulation, it is crucial to have the data of the bilateral interbank exposure, 
i.e. the amount of interbank lending and borrowing to a specific bank.  However, this type 
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of data is difficult to obtain even at the supervisory level for many central banks.  Banks 
only release aggregate data revealing total interbank exposure.  Following existing studies, 
the author uses Entropy Maximization method (ME) to estimate the bilateral interbank 
exposure.   The method assumes that banks seek to maximize the dispersion of their 
interbank activity, which means each bank symmetrically holds claims on all other banks in 
the system.  This is sensible in that the amount that a bank I lends to a bank J depends on 
the share of the bank I’s total lending to the market and the share of the bank J’s total 
borrowing from the market.  However, it resembles a complete market structure proposed 
by Allen and Gale (2000) where every bank is symmetrically linked with all others.  This 
assumption rules out relationship banking in which banks normally have a few fixed clients 
to transact with.  Moreover, it could underestimate the contagion effect of the UK 
interbank market which is more close to the money centre market structure proposed by 
Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) where all other banks transact only with the money centre 
bank.   
 
The author deals with the drawbacks of ME by manually changing the weights of interbank 
exposure between banks.  This is realized by increasing the exposure of intra-group, 
increasing the exposure with money centre banks, or increasing the exposure of transactions 
with foreign banks.  The simulation results suggest that there is a huge knock-on impact 
using consolidated exposure: 89.48% of the total balance sheet assets are affected in the 
worst scenario at a rate of 100% loss.  The scale of contagion prevails disregarding the type 
of market structure, although the contagion propagates faster under a money centre market 
structure than under the complete market structure.  Nevertheless, contagion impact varies 
substantially at different loss rates.   If the loss rates are lower than 40%, no contagion will 
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occur.  The results also show that the market is less contagious when lending and 
borrowing is mostly solved within the same banking group; and increasing interbank 
transactions to foreign banks rather than local banks could effectively decrease the severity 
of contagion due to risk diversification.   
 
However, in contrast to existing studies on UK, the severity of contagion is much higher.  
For example, in the same benchmark model, the contagion impact of this chapter is four 
times higher than that of Wells (2004) in which only 25.25% assets are affected.  The 
inconsistency is largely due to the consolidated data used in this chapter.  Illustrating in a 
pseudo-four-bank system using both consolidated and unconsolidated exposure, the author 
shows that the banking system of consolidated exposure which is more likely to experience 
contagion than the system of unconsolidated exposure, if the possibility is measured by the 
average interbank exposure relative to tier-I capital is larger in the system of consolidated 
exposure than that of unconsolidated exposure.  Moreover, if the contagion impact is 
measured by the percentage of total banking sector assets, the author demonstrates that 
simulation using consolidated exposure is more contagious when the average capital 
position is between the consolidated interbank exposure and the unconsolidated exposure. 
 
Furthermore, the author assess years before 2004 to see if the scope of contagion has 
changed over time.  As most small and mid-sized banks do not release their annual reports 
prior to 2002, only two years are assessed prior to 2004.  The investigation suggests a similar 
wide-scale contagion between 2004 and 2003, accounting for 90% of total banking sector 
assets, but a limited impact in 2002, accounting for only 12.57%.  This is attributed to 
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higher interbank exposure relative to Tier-1 capital in 2003 and 2004 compared to 2002.  
However, as far as cases of contagion are concerned, 2002 seems to be the year most likely 
to trigger a contagion with highest number of initial defaults leading to contagion.  Analyses 
show that the standard deviation of the ratio of interbank exposure to Tier-1 capital across 
banks is highest in 2002 and lowest in 2004.  This implies systemically, the interbank 
exposure is more concentrated in a few banks in 2002 than other two years. 
   
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 explains sources of contagion 
and reviews theories on the relationship between market structure and contagion effects; 
section 2.3 looks at the existing studies of contagion simulation owing to interbank 
exposure, various assumptions and their biases against the robustness of simulation results; 
section 2.4 simulates the systemic risk of the UK interbank market in 2004 using 
consolidated data and section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature Review  
 
Under normal conditions, interbank markets provide benefits in the form of optimal 
allocation of resources.  Funds are distributed efficiently from banks that have a 
comparative advantage in collecting deposits, but are less skilled in investing them, to banks 
who are experts in making investments, but lack funding.  Interbank transactions that 
achieve this function include intraday debits on payment systems, overnight and term 
interbank lending in the money markets, securities, FX settlements and off-balance-sheet 
instruments such as over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.   
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Lending banks prefer liquid assets of interbank loans to cash reserves, as they could reduce 
the opportunity costs of holding the latter.  However, the interbank market does not always 
function properly, especially during crises, when all banks find it optimal to withdraw bank 
loans for fear that other banks will not be able to honour their obligations if their 
depositors withdraw all their wealth (Freixas, Parigi and Rochet 2000).  It is therefore 
questionable for prudential purposes to rely solely on interbank loans as a better liquidity 
cushion than cash resources.   As Rochet and Tirole (1996) put it, interbank transactions 
reduce the transparency of a bank’s balance and off-balance sheet data and complicate the 
assessment of a bank’s actual liquidity ratio.   
 
However, it is more worrying that the netting obligations of the interbank market pose a 
potential risk of contagion from the failure of one institution to another.  The propagation, 
often referred to as “systemic risk”, is a serious concern for all sectors of the economy.  
Anxiety over systemic risk in the banking sector is perhaps the strongest concern for 
regulators because of its close connections with the other industries that form a broader 
economy.  Moreover, the risk does not diminish due to the fact that interbank loans or 
transactions, neither collateralized nor insured against, now make up an increasingly large 
proportion of banks’ balance sheets in many countries (Lublóy 2005). 
 
The following sections examine several sources that trigger the interbank propagation and 
explore the causality relationship between interbank market structure and the severity of 
contagion.   
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2.2.1 Sources of Contagion 
 
Interbank markets are susceptible to contagion failure from three major sources: 
macroeconomic impulses, information externalities and explicit credit linkages.  
Macroeconomic impulses refer to exposure of the market to a common shock or the 
sudden movement of aggregate risk factors such as interest rates, exchange rates, equity 
index rates, etc.  In that case, contagion risk is imposed on all banks simultaneously and the 
movement of these risk factors is often related to business cycles and triggered by domestic 
and external macroeconomic imbalances.  As a separate source, macroeconomic impulses 
do not stress the credit linkage between banks in the interbank market and is not the focus 
of this chapter.  However, the author will discuss the macroeconomic shock on the entire 
banking sector in Chapter Four. 
 
The second source is information externalities which originally refer to a self-fulfilling bank 
run by depositors (Diamond and Dybvig 1983).  In the interbank market, banks are 
depositors themselves in terms of credit lending.   When there is an aggregate shortage of 
liquidity (aggregate withdrawal demand in the market is greater than the total stock of the 
short-term asset), individual banks find it optimal to withdraw all their deposits for fear that 
the other banks will not be able to honour their netting obligations if their depositors have 
withdrawn all their wealth and if a sufficiently large fraction of deposits in other banks is 
withdrawn (Freixas, Parigi and Rochet 2000).  A “gridlock” or “coordination failure” occurs 
in which interbank markets cease to function as they should under normal circumstances.  
Moreover, Allen and Gale (2000) show that coordination failure will cause the originally 
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solvent, but illiquid, bank to become insolvent and, in turn, the healthy banks on the nodes 
of the netting system will also find themselves on the edge of failure.  The UK small bank 
crisis in the early 1990s gives a good illustration of a “gridlock” status. 
 
The chapter focuses on the contagion that comes from the explicit credit linkages of the 
interbank market.   It differs from the information externalities in that the contagion is not 
a self-fulfilment rational or irrational behaviour.  Instead, it occurs with a chain reaction, 
where the propagation spread through a chain of interbank loan default.  The initial default 
is an idiosyncratic bank failure regardless if it is caused by either macroeconomic distresses 
or microeconomic deficiencies.   
 
2.2.2 Impact of Market Structure  
 
The risk of interbank contagion is sensitive to the pattern of linkages and the size of the 
exposures on the node of the netting system.  Allen and Gale (2000) consider two types of 
market structure and compare their systemic stability.  One is a complete market structure 
(Figure 2.1), where every bank is symmetrically linked with all the others; the other is an 
incomplete market structure (Figures 2.2 and 2.3) where banks have connections only to a 
few neighbouring counterparts.  They contend that the former is more stable and may 
involve no contagion at all, while the latter is inclined to be more fragile.  This is because, 
for a given total interbank exposure, if the market is complete, each bank holds a lower 
amount of interbank assets than in the case of the incomplete market, thus lowering the risk 
that a bank default may spread to other banks (Mistrulli 2005).  To consider it in another 
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way, the contagion effect is dampened or diversified, since the symmetrical holding of 
deposits of the same value within banks can be simply cancelled out.  Figure 2.2 and Figure 
2.3 both exemplify incomplete markets, but differ in interconnectedness, another evaluation 
of the extent of contagion put forward by Mistrulli (2005).  Contagion risk is lower in 
Figure 2.3 when the market is segregated and any contagion is therefore limited to banks 
that link together.   
 
 
Figure  2.1: “Complete market structure” according to Allen and Gale (2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  2.2: “Incomplete and interconnected market structure” according to Allen 
and Gale (2000) and Mistrulli (2005) 
 
bank A bank B 
bank C bank D 
bank A bank B 
bank C bank D 
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Figure  2.3: “Incomplete and disconnected market structure” according to Allen and 
Gale (2000) and Mistrulli (2005) 
            
Modelling a money centre market structure, Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) argue that the 
contagion impact might be dramatically different even under the same structure, as it is 
subject to the hierarchical position of the initial bank that fails.   A money centre market is a 
centralized banking system (see Figure 2.4) where all other banks transact only with the 
money centre bank which thus has the highest exposure to the entire system.  Compared to 
contagion impact initialized by the distress of any other bank, breakdown of the money 
centre bank could result in paralysis of the whole system. 
Figure  2.4: “Money Centre Model” according to Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) 
 
Interbank markets in many countries (Germany, Belgium, Hungary, to name a few) are 
featured as multiple money centre market structures, and some of them have changed from 
a complete market structure.  The prevalence reflects a common trend of financial 
consolidation/integration and internationalization as far as the cross border interbank 
market is concerned.  One explanation for this trend by Mistrulli (2005) is that banks could 
bank A 
bank B bank C bank D 
bank A bank B 
bank C bank D 
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exploit the economy of scale by pooling the liquidity together.  He argues that the 
consolidation trend has a mixed impact on systemic risk, subject to the interconnectedness 
of the system. He illustrates his statement with two concentrated systems (see Figures 2.5 
and 2.6), one showing the two money centres as connected, and the other where they are 
disconnected.  
Figure  2.5: “Interconnected money centre bank market structure” according to 
Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) and Mistrulli (2005) 
 
Figure  2.6: “Disconnected money centre bank market structure” according to 
Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) and Mistrulli (2005) 
 
He concludes that the risk of systemic paralysis is lower in Figure 2.6 than in Figure 2.5 in 
the worst case scenario where the initial failure is triggered by a money centre.   This is 
because, when the two money banks are connected in Figure 2.5, the degree of 
incompleteness increases comparable to Figure 2.2.  Similarly, Figure 2.6 is comparable to 
Figure 2.3 in connectedness and incompleteness.  Therefore, it is inferred that the overall 
contagion effect of financial consolidation is not a priori determined.  
bank E 
bank F bank G bank H 
bank A 
bank B bank C bank D 
bank E 
bank F bank G bank H 
bank A 
bank B bank C bank D 
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2.3 Simulation of Contagion Risk: Robustness of 
Existing Empirical Studies 
 
A number of comparable studies (see Table 2.1) contain simulations to assess the contagion 
risk of the interbank market in different countries.  The simulation starts by assuming a 
bank, or a cluster of banks, is unable to repay their obligations in the interbank market.  The 
losses of the creditor banks are calculated.  Contagious defaults generally arise when the 
losses as a result of the exposures to the defaulting banks exceed the capital of a creditor 
bank.  As each default weakens the surviving banks, it may end up causing a chain reaction 
of defaults, resembling the fall of domino pieces.  Section 2.3.1 analyses the simulation 
results of authors in different countries.  However, due to different research focus and data 
restrictions, the simulation is performed based on a number of assumptions/conditions 
which may either bias the magnitude of contagion or cause the contagion impact to be 
incomparable across studies.  Section 2.3.2 explores various sources of bias and assesses 
their influence on the results. 
 
2.3.1 Contagion Impact across Countries 
 
On the whole, the existing studies imply that contagious defaults are quite unlikely in the 
sense that they occur in very few cases; nevertheless, if they do occur, they might have a 
considerable impact on the health of the banking sectors of many countries.  Figure 2.7 
illustrates the contagion impact simulated in these papers spread across countries.  
Comparable results are available at 40%, 60% and 100% loss given default rate (LGD).     
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Figure  2.7: Contagion across countries (in % total assets of banking system)  
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Note: 40%, 60% and 100% represent loss given default rate (LGD).  
 
In the U.S., for example, Furfine (1999) finds that the failure of the top two most significant 
banks causes, at most (LGD=100%), the failure of banks holding 4% of the assets in the 
banking sector.   If loss rates are kept to less than 60%, asset loss would never be expected 
to exceed 1% of total assets.  In contrast, investigating the German market, Upper and 
Worms (2002) discover that contagious defaults as a percentage of total banking assets 
could sour to 88% if no loss can be recovered immediately.  Even at 60% LGD, the 
contagion still affects around 70% of total industry assets.  However, they suggest that the 
result is exaggerated without considering any banking supervision, regulation and a safety 
net.  Under a perfect safety net, the maximum effect at 100% LGD drops to under 15% of 
total assets.   
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Regarding the UK interbank market, Well (2004) finds that a multiple bank failure could 
affect 42% of total assets under a money centre structure.  However, he implies that this 
scenario is rare and is most likely triggered by the assumed insolvency of a large UK-owned 
bank.  Since large UK-owned banks generally have a high credit profile, their default 
probability is generally low, thus indicating a low possibility of a knock-on systemic failure.  
Nevertheless, Well (2004) concludes that, in many cases, the contagion could result in banks 
holding over 50% of total industry assets suffering losses exceeding 10% of their Tier-1 
capital1.   Similar to the UK, Van Lelyveld, & Liedorp (2006) find that the bankruptcy of 
one Dutch bank could have a considerable impact on other banks, causing a contagious 
effect on 72% of total banking assets.  However, if the loss rate is assumed to be less than 
60%, asset loss is dramatically decreased to less than 1%.   For Belgium and Italy, the 
contagion impact is relatively lower, accounting for less than 20% of total assets.   
 
In many countries, except for Belgium and Italy in Figure 2.7, the severity of contagion 
varies substantially for different loss given default rates (LGD).  As LGD can be interpreted 
as an immediate loss rate following default, it suggests that if there is an efficient crisis 
resolution mechanism or lender of last resort, the contagion can effectively be kept at a low 
level.   
 
Moreover, three countries listed in Table 2.1 are not plotted in Figure 2.7, because the 
contagion impact in those countries is comparable only at 100% LGD.  They are: 
Switzerland (Sheldon & Maurer 1998), Hungary (Lubloy 2004) and Austria (Elsinger, Lehar 
                                                           
1 Tier 1 capital is the core measure of a bank's financial strength from a regulator's point of view. It consists 
primarily of shareholders' equity but may also include preferred stock that is irredeemable and non-cumulative 
and retained earnings. 
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& Summer 2002).   For LGD at 100%, these authors find that the extent of contagion is 
quite limited; close to zero in Hungary and Switzerland and Austria’s affected assets never 
exceed 1% of the total banking sector assets.   
 
2.3.2 Assumptions & Biases  
 
Interpretation of the severity of contagion in various studies above is subject to important 
caveats.   Data limitations at different levels and distinctive assumptions not only make the 
contagion impact incomparable across countries, but subject their results to bias in the first 
place.  This section explores the sources of bias and analyses how these aspects could cause 
an overestimation or underestimation of the contagion risk in a country’s interbank market.  
As this chapter also makes similar assumptions, the empirical result may also subject to 
similar bias at different scale. 
  
2.3.2.1 Aggregated vs. Bilateral Data 
 
As can be seen in the first column of Table 2.1, except for the US, all interbank transaction 
data are authoritative.  On a confidential basis, central banks in different countries, as 
prudential supervisors, regularly receive balance sheet data.  However, it is difficult for some 
countries such as Switzerland and the UK to determine the precise structure and 
interlinkages of the interbank market, because those reports do not disclose the bilateral 
interbank positions of each bank.  In Switzerland, such information is aggregated or one-to-
all reported, i.e. the total size of a bank’s interbank lending or borrowing in the market is 
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disclosed to the regulator, but the counterparty to which it lends to or borrows from is 
unknown.  In the UK, however, partly aggregated or one-to-some information is available, 
since banks are required to report the several largest credit exposures to some specific 
counterparts.  In an effort to perform a simulation on contagion risk, it is inevitable that 
one-to-one interbank exposures must be estimated.  The entropy maximisation (ME) 
approach, first used by Sheldon and Maurer (1998), is commonly adopted by others that 
suffer a similar problem.  However, when estimating bilateral interbank positions, the ME 
approach assumes that banks seek to maximize the dispersion of their interbank activity.  
This setup could alter the original market structure, often a concentrated money centre 
structure (see the 5th column of Table 1), towards a complete structure described in Allen 
and Gale (2000).  As Degryse and Nguyen (2004) argue, it cannot be determined a priori 
which is more contagious: a complete market structure or a money centre structure. The 
result depends on the robustness of money centre banks, as the direction of bias of using an 
ME approach is unknown.  However, authors who perform simulations on both bilateral 
exposures and aggregated data using ME find that the severity of contagion is similar for 
different datasets. 
 
Data incompleteness problems also exist in cross border exposure, as data on overseas 
banks are usually only available as an aggregate position according to different geographical 
regions; each region is thus treated as a counterpart with which banks are transacting.  This 
arrangement in Van Lelyveld, & Liedorp (2006), Wells (2004), and Degryse & Nguyen 
(2004) could overestimate the contagion risk because it is very rare that a region could 
default as a whole.  However, Van Lelyveld, & Liedorp (2006) argue that such a scenario 
should not be overlooked if taking account of the examples of the Asian crisis in 1997 and 
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the event of September 11, 2001.  Moreover, a large share of total interbank lending in 
many countries is by resident-bank to non-resident banks.  To obtain a comprehensive 
understanding of the scope for contagion within the UK banking system, implied by Wells 
(2004), bilateral exposures would have to be estimated for all banks within the global system, 
including transactions between overseas banks.  Unfortunately, as data are not readily 
available for banks that are beyond the supervision of central banks, simulation is restricted 
to domestic-resident banks, i.e. domestic-owned banks and branches or subsidiaries of 
foreign banks located within the country in the study.  This amounts to spreading large 
cross-border exposures into the domestic market, creating serious bias to the simulation 
results. 
 
2.3.2.2 Consolidated vs. Unconsolidated Exposure 
 
Nearly all studies estimate consolidated exposures between banking groups using 
unconsolidated data, selected from the balance sheets of subsidiaries of individual banking 
groups.  This could seriously bias the simulated contagion of a country, especially where it 
has a highly concentrated banking system (many are money centre structured) and the large 
banking groups usually own a significant number of subsidiaries.  Well (2004) also considers 
the importance of consolidated exposure between banking groups, since the 
entities/subsidiaries of a large group are likely to stand or fall together.  Unfortunately, no 
studies discuss the influences and direction of this bias on the contagion risk.  This chapter 
explores this issue later by simulating a pseudo-four-bank system.  The results suggest that, 
as far as average interbank exposure relative to capital is concerned, the simulation using  
 27 
 
Table  2.1: Comparison of the recent literature using matrix analysis 
Country 
Author(s) 
Interbank 
data 
Completeness 
of information 
ME 
method 
Market 
structure 
Domestic/ 
foreign & No. 
institutions 
Interbank 
credit 
exposure 
included 
Collateralized/ 
uncollateralized 
Sample 
date/period 
Fixed/ 
endogenous 
loss ratio θ 
US 
Furfine (1999) 
Public 
available 
Bilateral 
(one-to-one) 
No Unspecified 719 Domestic  Deposits Uncollateralized 
Daily 
Feb.-Mar. 1998 
A range of 
fixed 
Switzerland 
Sheldon & Maurer 
(1998) 
Authoritative 
Aggregated 
(one-to-all) 
Yes Unspecified 576 Domestic Deposits Both 1987-1985 One fixed 
Germany 
Upper & Worms 
(2002) 
Authoritative 
Partly 
Aggregated 
(one-to-some) 
Yes Money centre 
3246 including 
foreign branches 
Deposits Both Dec. 1998 
A range of 
fixed 
Sweden 
Blavarg and 
Nimander (2002) 
Authoritative Bilateral No Money centre 
108 including 
foreign branches 
FX settlement, 
Deposits, 
Securities, 
Derivatives 
Uncollateralised 
Sep. 1999-Sep. 
2001 
A range of 
fixed 
Austria 
 Elsinger, Lehar & 
Summer (2002) 
Authoritative 
Partly 
Aggregated 
Yes Money centre 881 Domestic Unspecified Unspecified Sep 2002 Endogenous 
Denmark 
Van Lelyveld, & 
Liedorp (2006) 
Authoritative 
Partly 
Aggregated 
Yes 
Incomplete less 
connected 
88+5 Foreign 
groups 
Deposits Uncollateralized Dec. 2002 
A range of 
fixed 
UK 
Wells (2004) 
Authoritative 
Partly 
Aggregated 
Yes Money centre 
27+5 Foreign 
groups 
Deposits Uncollateralized 31 Dec. 2000 
A range of 
fixed 
Belgium 
Degryse & 
Nguyen 
(2004) 
Authoritative 
Partly 
Aggregated 
Yes 
Form complete 
market to money 
centre 
65+2 Foreign 
groups 
Deposits Both 
Dec. 1992- 
Dec. 2002 
Partly 
Endogenous 
Hungary  
Lubloy (2004) 
Authoritative Bilateral No 
Moderately 
concentrated 
39 Domestic Deposits Uncollateralized 
l50 days in 
2003 
One fixed 
Italy 
Mistrulli (2005) 
Authoritative 
Bilateral & 
Aggregated 
Yes 
Gradually 
converge to 
money centre 
structure 
Domestic 
(No. Unknown) 
Deposits, 
Repo 
Both 1990-2003 Fixed θ 
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consolidated reporting is more contagious than that using unconsolidated reporting.  
However, if the contagion is measured by assets affected in terms of a percentage of total 
industry assets, it is not evident, depending on the capital adequacy of existing banks 
following the initial default.   
 
2.3.2.3 Scope of Interbank Transactions 
 
It can be seen from Table 2.1 that most authors include only interbank loans/deposits as 
interbank credit exposure.  This is because other interbank transactions, including securities, 
repos, FX settlements and off-balance-sheet instruments such as over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives, are either not included in the balance sheet reporting (e.g. Denmark) or not 
reported by the type of counterparty (e.g. U.S.).  Exclusion of these exposures may 
underestimate the contagion risk of a particular country.  However, authors like Wells (2004) 
and Furfine (1999) defend that excluded items such as repos and OTC derivatives are either 
collateralized or small in size relative to on-balance items.  Moreover, Wells (2004) suggests 
that not all the excluded exposures are to other banks and the absence of information on 
other types of exposure is mitigated by various collateral netting agreements. 
 
2.3.2.4 Sample Dates and Period 
 
Table 2.1 also lists the sample date/period that is investigated in the respective studies.  Not 
all papers take an evolutionary view of the interbank market.  Studies such as those 
examining Germany, Austria and Denmark assess the contagion risk based on a fixed-date 
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balance sheet report.  It is not clear, therefore, whether the contagion impact has been 
changing over the previous period.  Besides, Van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) imply that 
studies that are based on the December report are subject to the end-of-year effect.  This 
means that reported exposures at this date are lower compared with the rest of the year. 
 
2.3.2.5 Contagion Sources and Definitions 
 
Nearly all studies assume the contagion is triggered by the failure of a single bank in the 
system due to some exogenous shock, and that the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks, 
which trigger contagion, is uniform among banks and does not change over time.  It is a 
relatively strong assumption, since completely idiosyncratic shocks are rare.  As explained in 
section 2.1.1 on sources of contagion, if the interbank market is exposed to common shock 
driven by macroeconomic impulses, it is more likely that several banks will be 
simultaneously affected and its influence on the whole system is obviously greater than 
individual bank failure.  Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2002) is the only study that considers 
macroeconomic impulses.  However, idiosyncratic failures did occur in many countries, e.g. 
the Barings Bank collapse of 1995, and potential contagion feared by the market still 
warrants the regulators to act as lenders of last resort.  Latest examples include the British 
bank Northern Rock, for which the Bank of England arranged an emergency loan facility in 
2007 to support its short-term liquidity problems, allegedly as a result of over-exposure to 
the failing US sub-prime mortgage market.  Similarly, a government sponsored bail-out in 
2008 was arranged for the investment bank Bear Stearns due to a panic run on its short-
maturity bonds (Asset Backed Commercial Paper) by which the bank is heavily financed.  
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Furthermore, the assumption of idiosyncratic shocks has a policy implication that it could 
help to identify which banks are crucial to the stability of the entire system.   
 
Apart from the sources of contagion, the existing studies vary in their definition of 
contagion, or the condition of contagious default.  As mentioned previously, most studies 
regard the occurrence of contagion as when the actual/immediate loss of a bank’s interbank 
credit exceeds the bank’s Tier-1 capital.  Blavarg and Nimander (2002) apply the definition 
that the Tier 1 capital (capital ratio) of the bank falling below the required level of 4% is 
assumed to constitute a default.  Therefore, the latter definition is more prudent in assessing 
contagion risk, as the contagious default occurs more easily.  Elsinger, Lehar and Summer 
(2002), however, define contagious insolvency as being the case when income received from 
other banks, plus the income position of non-interbank activities, minus the bank's own 
interbank liabilities, becomes negative.  However, since they defer from other studies in the 
source of contagion, it is not possible to appraise whether their definition of contagion is 
more prudent.  Moreover, the bias caused by different definitions cannot be judged until a 
benchmark definition is agreed to be applicable to all the banks in a country. 
2.3.2.6 Loss Given Default Rate (LGD) 
 
A. Choice of LGD 
Some authors in Table 2.1 assess contagion at only 100% LGD while many others apply a 
range of LGD.  The former assumes the largest immediate loss rate mainly because the 
magnitude of contagion in Switzerland and Hungary is very limited and a stress test gives a 
prudent picture of the worst possible scenario.  However, this assumption ignores 
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mitigation factors such as a safety net (Sheldon & Maurer 1998), market expectations 
(Lubloy 2004), and banks’ reaction to shocks (Mistrulli 2005).  In reality, argued by these 
authors, both banks and regulators could respond to the shock by providing various crisis 
warning or crisis management schemes.   
 
Other factors such as netting agreements and seniority relative to other claims can also 
affect immediate loss and, in turn, affect the simulation result.  In a netting agreement, 
default interbank loans are netted off from the interbank liability of the same counterpart, 
thus decreasing the actual incurred loss.  In the event of bankruptcy, if interbank loans are 
senior to other claims, the immediate loss could be less than otherwise, i.e. subordinate in 
claim order.  The impact of these two factors, as well as the efficiency of response, could be 
reflected in the simulation by applying a range of LGD rates. 
 
Last but not least, the choice of LGD rates changes over time. For example, Mistrulli (2005) 
suggests that financial consolidation, by leading to the creation of larger and more 
diversified banks, may lower the probability of banks defaulting. 
 
B. Fixed vs. Endogenised LGD  
 
Although a range of fixed LGD reflects the common mitigation factors of banks, as 
explained in the previous section, Mistrulli (2005) notes that it has the drawback of 
assuming that each bank faces similar constraints when raising capital, which is in contrast 
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with theories on bank-lending channels.   However, he also points out that it is difficult to 
introduce banks’ heterogeneity into the contagion mechanism since banks’ failures are rarely 
observed empirically.  For that reason, most studies select common LGD rates for all banks, 
according to historical cases of bank failure and existing literature.  For example, based on 
previous studies, Furfine (1999) focuses on two LGD, 40% and 5%.  According to James 
(1991), in the middle of the 1980s in the U.S. the average value LGD was 30% of the book 
value of the banks’ assets, and an additional 10% covered the administrative costs. Kaufman 
(1994) estimates a 5% LGD based on the failure of Continental Illinois.  Upper and Worms 
(2002) refer to an article in the Financial Times which mentions that the preliminary LGD 
when the BCCI went bankrupt in 1991 was assumed by creditors to be 90%.   
 
Nevertheless, there are two studies that endogenize the loss rates.  Degryse & Nguyen 
(2004) depend upon the LGD of all the other banks to which a given bank is linked in 
order to construct its LGD.  However, the endogenization is partly possible because it 
assumes an exogenous LGD on assets other than interbank loans and it assigns a fixed 60% 
LGD on the first domino.  More interestingly, the simulation results suggest that the 
magnitude of contagion is broadly similar to the results of simulations that assume a fixed 
LGD for all assets.    In another article, Elsinger, Lehar & Summer (2002), fully endogenize 
the LGD rate.  However, as their assumptions of contagion source and contagion 
mechanism are generally different from other papers, it is not approriate to interchange 
their method with others and assess the difference when the LGD is endogenized. 
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2.4 Simulation Using Consolidated Data of UK Banks 
2.4.1 Definitions and Assumptions 
 
The simulation begins by assuming that a bank, or a cluster of banks, fails due to some 
exogenous shock and is unable to pay its interbank obligations.  The losses are then 
calculated at the creditor banks from whom the first-default bank has borrowed.  A fixed 
LGD rate is set a priori to measure the actual loss.  Contagion occurs if the actual loss 
exceeds the Tier-1 capital of a creditor.  Although the contagion mechanism presented 
below allows any number of banks to trigger contagion, the simulation begins with an 
individual bank in order to compare with existing studies that let each bank fail sequentially 
(regarded as one scenario).    Formally, the contagion condition is expressed as  
                                   iij
cx ≥θ                                                                                      ( 2.1) 
where θ is the pre-set loss rate, χij denotes a creditor bank I’s interbank lending exposure to 
a borrowing bank J, and ci is bank I’s Tier-1 capital.  Tier-1 capital is defined as 
shareholders’ equity.  
 
For each scenario, if no banks default following the initial failure (i.e. the contagion 
condition is not satisfied), it is deemed that there is no contagion risk for the chosen trigger 
bank.  However, if at least one bank is insolvent as a result of the loss realized on its 
interbank claim, the scenario experiences the first round of contagion.  The first round may 
involve more than one bank.  In that case, a second round of contagion will occur if the 
combined actual losses on the exposure to the defaulting banks exceed the Tier-1 capital of 
existing banks.  The process is iterative in calculating the credit losses and comparing them 
 34 
 
with the capital.  Therefore, a general form of the contagion condition can be used to take 
account of N number of defaulting banks: 
ijij
N
j cx ≥∑ θϕ                                                                                     ( 2.2) 
 
where jϕ  is a dummy variable that equals 0 if bank j has survived and 1 if it goes bankrupt 
and other parameters are interpreted consistent with condition (2.1).   
 
Based on Literature Review and existing empirical studies in section 2.2 and section 2.3.2 
above, the simulation of this study makes a number of other assumptions as follows: 
(i) Contagion is triggered by an exogenous idiosyncratic shock and no other 
sources of contagion exist; 
(ii) The distribution of idiosyncratic shocks, which trigger contagion, is uniform 
among banks and does not change over time; 
(iii) Entities/subsidiaries of a large group stand or go bankrupt together;   
(iv) Contagious default occurs when the actual/immediate loss of a bank’s interbank 
credit exceeds the bank’s Tier-1 capital; 
(v) No netting agreements apply when calculating the loss on the exposure to the 
default bank; 
(vi) Interbank loans are senior to other claims on the capital of the default bank; 
(vii) LGD rates less than 100% are able to reflect the mitigation factors of a safety 
net, market expectation and banks’ reaction to shocks at different levels. 
(viii) There is no heterogeneity for individual banks in the contagion mechanism. 
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2.4.2 Data Description 
 
Interbank loan/deposit data are chosen from the annual reports of 16 major UK-owned 
banks which release consolidated balance sheets.  According to asset size, banks are 
categorized into large, mid-sized, and small banks.  Therefore, the sample contains six large 
banks, whose assets are over £100 billion; six mid-sized banks, whose assets are between 
£10 billion and £100 billion, and four small banks, whose assets are below £10 billion.   
    
As the UK banking system is highly concentrated, the 16 banks cover around 71% of the 
total interbank loans of UK-owned banks in 2004, calculated from the data published by 
Bank of England.  The rest of the domestic banks are all small banks and are not included 
in the sample because almost all of them do not release their balance sheets to the public.  
Moreover, the individual failure of these small banks is not considered to be likely to have a 
sizable impact in terms of contagion2.  In addition, for branches or subsidiaries of foreign-
owned banks located within the United Kingdom, the Bank of England provides aggregated 
data of the outstanding interbank deposits/loans.  The information available is divided into 
five regions, i.e. other EU, America, Japan, Other developed and Other countries (the rest 
of the world).  The size and share of each region in terms of total interbank loans and 
deposits are given in Table 2.4. 
 
                                                           
2 The joint default of small banks may cause contagion.  However, as the total interbank assets of the small banks exceed 
the combined interbank assets of many largest banks, the joint default amounts to assuming a common macroeconomic 
shock to all banks.  Hence, instead of including the aggregate data of small banks, the chapter simulates the common 
shock later by assuming that most of the interbank assets of a bank turn out to be defective.  The last section will examine 
this scenario from 2002 to 2004. 
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Table  2.2: UK interbank loans and deposits in December, 2004 
Bank Group 
Interbank Assets Interbank Liabilities 
Billion 
GBP 
% of 
Total 
Billion 
GBP 
% of Total 
UK-owned banks  
Other EU  
American  
Japanese  
Other developed 
Other 
327.139 
58.373 
33.457 
8.359 
55.588 
8.896 
66.52% 
11.87% 
6.80% 
1.70% 
11.30% 
1.81% 
333.961 
68.436 
24.928 
6.344 
58.926 
2.333 
67.80% 
13.89% 
5.06% 
1.29% 
11.96% 
0.47% 
Total 491.818 100% 492.561 100% 
Source: Bank of England. 
The interbank information in the balance sheets from both the individual banks and the 
central banks are aggregated in nature.  In order to run the simulation, the bilateral position 
xij needs to be estimated.  Given the 16 UK-owned banks and an aggregate position for 
foreign banks of five regions, this can estimate a 21 by 21 matrix of interbank exposures of 
money market loans and deposits. 
 
2.4.3 Estimating Bilateral Lending Exposure— Entropy 
Maximization 
 
To identify the contagion process in section 4.1, the bilateral exposure xijs should be 
estimated in equation (2.2), based on the aggregated information of interbank assets and 
liabilities.  The method used is entropy maximization, first applied by Sheldon and Maurer 
(1998), who have the similar data limitations.  The ME approach can be illustrated by the 
following N×N matrix denoting the interbank position between N banks: 

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xij represents the interbank assets of bank J owned by bank I .  ai and lj are the sum of each 
row and column, representing the aggregate claims/liabilities of bank I against all other 
banks.   
with ∑
=
=
N
j
iij ax
1
∑
=
=
N
i
jij lx
1
                                                                                          ( 2.3)     
 
Both ai and lj can be obtained from the individual bank’s balance sheet, but xij is not 
observable as no information is revealed on the specific counterparts with which each bank 
is transacting. 
 
In order to estimate xij,, it is necessary to first assume the distribution of the bilateral 
exposures. The ME approach starts with the assumption that banks seek to maximize the 
dispersion of their interbank activity, which means each bank symmetrically holds claims on 
all other banks in the system.  In the terminology of information theory from which ME 
originates, it amounts to maximizing the entropy of the matrix.  This assumption may 
introduce bias to the simulation result and, as discussed earlier, the direction of bias could 
be mixed.  Given no better choice for the method, this paper follows Sheldon and Maurer 
(1998) and many others who deal with aggregated data.    
 
∑ ∑ == 1ji la                                                                         ( 2.4) 
 
By normalizing a’s and l’s as in equation (2.4), the solution is given by equation (2.5) 3:  
                                                           
3 Refer to Sheldon and Maurer (1998), Upper and Worms (2002) and the Appendix in Wells (2004) on how 
the equation is derived. 
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jiij lax ×=                                                                            ( 2.5) 
 
Equation (2.5) implies that the amount that bank I lends to bank J depends on the share of 
bank I’s total lending to the market and the share of bank J’s total borrowing from the 
market.  The approach is sensible because, in reality, large banks normally have a large 
volume of interbank transactions with their large-sized counterparts.  Equation (2.5) also 
suggests that the ME approach produces a “complete market structure” in that any bank, 
even borrowing/lending with a small size, will spread their transactions across all banks in 
the system, i.e. maximisation dispersion.  In reality, however, the approach rules out 
relationship banking, in which banks normally have a few fixed clients with which to 
transact. 
 
On the main diagonals of the matrix, where I=J, xij’s represent their exposure to themselves.  
On one hand, it is an appealing result for large banks because the aggregate interbank 
loans/deposits (represented by the marginal a’s and l’s) contain intra-group transactions4.  
Similarly, for foreign groups, the xij’s on the main diagonal denote interbank transactions 
between foreign banks located in the UK.  On the other hand, for independent small or 
mid-sized banks, this might be an unappealing feature because they do not lend to or 
borrow from themselves.  A restriction that sets those xij’s to zero has to be imposed on 
some of the xij’s that represent ten small and mid-sized banks.  Hence, the matrix X
0 is 
reconstructed with elements expressed as: 
 
                                                           
4 See the “Notes to the Accounts” of the consolidated balance sheet of each bank. 
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

 −∈=∀
=
otherwisela
bankssizedmidsmallji
x
ji
ij
,
&00                                                  ( 2.6) 
 
where the expression of 0ijx ’s for all entries are unchanged from equation (2.6) except for 
those small and mid-sized banks.   
 
Since the matrix is now inconsistent with the adding up constraints, i.e. ai’s and lj’s,  a 
minimization problem needs to be solved to find a new matrix X*  that gets as close to the 
matrix X0 as possible, given the constraints.  In information theory, this is termed as cross-
entropy minimisation.  This problem can be formally written as follows:   
 
∑∑
= =







N
i
N
j ij
ij
ij
x
x
x
1 1
0
*
* lnmin  
∑∑
==
==
N
i
jij
N
j
iij lxaxtoSubject
1
*
1
*                                        ( 2.7) 
 
with the convention that 0* =ijx , and only if, 0
0
=ijx , and 0ln(0/0)≡0.  This matrix is 
calculated by the RAS algorithm.  Although Blien and Graef (1991) and Censor and Zenios 
(1997) have an exclusive explanation on the RAS,   Wells (2004) provides a  simple 
summary of how the algorithm works, given the estimate matrix X0, as follows: 
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Step 1 (row scaling): 
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Step 2 (column scaling): 
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U
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ij
U
ij
x
l
wherexx σσ  
Step 3: 1+←UU , and return to step 1. 
 
The new matrix X* , estimated from the iteration process, is regarded as a benchmark model, 
a proxy of the complete market structure to be compared later with other market structure 
simulations.  
 
2.4.4 Simulation, Structures & Results  
 
This section presents the scope of contagion in the UK interbank market, simulated 
through the contagion mechanism in section 4.1 and relying on the bilateral exposure 
estimated in section 4.4.  As the ME approach used to estimate the bilateral exposure 
assumes a complete market structure, the section performs a number of sensitivity analyses 
or places additional restrictions upon the benchmark structure in order to take account of 
other structures/scenarios.  Changes of magnitude in contagion are assessed in various 
scenarios including intensive transactions within the same bank groups, money centre 
structure and increasing levels of internationalization.  
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2.4.5.1 Complete Market Structure 
 
Table 2.5 presents the simulation results under the benchmark complete market structure.  
The magnitude of contagion is analysed in several ways: cases of contagion out of total 
scenarios, number of contagious banks, number of failing banks at each round of contagion 
and assets affected by percentage of total industry assets.  The result suggests a wide scale 
contagion at 100% and 80% LGD, leading to contagious default of 17 banks (excl. the 
triggering bank), amounting to 89.48% of total assets in the banking sector.  The spill-over 
effect could happen in four out of a total of twenty-one cases.  In particular, the triggering 
banks appear to be either one of the two largest domestic banks or one of the largest 
foreign groups, one from Other EU countries, the other from Other Developed countries.  
These four might be the biggest borrowers from the market.  In contrast, when the LGD is 
lowered to 60%, only one case out of 21 would trigger contagion and that case causes the 
default of nine banks holding 69.45% of total assets. No contagion is found under 40% 
LGD. 
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Table  2.3: Magnitude of contagion under benchmark structure 
 
LGD 
Cases of 
contagion 
(out of 
21) 
Triggering 
bank 
No. of banks failed at each round of contagion 
(excluding the initial failure) 
1st 
round 
2nd 
round 
3rd 
round 
4th 
round Total Assets% 
100 4 
Large bank 1 1 9 7 0 17 
89.48% 
Large bank 2 1 9 7 0 17 
Other EU 1 12 4 0 17 
Other 
Developed 
6 10 1 0 17 
80 4 
Large bank 1 1 6 9 1 17 
89.48% 
Large bank 2 1 6 8 2 17 
Other EU 1 7 8 1 17 
Other 
Developed 
4 10 2 1 17 
60 1 Other EU 5 3 1 0 9 69.45% 
40 0 - - - - - - - 
 
 
The interpretation of the round of contagion is different from some of the existing studies, 
as they conclude that the more rounds involved in the contagion, the worse the magnitude.  
Their conclusions are based on a large sample of data (e.g. 3,246 banks in Germany) which 
could generate up to eight rounds in a simulation.  In this case, however, the total sample is 
limited and the simulation generates at most four rounds of contagion.  Here, the number 
of rounds is regarded as the speed of transmitting—under the same scenario, the more 
rounds, the slower the contagion is to transmit and the more favourable the scenario for 
regulators to manage crises.  Moreover, the number of banks failing at each round of 
contagion also tells the speed.  For example, at 100% LGD, although the total number of 
banks failing in the end stays the same, the contagion triggered by banks from Other 
Developed results in a faster transmission than other scenarios, because banks that default 
in the first round amount to six compared to one in others.  
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2.4.5.2 Increasing Weights to Intra-group Exposure 
 
As the complete market structure maximizes the dispersion of interbank lending, it neglects 
the fact that lending/borrowing could be largely resolved within the same bank group.  
Thus, bias could be created in the contagion simulation.  Using unconsolidated data, Wells 
(2004) tackles this problem through forming a new initial estimate of the interbank structure.  
If a bank belongs to banking group I, the elements are: 
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                                               ( 2.8) 
 
He introduces δ  to determine the additional weight given to intra-group lending.  One 
extreme, δ  = 0, yields the benchmark case. At the other extreme, δ  = 1, a bank that 
belongs to a larger group is assumed to borrow and lend only with other members of the 
same group. 
 
Inspired by Wells, this chapter alters equation (2.8) to suit the consolidated data as below in 
equation (2.9).  The common nature of equation (2.8) and (2.9) is that, although the 
distribution of funds in the market has been altered, the total exposure of interbank market 
remains unchanged, ∑ = 1ijx .     
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In the new structure, δ  still determines the additional weight given to intra-group lending.  
Self-exposures of banking group A (here, four large banks) are assigned with more weights 
)1( δ+ , while the rest of the elements ( Aji ∉= ) are weighted down to scale.  
Since ia)1( δ+  is between zero and one, the upper and lower bound forδ  can be derived5.  
Particularly, if δ =0, it still yields the benchmark model.      
 
The change of contagion impact in increasing intra-group transactions is presented in Table 
2.6.  The first column lists the value of δ in ascending order, indicating increasing weights 
assigned to intragroup activities.  At each row of a differentδ , the magnitude of contagion 
is measured by the cases of contagion, the number of failing banks at each round of 
contagion, the total number of contagious banks excluding the initial bank and their assets 
according to a percentage of total industry assets.  All results are based on the worst case 
scenario (fast transmission) and are presented at 100% LGD.   
 
                                                           
5 Choosing the highest ai, the upper boundary level of δ  in this paper is 2.2791. 
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Table  2.4: Increasing weight to intragroup exposure (Worst Case Scenario, 
LGD=100%) 
 
δ 
Cases of 
contagion 
(out of 21 
cases) 
Number of failing banks at each round of contagion 
(excluding the initial failure) 
Banks failed 
(excl. initial 
failure) 
1st 
round 
2nd 
round 
3rd 
round 
4th 
round 
5th 
round 
Total Assets % 
-0.5 4 1 7 8 1 0 17 89.96% 
0.1 4 1 5 8 2 1 17 89.96% 
0.5 4 1 5 7 3 0 16 89.88% 
1 2 1 4 3 1 0 9 69.45% 
1.4 1 1 3 3 1 0 8 63.73% 
1.7 1 1 3 2 0 0 6 57.29% 
1.9
4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 
 
 
Table 2.6 implies that a rise in δ  from -0.5 to 1.94 increasingly mitigates the magnitude of 
contagion.  The cases of contagion are reduced from 4 to 0; total contagious banks are 
reduced from 17 holding 89.96% of total assets to no evidence of contagion.  For δ ’s 
equalling -0.5, 0.1 where there are all four cases out of 21, Table 2.6 suggests that the speed 
of contagion slows from the second round, with the number of defaulting banks reducing 
from seven banks ( 5.0−=δ ) to five banks ( 1.0=δ ).   
 
However, it is worth noticing that this sensitivity analysis cannot be compared with a 
benchmark structure in the way that the money centre model can in the next section.  This 
is because, by applying equation (9), the restrictions of the matrix have been changed.  The 
amount of aggregate interbank assets (ai’s) and liabilities (lj’s) for each bank diverges from 
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the sample data, although the total exposure ( ∑ ia or ∑ jl ) remains the same.  
Nevertheless, as long as the relative scale for each restriction does not vary much, the 
comparison can be made with the benchmark ( 0=δ ) in terms of assessing contagion risk 
other than in the year 2004. 
 
2.4.5.3 Multiple Money Centre Structure  
 
The multiple money centre structure assumes a two-tier hierarchical lending system 
illustrated in Table 2.7.  The capital letters are short forms of “Small banks” (S), “Mid-sized 
banks” (M), “Large banks” (L) and “Foreign banks” (F).  It can be seen in the table that 
intersect values between S and S, M and M, S and M, S and F are zero.  This means that, at 
the bottom level of the hierarchical structure, small and mid-sized banks transact only with 
large banks and conduct no activities among themselves or with foreign banks6.  All other 
cells in the table are filled with 1s, representing transactions between large banks and all 
banks.  Therefore, at the top level of the hierarchical structure, large banks serve as money 
centres in the system.   
 
                                                           
6  A pure money centre structure is constructed to be compared with the complete market structure in 
contagion analysis.  However, the assumption may be slightly divergent from the real market where small and 
mid-sized banks do transact with each other.  Equation (9) allows this feature to be captured by weighting the 
shares of transactions of small banks.  Higher weights are assigned to the transactions of small banks with 
large banks while lower shares represent transactions among small banks.   
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Table  2.5: Matrix of money centre structure 
 
  S M L F 
 S 0 0 1 0 
M 0 0 1 0 
L 1 1 1 1 
F 0 0 1 1 
 
Note: S, M, L, F denote small, mid-sized, large and foreign-owned banks respectively.  “1” and “0” means 
transaction and no-transaction between two banks.   
 
Technically, a money centre matrix is constructed by placing an extra zero into the initial 
matrix X0 as follows: 
 
=
0
ijx  
bankssizedmidsmallji −∈=∀ &0  
banksrgelajandbankssmalli ∉∈∀0  
banksrgelajandbankssizedmidi ∉−∈∀0                                 ( 2.10) 
otherwisela ji ,  
 
 
Then, the RAS algorithm is applied again to minimise the distance between X0 and X* (refer 
to equation 2.7).  The estimated elements in X*   will go through the contagion mechanism.    
 
Table 2.8 presents the magnitude of contagion under a money centre structure, which can 
be compared with the benchmark complete market structure.  In the worst case scenario, 
the two structures are equivalent in the total number of contagious banks, 17 banks at both 
100% and 80% LGD, nine banks and zero banks respectively for 60% and 40% LGD.   
However, in general, it is hard to judge whether the complete structure or money centre 
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structure is more contagious from the simulation test.  On the one hand, the average 
number of total banks affected under the money centre structure is less than the complete 
market structure (e.g., 15 banks for two scenarios under a money centre structure vs. 17 for 
all scenarios under a complete market structure at LGD=100% and 80%).  This suggests a 
lower possibility of severe contagion in a money centre model.  On the other hand, a 
money centre structure appears to be slightly more contagious in terms of cases of 
contagion.  At LGD=60%, one more scenario triggered by banks owned by other 
developed countries could cause contagion under a money centre structure.   
 
Table  2.6: Magnitude of contagion under a money centre structure 
LGD 
Cases of 
contagion 
(out of 
22) 
Scenario 
No. of failing banks at each round of contagion 
(excl. the initial failure) 
1st 
round 
2nd 
round 
3rd 
round 
4th 
round 
5th 
round 
Total 
100 4 
Large bank 1 1 7 7 0 - 15 
Large bank 2 3 6 6 2 - 17 
Other EU 1 6 8 2 - 17 
Other 
Developed 
4 7 6 0 - 17 
80 4 
Large bank 1 1 6 8 0 - 15 
Large bank 2 1 7 6 2 - 16 
Other EU 1 5 5 6 - 17 
Other 
Developed 
3 5 3 6 - 17 
60 2 
Other EU 1 2 3 1 0 7 
Other 
Developed 
1 1 3 3 1 9 
40 0 - - - - - - - 
 
When comparing the number of banks at each round of contagion in both models, it seems 
that the money centre model is slower in transmission speed, as more banks fail in the 3rd 
round rather than in the 2nd round in the benchmark model.  This is because the money 
centre structure assumes no transactions between small or mid-sized banks and foreign 
banks; it is assumed that transactions only occur with money centre banks.  When the 
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triggering banks are foreign bank groups, the contagion will not be transmitted quickly until 
a money centre bank defaults.   
 
2.4.5.4 Increasing Weights to “Foreign Exposures”  
 
According to the Bank of England and Wells (2004), 75% of total interbank lending 
consists of transactions between UK resident banks and non resident banks.  However, due 
to data limitation, Wells (2004) simulates contagion of UK resident banks using interbank 
lending data containing a large share of cross-border exposure.  As discussed earlier in 
section 3.2.1, this amounts to spreading large cross-border exposures into the domestic 
market, creating a serious bias in the simulation results. 
 
Although restricted by the same data problem, this chapter is able to fix the bias by 
increasing the proportion of interbank exposure of domestically owned banks with foreign-
owned banks.  The process can also be regarded as a sensitivity analysis in order to assess 
the scope of contagion in increasing internationalization.  As illustrated in Table 2.9 below, 
the cells representing bilateral exposures xij of banks of different types vary in shading.  The 
darkly shaded parts represent more weights assigned to all exposures to foreign banks 
(denoted by “H”) while other squares in lighter shading mean transactions are weighted 
down to scale.  
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Table  2.7: Matrix of for internationalization analysis 
  S M L F 
 S     
M    I 
L     
F  I   
Note: S, M, L, F denote small, mid-sized, large and foreign-owned banks respectively. The darkly 
shaded squares represents more weights assigned to transactions with foreign banks, while the 
lighter shaded squares mean transactions are weighted down to scale.  
 
Formally, Table 2.9 can be formulated as follows: 
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where µ  denotes the additional weight given to transactions with foreign banks.  One 
extreme, µ = 0, yields the benchmark case. At the other extreme, µ = 1, no lending is 
made domestically, all transactions take place with foreign banks.  Equation (2.11) is an 
application of Wells’ equation (2.8) in a different way.   
 
The test is based on two initial structures: the benchmark structure and the money centre 
structure; hypotheses can be made before the simulation.  Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11 plot 
the two structures showing increased levels of internationalization which are denoted by 
bold arrows.    Based on the benchmark complete market structure in Figure 2.10, the scope 
of contagion will increase with internationalization, because the market becomes more 
consolidated with foreign banks than previously. 
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Figure  2.8: Increasing weights to “foreign exposure” in benchmark structure 
 
Note: S, M, L, F denote small, mid-sized, large and foreign-owned banks respectively. Bold arrows denote 
intensive transactions, while the dashed arrows denote fewer transactions. 
 
However, based on the money centre structure in Figure 2.11, raising the level of 
internationalization will decrease the severity of contagion, because the exposure levels of 
the money centre banks become more diversified. 
 
Figure  2.9: Increasing weights to “foreign exposure” in a money centre structure 
 
Note: S, M, L, F denote small, mid-sized, large and foreign-owned banks respectively.  Bold arrows denote 
intensive transactions, while the dashed arrows denote fewer transactions. 
 
 
The results of the sensitivity test are displayed in the following two tables.  Generally, they 
are consistent with the two hypotheses stated above.  Table 2.10 and Table 2.11 are 
respectively based on the complete market structure and the money centre structure under 
 
 
L F 
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L F 
M S 
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worst case scenarios at 100% LGD level.  The magnitudes of contagion are measured for 
µ  ranging from 0 to 1, representing increasing levels of internationalization.   
Table  2.8: Increasing internationalization in a benchmark structure (Worst Case 
Scenario, LGD=100%) 
µ  
Cases of 
contagion 
(out of 21 
cases) 
Number of failing banks at each round of 
contagion (excluding the initial failure) 
Banks 
failing (incl. 
initial 
failure) 
1st 
round 
2nd 
round 
3rd 
round 
4th 
round 
Total Assets% 
0 4 4 10 2 1 17 86.0345% 
0.2 4 4 4 8 1 17 86.0345% 
0.4 3 4 3 9 1 17 86.0345% 
0.6 3 5 8 4 0 17 86.0345% 
0.8 4 9 5 3 0 17 86.0345% 
1 4 11 4 2 0 17 86.0345% 
 
Table 9 suggests that, in general, the contagion impact does not change significantly for 
different µ .  The total number of contagious banks remains the same and so does the same 
share of total banking assets.  However, when µ  arises, an increasing number of banks 
default at the first round of contagion.  This implies that the speed of contagion increases 
when the market evolves to become concentrated on foreign banks which function as 
money centres.  Based on the money centre structure, Table 7 indicates a decrease in the 
magnitude of contagion, though not significantly.  The total number of bank failures, 
excluding the initial collapse, fall from 17 to nine.  Assets affected as a percentage of the 
total diminish from around 95% to 84%.     
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Table  2.9: Increasing internationalization in the money centre structure (Worst Case 
Scenario, LGD=100%) 
 
µ  
Cases of 
contagion 
(out of 21 
cases) 
Number of failing banks at each round of 
contagion (excluding the initial failure) 
Banks 
failing (incl. 
initial 
failure) 
1st 
round 
2nd 
round 
3rd 
round 
4th 
round 
Total Assets% 
0 4 3 5 3 6 17 94.9962% 
0.2 4 3 5 3 5 16 89.8773% 
0.4 4 2 3 5 1 11 84.9685% 
0.6 3 3 4 2 1 10 84.2440% 
0.8 4 4 5 0 0 9 84.2436% 
1 4 5 4 0 0 9 84.2436% 
 
 
2.4.5 Consolidated vs. Unconsolidated Exposure: a Four-Bank 
Illustration 
 
Simulation results in the previous sections demonstrate wide scale contagion in the 2004 
UK interbank market.  At 100% LGD of benchmark structure, the failure of a large 
domestic bank or a foreign bank group could cause contagious default of banks holding 
89.48% of total industry assets.  However, the magnitude is four times higher than that in 
the benchmark structure of Wells (2004), in which only 25.25% assets are affected.   
As discussed earlier, the consolidated data could be the major source of the divergence as 
Wells (2004) uses unconsolidated data to estimate the consolidated contagion impact.  
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According to International Accounting Standards rule 27 (IAS 27), consolidated financial 
statements present financial information about a parent’s undertakings and its subsidiary 
undertakings as a single economic unit, while unconsolidated statements present them as 
separate units.  The differences in interbank exposure between consolidated and 
unconsolidated reporting are illustrated in a pseudo-four-bank interbank system.  Figures 
2.8 and Figure 2.9 represent two interbank markets comprising the same bank entities.  
Bank A and bank B are the only two subsidiaries under the group AB while bank C and 
bank D are independent institutions7.  However, group AB is reported in an unconsolidated 
way in Figure 2.8 and is regarded as two separate entities, while it is reported as one in 
Figure 2.9.  It assumes that the bilateral interbank exposure of and between the four banks 
is known and denoted by lower case letters.  Both interbank markets are equalized in 
aggregate liquidity demand and cash excess, i.e. the total volume of interbank transactions 
e+f+g+h+i+j+k+l+m+n+o+p is same for Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9.   
Figure  2.10: Interbank positions of unconsolidated exposure 
 
  
 
                                                           
7 Consolidated and unconsolidated statements, according to accounting standards, only refer to the financial 
statement of the bank group (bank C and bank D combined).  Independent institutions (bank C and bank D) 
that neither govern nor are controlled by another entity do not have to show their financial statements in 
several ways. 
e 
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i 
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g      h 
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p 
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Figure  2.11: Interbank positions of consolidated exposure 
 
Most studies use unconsolidated balance sheets, which imply in Figure 2.10 that they regard 
the transactions of bank A and bank B with other banks as separate.   However, the 
simulation in this chapter, using consolidated balance sheets, regards all the transactions of 
the group as being carried out by a single equivalent company.  Thus, the exposure of bank 
A and bank B to bank C in Figure 2.10 is “m” and “g” respectively, while the exposure of 
the bank group AB to bank C is “m+g” in Figure 2.11.    It can also be seen that the 
interbank structure using unconsolidated data is more complete, while the structure using 
consolidated data is more concentrated.  It is clear from a simple simulation which is more 
contagious in magnitude.   The assets and Tier-1 capital of each individual bank are first 
denoted as: 
Tier 1 of A=α  Assets of A=a 
Tier 1 of B= β  Assets of B=b 
Tier 1 of C=γ  Assets of C=c 
Tier 1 of D= λ  Assets of D=d 
 
e+f 
D 
C 
A 
B 
m+g 
l+p 
n+h 
k+o 
j       i 
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Applying the contagion mechanism of condition (1), the simulation result is displayed in 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3.  The first row of both tables lists four scenarios, with each bank denoted 
as the triggering bank.  Cells under each scenario (excl. the last row) indicate the contagion 
condition for banks other than the triggering bank.  θ ’s represent LGD rates.  The last row 
shows the assets affected under the worst case scenario, i.e. all banks fail in the first round 
of contagion. 
 
Table  2.10: Contagion simulation using unconsolidated exposure 
 
 Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D 
Bank A fails if - αθ >e  αθ >m  αθ >k  
Bank B fails if βθ >f  - βθ >g  βθ >o  
Bank C fails if γθ >n  γθ >h  - γθ >j  
Bank D fails if λθ >l  λθ >p  λθ >i  - 
Assets affected in 
worst case scenario 
b+c+d a+c+d a+b+d a+b+c 
 
 
Table  2.11: Contagion simulation using consolidated exposure 
 
 Bank Group AB Bank C Bank D 
Bank AB fails if - βαθ +>+ )( gm  βαθ +>+ )( ok  
Bank C fails if γθ >+ )( hn  - γθ >j  
Bank D fails if λθ >+ )( pl  λθ >i  - 
Assets affected in 
worst case scenario 
c+d a+b+d a+b+c 
 
From the simulation, it seems that the banking system using consolidated exposure is more 
likely to experience contagion than the system using unconsolidated exposure.  This is 
because the average interbank exposure to the system, relative to Tier-1 capital using 
consolidated exposure, is larger than using unconsolidated exposure or: 
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hhnnhn >+>+  
ppllpl >+>+  
versavicenotbutgmgm βαθβθαθ +>+⇒>> )(&  
versavicenotbutokok βαθβθαθ +>+⇒>> )(&  
 
However, many studies measure contagion by assessing assets affected as a percentage of 
total assets in the system.  If the triggering bank is an independent bank like bank C or bank 
D, there is no difference in magnitude of contagion between consolidated and 
unconsolidated exposure.  If the triggering bank is bank A or bank B, which are treated as 
an independent bank in Figure 2.10, but single entities in Figure 2.11, chances are that 
unconsolidated exposure is more contagious following the default of bank A or bank B in 
Table 2.2, because: 
dcba
dc
dcba
dca
and
dcba
dc
dcba
dcb
+++
+
>
+++
++
+++
+
>
+++
++
 
 
In that case, it is interesting to point out that the simulation results depend heavily on the 
Tier-1 capital of the existing banks following an idiosyncratic shock with LGD at 100%: 
contagiousmoreposureexatedUnconsolidxci Unconii ⇒< _)(  
contagiousmoreposureexedConsolidatxcxii ConiiUnconi ⇒<< __)(  
systemsbothincontagionNoxciii Conii ⇒> _)(  
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ic  denotes the Tier-1 capital of banks in the system other than the triggering bank (three 
cases, A fails, B fails or AB fails).  If the Tier-1 capital of each existing bank is less than its 
exposure to the triggering bank using unconsolidated reporting, or denoted as Unconix _ , the 
system of unconsolidated exposure (Figure 2.10) is more contagious than that of 
consolidated exposure (Figure 2.11);  If the Tier-1 capital of each existing bank is more than 
Unconix _ , but less than Conix _ , the exposure to the triggering bank using consolidated 
reporting, the system of consolidated exposure is more contagious;  if the Tier-1 capital is 
adequate for each bank and greater than  Conix _ ,  both systems in Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9 
are robust to the shock and no contagion exists.   If each bank has its Tier-1 capital within a 
different range, for example bank I within range (i) and bank J within (ii), it cannot 
determine a priori which system is more contagious.   
 
Another interesting finding from the simulation is that the intra-group transaction 
(amounting to e+f) is irrelevant8 to the contagion analysis under consolidated reporting, 
since it assumes that all subsidiaries stand and fall together as a single entity.  Therefore, it is 
not important to know which subsidiary, bank A or bank B, takes control in the group, in 
addition to the seniority of interbank loans within the group. 
 
                                                           
8 It is relevant, however, if the bilateral position is not known and has to be estimated.  The following sections 
will explore how the change of estimated intragroup exposure will affect the severity of contagion.  
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2.4.6 A Historical Comparison 
 
The author also investigates the inconsistency in results by simulating the contagion effect 
prior to 2004.  This is because the possibility exists that the magnitude of contagion has 
been increasing over time since 1999, the year on which Wells’ study (2004) is based.  As 
most small and mid-sized banks did not release their annual reports prior to 2002 when they 
become publicly limited companies, the oldest year it is possible to simulate is 2002.   
 
Simulation results from 2002 to 2004 are displayed in Table 2.12.  It can be seen that the 
scale of contagion in 2003 is close to that of 2004.  Eighteen banks in the system are 
affected, accounting for 98.70% of the total for both 80% and 100% LGD.  In 2002, 
however, the scale is quite limited, with only 12.57% of assets being affected.   
 
Table  2.12: Magnitude of contagion in the benchmark structure in 2002 and 2003 
 
 2002 2003 2004 
LGD 
Cases of 
contagion  
Total 
No. 
failed 
Assets
% 
Cases of 
contagion  
Total 
No. 
failed 
Assets
% 
Cases of 
contagion  
Total 
No. 
failed 
Assets
% 
100 11 2 
12.57% 
7 18 
98.70% 
4 17 
89.48% 
80 7 2 5 18 4 17 
60 6 2 5 9 67.37% 1 9 69.45% 
40 3 2 0 0 - 0 0 - 
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The reason for a greater magnitude in 2003 is revealed in Figure 2.12.  The ratio of 
maximum exposure of each bank i.e. xij to its Tier-1 capital, is relatively higher in 2003 (and 
lower in 2004) than other years.  This means that, in 2002, banks were more vulnerable to 
the credit shocks of their largest borrower due to a relatively lower capital ratio.  
 
Figure  2.12: Ratios of interbank exposure to Tier-1 capital (maximum value) 
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However, it is interesting to find that the year that suffers the least number of spill-out 
effects also experiences the most cases of contagion, i.e. 11 out of 21 scenarios in 2002 
under 100% LGD.  In 2003, the number of cases was seven, while in 2004 the number of 
scenarios was four.   For all other LGD, 2004 experiences the lowest number of cases of 
contagion.  These findings are associated with the concentration of interbank loans over the 
period, which is shown in Figure 2.13.  Except for small banks and one foreign group, the 
standard deviation of the ratio of interbank exposure to Tier-1 capital across banks is 
highest in 2002 and lowest in 2004.  This implies systemically, the interbank exposure is 
more concentrated in a few banks in 2002 than other two years. 
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Figure  2.13: Ratios of interbank exposure to Tier-1 capital (standard deviation) 
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Additionally,   the section also investigates interbank contagion following a system-wide 
shock which can be simulated by multiple bank failures.  Table 2.13 presents, for each bank, 
the possibility of joint default of all borrowers.  Here, if the ratio of the total interbank 
loans of a bank 
ij
N
j x∑  to its Tier-1 exposure exceed 1, the bank will become bankrupt at 
LGD=100%.  If the ratio is less than 1, the bank could survive the shock.   It can be seen 
from the table that nine out of 21 banks could survive in 2002, while the number is reduced 
to two banks in 2003 and 2004, suggesting overall that banks tend to be increasingly 
susceptible to common macroeconomic shocks. 
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Table  2.13: Ratios of interbank exposure to Tier-1 capital (joint default) 
 
  2002 2003 2004 
1 3.621348 1.768707 1.85268 
2 3.979546 3.904361 4.509123 
3 1.930065 1.662361 1.942208 
4 2.419217 1.765794 2.361932 
5 2.571335 4.126534 3.175809 
6 0.939139 1.093311 1.007547 
7 0.558321 1.954728 0.971055 
8 0.51847 0.758224 1.818423 
9 1.07521 2.187835 3.42283 
10 2.067541 2.574968 2.143719 
11 3.734232 2.724283 2.107269 
12 0.877676 1.34215 2.060926 
13 0.287979 0.302746 0.434678 
14 0.939083 1.534502 1.439389 
15 3.206469 3.164737 2.105121 
16 0.992714 3.415251 2.127453 
17 2.745744 7.281425 4.36928 
18 0.136692 4.024392 2.647914 
19 0.014704 5.460723 4.689732 
20 25.13567 20.38998 12.31786 
21 23.71094 4.739103 2.72376 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
Netting obligations pose contagion risk to all economic sectors when one or multiple 
obligors in the netting system are unable to make repayments.  In manufacturing, the risk 
lies in the trade credit which links producers through a chain of obligations, and in the 
insurance industry the propagation could spread through the line of reinsurance.  Similarly, 
in banking sectors, the risk exists in interbank lending in which the transactions are often 
not collateralized or insured against.  Regulators anxiety, however, is perhaps strongest 
regarding the banking sector, because it has vital connections with other sectors and 
interbank exposure is increasingly forming a large proportion of banks’ balance sheets.    
 
The chapter reviewed studies conducted by central banks of different countries that 
simulate the contagion risk in the interbank market.  It found that the severity of contagion 
impact is subject to various “conditions”/assumptions, making the interpretation of 
contagion subject to important caveats.  By analyzing a number of potential sources of bias, 
the author found that it is not possible to determine a priori whether these biases result in 
an overestimation or an underestimation of contagion.   
 
Among the source of bias, the chapter is particularly interested in the impact of using 
consolidated data vs. unconsolidated data.  This is because most of the existing studies use 
the latter to simulate interbank contagion, in which the structure of which is close to a 
complete market structure.  However, their results could significantly distort the real picture 
of contagion effect because for many countries, the banking sectors are normally highly 
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concentrated with large bank groups owning a significant number of subsidiaries.  And it is 
most likely that mother banks and their subsidiaries stand or fall together.   
 
Subject to a number of assumptions (no netting agreement, seniority, etc), the author 
assesses the contagion effect of the UK interbank market in 2004, and found the spill-over 
scenarios are usually triggered by large banks that have the most exposure to the market.  
This supports the “too-big-to-fail” theory that many central banks are concerned about 
when a big bank is endangered.  More importantly, the author found that the contagion is 
much severer if the simulation uses consolidated data (89.48% assets affected) than 
otherwise (unconsolidated data) in the existing studies (25.25% assets affected).  The 
difference has been explained in a 4 bank illustration.  First, simulation using consolidated 
exposure is more likely to trigger contagion in a system of unconsolidated exposure than 
that of consolidated exposure, because the average interbank exposure relative to tier-I 
capital is larger in the system of consolidated exposure than that of unconsolidated 
exposure.  Second, if the contagion impact is measured by the percentage of total banking 
sector assets, the author demonstrates that simulation using consolidated exposure is more 
contagious when the average capital position is between the consolidated interbank 
exposure and the unconsolidated exposure.   
 
As the result of existing studies is based on years before 2004, the chapter also investigates 
if the scope of contagion has changed over time.  Due to data limitation, the chapter 
simulates the contagion impact for only two years before 2004.  The results show a similar 
contagion impact between 2003 and 2004 in terms of the percentage of total banking sector 
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assets affected.  The effect of 2002 is quite limited, accounting for only 12.57%.  The 
statistics of an increasing ratio of the interbank exposure over Tier-1 capital also imply that 
the contagion impact could increase rapidly since 2000 from which Wells (2004) has 
conducted the simulation on UK.   
 
Moreover, the Entropy Maximization method has to be used to estimate the bilateral 
interbank exposure due to data limitations.  The method assumes that banks seek to 
maximize the dispersion of their interbank activity and has the drawback of neglecting 
relationship banking.  The author deals with the drawbacks of ME by manually changing 
the weights of interbank exposure between intra-group banks, or between money centre 
banks and small banks, or between domestic banks and foreign banks.  The results show 
that encouraging intra-group financing could effectively alleviate the potential systemic risk 
while increasing interbank transactions with foreign banks in a highly concentrated market 
like UK could facilitate diversification and enhance financial stability.   
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CHAPTER THREE   
TESTING INTERBANK MARKET 
DISCIPLINE IN THE UK 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
The role of market discipline has become increasingly important as the banking industry has 
grown more complex.  Unlike government discipline, in the form of regulation, the 
effectiveness of market discipline is characterized by strong built-in incentives that promote 
safety and soundness in banks.  Market discipline literature generally study the disciplinary 
role of the bond or equity market (Morgan and Stiroh 2001; Sironi 2002; Evanoff and Wall 
2002; and Ashcraft forthcoming).  However, this chapter focuses on the interbank market, 
where investors are the banks themselves and the underlying discipline is peer monitoring.        
 
Some of the early studies in this area equate the risk sensitivity of investors to market 
discipline (Furfine 2001; King forthcoming; Ashcraft and Bleakley 2006).  The significance 
of their test results proves that investors can monitor and rationally differentiate the risks 
undertaken by banks.  Other studies examine this subject from another direction, i.e. the 
effectiveness of market monitoring.  Dinger and Hagen (2008), for example, test whether 
banks with more interbank borrowing are characterized by lower levels of risk.    
 
However, this chapter redefines the conditions of interbank market efficiency and argues 
that, to verify market discipline, one should verify both the risk sensitivity of the investors 
and the effectiveness of their risk control.  This is because, on the one hand, risk sensitivity 
does not guarantee market discipline.  The test of Furfine (2001) and others cannot verify if 
the risk sensitivity of lending banks can influence the decisions of borrowing banks to take 
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more risk.  On the other hand, without first confirming the monitoring incentive of the 
lenders, the negative correlation found in Dinger and Hagen (2008) between the riskiness of 
banks and their interbank borrowing position could be spurious.     
 
Hence, this chapter examines both aspects of market discipline.  This is achieved by 
performing a Granger Causality test on 12 major UK banks between a number of risk 
variables and banks’ interbank borrowing position.  If the riskiness of a bank Granger 
causes its access to interbank funding, the market is risk sensitive and is monitoring risk.  
Given the confirmed risk sensitivity, the increasing net interbank position (NIP) of the 
borrowing banks implies increasing the monitoring incentives of the lending banks.  If the 
lending bank’s monitoring incentives Granger causes bank’s riskiness, it is very likely that 
the interbank market disciplines banks.  In addition, as the Granger causality test is 
performed on individual banks9, this chapter repeats the test on panel data by using least-
squared regression.  The results are consistent with the Granger test.    
 
The empirical results give little support to the hypothesis of interbank market discipline in 
the UK.  Specifically, it finds both low risk sensitivity and ineffectiveness of risk control.  
The weak risk sensibility in the UK market is compared to CEE countries studied by 
Dinger and Hagen (2008), who find strong evidence of market discipline.  However, the 
author find that the nature of the two interbank markets is different.  While the net 
interbank borrowers in CEE countries are all small banks, the major borrowers in the UK 
are large institutions.  Peer monitoring incentives could therefore be dampened if the 
                                                           
9
 The limitations of applying the panel causality test based on existing literature will be analyzed in section 3.2.1. 
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interbank lenders assume “too-large-to-fail”.  In addition, lender accountability requires 
interbank loans to be medium-/long-term so that lenders cannot fly by night and escape 
their monitoring obligations.  However, in contrast with CEE countries, the majority of 
interbank transactions in the UK market are short-term (mostly less than three months).   
 
Moreover, the chapter explains the results of “risk sensitive but ineffective risk control” in a 
simple theoretical model.  In particular, the model assumes four types of assets in a bank’s 
investment portfolio: “good”, “bad”, “long-term” and “short-term”.  Lenders of the 
interbank transactions are presumed to monitor the riskiness of banks by requiring higher 
repayment for “bad” assets than “good” assets.   Based on four scenarios of repayment 
described later, the model demonstrates that, even with peer monitoring, banks financed by 
an interbank fund could choose a riskier asset portfolio to maximize their net expected 
return.  This happens if the “bad” assets are much riskier than the “good” assets and if the 
probability that both “bad” assets and “good” assets will be repaid is very small.  Under the 
same circumstances, the model demonstrates that banks that have a higher share of short-
term interbank borrowing could take more risk.   
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows.  Section 3.2 reviews early studies on 
interbank market discipline and their limitations; it then presents a redefinition of market 
discipline.  Section 3.3 presents an empirical study of the UK interbank market, using both 
the Granger causality test and least squared regressions.  Sections 3.4 and 3.5 explain the 
results found in Section 3.3.  Respectively, Section 3.4 investigates the reason for the weak 
risk sensitivity of the UK market, compared with CEE countries; section 3.5 establishes a 
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theoretical model to propose a possible explanation for the ineffectiveness of risk control.  
Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Interbank Market Discipline: Literature Review 
 
Interbank exposures have largely been discussed in the literature as a source of contagion 
(see Chapter Two) and, accordingly, a factor increasing systemic risk.  However, Rochet and 
Tirole (1996) argue that, by generating incentives for peer monitoring, the existence of 
interbank exposure may also facilitate prudent market behaviour and reduce the risk of 
bank failure and systemic distress.  This is because banks possess the technology to 
differentiate the risks of other banks (Calomiris, 1998).  Given proper incentives, they 
would peer-monitor each other.  Rochet and Tirole (1996) suggest that such incentives are 
compatible with protecting central banks from undesirable interventions that could lead to 
moral hazard.   
 
To test the theory of Rochet and Tirole (1996), some of the empirical works evaluate the 
risk sensitivity of lending banks (Furfine, 2001; King, forthcoming; Ashcraft and Bleakley, 
2006).  Specifically, they examine how a borrowing bank’s access to the interbank market 
(non-price rationing), or the pricing of its interbank funding is affected by its credit-
worthiness.  Furfine (2001) finds that borrowing banks with higher profitability, a higher 
capital ratio, and fewer problem loans pay a lower rate of interest on US federal fund loans 
than others.  Covering a longer and larger cross section, King (2004) supports Furfine’s 
results and finds that risky banks pay a higher rate of interest on US federal funds.  He 
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examines, in addition, quantity rationing in response to the riskiness of banks and finds that 
high-risk banks borrow less from federal funds.  However, the impact found in both 
Furfine (2001) and King (2004) is limited.  In Furfine’s study (2001), a one standard 
deviation rise in the loan-to-capital ratio raises the interest rate by merely 1.5 basis points; in 
King’s study (2004), a ten-percentage-point increase in the probability of bank failure leads 
to a rise of only three basis points in the fed-funds rate.  More importantly, monitoring 
incentives found in those studies are not equivalent to “market disciplines”, because it is not 
clear whether the monitoring incentives discovered have any influence on banks’ decisions 
to take risks. 
 
In contrast, other studies such as Dinger and Hagen (2008) test the interbank market 
discipline by examining the effectiveness of market monitoring in Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries.  They assume that the monitoring incentives of lenders are 
increasing with the amount of interbank borrowing.  Therefore, they examine whether 
banks with more interbank borrowing are characterized by lower levels of risk.  Their 
results show that interbank borrowing is associated with substantially lower risk with 
regards to borrowing banks.  Specifically, an increase in interbank exposure from zero to 0.1 
is associated with a drop in the ratio of loan loss provisions to gross loans of almost 48%, 
implying strong market discipline in CEE countries.  However, the result has an important 
caveat.  The monitoring incentives of lenders are assumed and have not been empirically 
proved.  Without first confirming the monitoring incentives of the lenders, the negative 
correlation between the riskiness of banks and their interbank borrowing position could be 
spurious.   
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3.3 Empirical tests on the UK interbank market 
 
Given the limitations of the existing literature explained in the previous section, this chapter 
argues that a single test of risk sensitivity or effectiveness of risk control is not sufficient to 
evaluate “market discipline”.  Furthermore, this section redefines “market discipline” by 
considering the following four scenarios in an interbank market: 
 
Case 1: Risk sensitive, Effective risk control 
Case 2: Risk sensitive, Ineffective risk control 
Case 3: Risk insensitive, Ineffective risk control 
Case 4: Risk insensitive, Effective risk control 
 
Case 2 and Case 4 respectively represent possible test results of Furfine (2001) and Dinger 
and Hagen (2008), which together with Case 3, cannot confirm the hypothesis of market 
discipline.     The only scenario that can confirm the hypothesis is Case 1.  This means that 
investors’ risk sensitivity and their effectiveness in terms of risk control are complementary 
factors of market discipline and should both be tested.  Based on the “redefinition” of 
market discipline, the section establishes a two-step procedure to test empirically the UK 
interbank market discipline: 
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Step 1: Test risk sensitivity, i.e. lending banks price risk or ration more risky banks.  If the 
test shows a negative result, it concludes “no market discipline”; otherwise, the test 
proceeds to Step 2. 
Step 2: Test the effectiveness of risk control.  If the test shows a negative result, it 
concludes “no market discipline”; otherwise, it concludes “market discipline”. 
 
As available data on individual risk pricing is limited, the test in step 1 examines only risk 
rationing. Specifically, risk rationing is reflected in the change of borrowing banks’ access to 
the interbank market in response to its riskiness.  Section 3.3.1 measures access by net 
interbank lending position (NIP) and the borrowers’ riskiness by a number of risk factors.  
In Step 1, NIP is dependant variable, while one of the risk measures is explanatory variable 
and vice versa in Step 2.  Section 3.3.2 applies the Granger test to evaluate the two-way 
causality between NIP and bank riskiness.  Section 3.3.3 uses least squared regression to 
repeat the test on panel data.                     
 
3.3.1 Data and risk measurement 
 
The empirical study employs 12 major UK resident banks which cover 70% of the total 
assets of the UK banking sector.  As described in the following two sections, the risk 
variables are calculated either from the 1995-2007 annual reports of these banks or from 
their stock market prices from 2001 to 200710.  NIP is defined as the ratio of net interbank 
liabilities to total assets, which is also selected from 1995-2007 banks’ annual reports.  If  
                                                           
10
 Many banks became public limited companies in the late 1990s. 
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the NIP ratio has positive/negative values, the bank is a net borrower/provider in the 
interbank market.  Both NIP and risk measurements are in the form of percentage change 
over the previous period.                                                                                                        
                     
3.3.1.1 Risk Measurement Based on SEER Rating Systems 
 
The chapter uses different risk measurements to evaluate banks’ credit-worthiness.  First, it 
calculate the over-all riskiness of a bank, designed to encompass all risk taking activities, 
including the risk of both on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet activities, and its chosen 
capital-to-assets ratio.  The over-all risk is based on the variability of bank stock return over 
time.  In particular, it is calculated as the annualized standard deviation of weekly stock 
return for a given bank in a sample year.  The stock market data are chosen because they are 
more easily accessible than regulatory data such as CAMELS, SEER or private ratings such 
as Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch Ratings.  Nevertheless, they contain the same 
information as those ratings, which reflect changes in the market’s perception of future 
profitability.  Thus, high standard deviations in the return imply that the expected profits of 
a bank are fluctuating rapidly---a sign that the bank is pursuing risky activities.  Second, the 
chapter evaluates banks’ specific risk based on some of the components of the SEER rating 
system: asset quality, capitals, and earnings.  The risk decomposition has the advantage of 
identifying the particular risk factor the lending banks are sensitive to in Step 1; and how the 
lenders’ accountability works through individual risk components in Step 2.  
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However, as shown in Table 3.1, the chapter replaces all variables in the SEER rating 
system by loan loss provision to gross loan ratio (LLP)11 to measure asset quality.  LLP 
represents estimated credit losses for total bank loans of the current balance sheet date, 
implying potential risk that has not been realized within the current accounting period.  
Assuming a similar accounting policy to calculate provisions over the sample period, a 
higher LLP ratio implies higher credit risk.  The chapter does not use the same categories of 
“Loans 30-90 days past due”, “Loans past due 90+ days”, and “Nonaccrual loans” as  
SEER alternatives because they reveal information from a previous accounting period and 
thus muddle the relationship under question.  It is implausible that new interbank lending 
has any impact on existing bad loans.  Similar consideration applies to whether to use net 
charge-offs to gross loans, accumulated loan loss reserves to gross loans to evaluate asset 
quality (applied in Dinger and Hagen, 2008).  In addition, “Other real estate owned”, 
“Commercial & industrial loans” are considered in SEER to have a negative effect on 
banks’ asset quality.   They are not used in this chapter, considering the bias they may cause.  
The greater in size of those two assets does not necessarily deteriorate total asset quality if 
banks diversify the risk properly through various industrial sectors.  Moreover, “Residential 
real estate loans” is considered in SEER to have a positive effect on banks’ asset quality.  
However, the chapter argues that it could also have a negative effect when the 
macroeconomic condition becomes worse, e.g. during the current sub-prime crisis. 
 
Same as in SEER, banks’ capital positions and earning abilities are measured respectively by 
capital to asset ratio (CAR) and net income to asset ratio (ROA), which have a positive 
                                                           
11 The chapter assumes LLP has a literal meaning, although provisions for bad loans are sometimes 
used by banks to smooth earnings.  
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effect on a bank’s riskiness.  However, “Investment securities” and “Large time deposits” 
are replaced by cash-to-asset ratio (LAR) largely due to data availability.   
 
Summary statistics describing the risk variables based on SEER ratings appears in Table 3.2.  
Panel (a) presents the average values over the sample period, while panel (b) presents 
summary statistics of total observations.  All risk variables are in the form of percentage 
change.  As the table indicates, most risk variables do not display trends over 1996-2007, 
except for CAR which generally appears to decrease over time.  Considerable variability in 
risk taking exists among banks in the sample.  For example, LLP averages -29.46 percent in 
the sample, but ranges from -1589.92 percent to 763.06 percent.   
 
3.3.1.2 Risk Components Based on Factor Model 
 
A second line of risk decomposing follows Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Straban (1996).  As 
explained in the previous section, overall risk is measured by annualized standard deviation 
of weekly stock return for a given bank in each sample year.  The risk is split into two 
components: common risk and bank-specific risk, which concerns respectively the common 
and idiosyncratic variability of bank stock returns.  Common risk reflects risks stemming 
from underlying economic conditions related to the banking industry as a whole, such as 
changes in the official interest rate, the target exchange rate, or the deposit insurance premia 
or banking regulations.  Bank-specific risk reflects risks unique to particular banks, such as 
lending to a particular sector of the economy.  The chapter estimates the two risk 
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components by a three factor return-generating model12 using factor analysis.  As illustrated 
in the equation below, the common risk is calculated as the square root of the portion of 
total return variance that can be explained by the factors.  Specific risk is the square root of 
the difference between total return variance and the square of common risk. 
Over-all Risk2=Common Risk2 + Bank-Specific Risk2 
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where each bank have a unique set of βs that measures bank i’s exposure to factor k.  Banks 
heavily exposed to common risk will have large βs and a high level of systemic risk.  The 
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i fσβ , in the equation is the variability of bank Is stock return 
generated by its exposure to the three systematic factors.  The second term above denotes 
the variability in bank Js stock generated by its exposure to bank’s concentration in 
particular industries or regions dominated by . 
 
Summary statistics describing the risk variables based on a factor model appears in Table 
3.3.  Panel (a) presents the average values in each sample year, while panel (b) presents 
summary statistics of total observations.  All risk variables are in the form of percentage 
change.  As the table indicates, over-all riskiness and common riskiness of the sample banks 
follows a U-shape movement, decreasing and then increasing over the sample period.  In 
contrast, the specific riskiness of banks first increases and then decreases over the sample 
period and has relatively higher variability than other two risk measures.   
                                                           
12 The number of factor is determined by the Kaiser-Guttman approach in Eviews 6.0. 
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3.3.2 Granger Causality Test 
 
 3.3.2.1 Applicability of “Panel Causality Test” 
 
The section employs a Granger causality test to assess the interbank market discipline of 12 
major UK banks between a number of risk variables and banks’ NIP, which have been 
described earlier.  If the riskiness of a bank Granger causes its access to interbank funding 
(measured by NIP), the market is risk sensitive and is monitoring risk.  Given the confirmed 
risk sensitivity, the increasing NIP of the borrowing banks implies increasing monitoring 
incentives of the lending banks.  If the lending bank’s monitoring incentives Granger causes 
bank’s riskiness, it is very likely that the interbank market disciplines banks.  However, the 
original Granger test (1946) was designed to deal with single time series data without cross 
sections.  Furthermore, later studies that extend the Granger test to panel data (see Holtz-
Eakin et al., 1988; Hsiao 1989; Weinhold 1996, 1999; Hurling and Venet 2001 and Hurling 
2004) fail to provide a satisfactory solution to deal with the power of the test, the key 
concerns of “panel causality test”.  The null hypothesis of non-causality is rejected as long 
as one bank in the panel displays significance in terms of the causality relationship.  Also, 
the rejection of the null hypothesis does not provide any guidance as to the number or the 
identity of the particular panel members for which the null of non causality is rejected.  If a 
causality relationship between a pair of variables exists, say X Granger causes Y, in one 
cross section, but not in the rest of the cross-sections in the panel, the question is whether 
one could thus conclude “X Granger causes Y statistically for the whole panel”; and if not, 
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then how many cross-sections should be tested positive to enable such a conclusion.  
Moreover, the test statistics used in the panel literature are eventually associated with 
individual cross sections and therefore do not facilitate a quicker calculation than 
performing the original Granger causality test in each cross section.  The detail of a “panel 
causality test”, illustrated by Hurling’s paper, is explained in Appendix 3.1. 
   
3.3.2.2 Granger Causality Test  
 
Due to the limitations of the existing “panel causality test” analyzed above, the chapter 
performs the original Granger (1946) test on each individual bank in the panel.  First, a unit 
root test is performed on each variable.  Since all variables are in the form of percentage 
change, the null hypothesis of non-stationary is rejected.   
 
For each individual bank i = 1,…,N, the Granger test considers the following linear model 
at time t = 1,…,T: 
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where in the first step mentioned earlier, y represents a borrowing bank I’s access to 
interbank funding (measured by NIP) while x represents a risk measure of the borrowing 
bank I described in the previous section; in the second step, y represents a risk measure of 
borrowing bank I’s while x represents the lending bank’s monitoring incentives (measured 
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by NIP); k represents the number of lag and is determined by Akaike info criterion (AIC).  
However, as the direction of causality may depend critically on the number of lagged terms 
included, it listed test results with different lags following Summers and Heston (1991).  
The null hypothesis for both steps of test is H0:∑ai = 0, that is, x does not Granger causes y.  
F test is applied to test this hypothesis.  To facilitate comparison between banks, P-values 
of the F-test are plotted. 
 
The results are presented in Figures 3.1 to 3.7, and Tables 3.4 and 3.5.  Figures 3.1 to 3.7 
plot the P-values of the causality test between risk measures and NIP.   In each graph, the 
black line represents the null hypothesis that NIP, not Granger, causes a risk measure; the 
grey line represents the null hypothesis that NIP, not Granger, causes overall risk.  The dash 
dots represent the 0.05 significance level.  The tests in both directions include a different 
number of lag terms denoted on the horizontal axis.   
 
As the graphs display, the black lines are generally above the 0.05 significance level, 
indicating that the majority of banks are insensitive to the risk of the interbank borrowers.  
However, the few regressions significant in the F-test are presented in Table 3.4.  
Specifically, the first three columns suggest that Barclays, Charter and RBS’s access to 
interbank funding is reduced when the overall risk increases.  The fourth column implies 
that Lloyds TSB’s access to interbank funding is reduced when its asset quality (measured 
by LLP) deteriorates.  The fifth to seventh columns indicate that only Barclays and RBS’s 
access to interbank funding is reduced when their capital (measured by CAR) contracts.  
However, the signs of LAR coefficients in the next two columns suggest that an increase in 
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the liquidity risk of Northern Rock (NR) and RBS leads to an increase in banks’ access to 
interbank funding.  This can be attributed to the function of the interbank market, i.e. 
providing optimal allocation of resources from banks sufficient in funding to banks lacking 
funding.  Similarly, the signs of Common Risk coefficients in the last column indicate that 
an increase in common risk of HSBC leads to an increase in banks’ access to interbank 
funding.  The latter is probably due to the herding behaviour of some banks such as HSBC.  
Moreover, the results suggest that no investors are sensitive to the specific riskiness or 
earning ability of a bank.   
 
In addition, Figures 3.1 to 3.7 show that the grey lines are generally above the 0.05 
significance level.  This indicates that, even regardless of the monitoring incentives, 
generally NIP not Granger causes a bank’s riskiness.  However, the few regressions 
significant in the F-test are presented in Table 3.5.  Compared with the banks in Table 3.4, 
Table 3.5 suggests that the banks monitored by investors shown in Table 3.4 do not reduce 
their riskiness accordingly.  Hence, Step 2 of the test finds no evidence of interbank market 
discipline.  In particular, the signs of the NIP coefficients imply that an increase in NIP 
leads to an increase in Lloyds TSB’s over-all riskiness, a deterioration in HBOS’s asset 
quality or a decrease in the earning ability of Barclays and HSBC.  Among the four banks, 
Lloyds TSB and Barclays are found in Table 3.4 to be monitored by investors according to 
their asset quality and capital position respectively, while HBOS and HSBC are 
unmonitored.  Consistent with the reason described above for Table 3.4, it is plausible to 
find that interbank borrowing increases the liquidity position of two banks.   Similar to 
Table 3.4, Table 3.5 finds positive causality relationship that runs from NIP to HSBC’s 
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common risk.  This implies that the herding behaviour of HSBC is probably encouraged by 
its interbank borrowing. 
 
 
3.3.3 Panel least-squared regression  
 
In the previous section, Granger causality tests were performed on individual banks.  This 
section tests the same hypotheses of market discipline, but on panel data.  This is achieved 
by using panel least-squared regression.  In particular, it evaluates whether the coefficient 
2β  in the following equation13 is equal to zero: 
 
ititititit AssetAssetNIPRisk εββββ ++++= 24321 )(                                          ( 3.1) 
 
where Riskit denotes a measure of the risk incurred by bank I at time t; NIP denotes net 
interbank position of a bank I at time t.  In addition, it adds two new explanatory variables -
---logarithm of total asset and its squared term to control for both linear and non-linear size 
effect on risk undertaking.  If the null of 2β =0 is rejected, the test can conclude there is 
evidence of market discipline.    
 
                                                           
13
 The fixed effect of the panel LS regression produces no different in the result: insignificance of the coefficient 2β . 
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However, it is important to note that the estimation of equation (3.1) is regarded as the 
second step of the test: effectiveness of risk control.  The first step of testing risk sensitivity 
is performed indirectly by testing the endogeneity of NIP in equation (3.1) with regards to 
the risk variable, Riskit.  Formally, if NIP is endogenous, there exists a simultaneous 
equation of (3.2) or (3.5) as below: 
 
                                ititit
RiskNIP υαα ++= 21                                                 ( 3.2) 
 
The section applies Pindyck and Rubinfeld’s version of the Hausman endogeneity test 
which is specified in Appendix 3.2.  If NIP is endogenous, the test would proceed to 
estimate equation (3.1).  However, if it is not rejected, the section would conclude that there 
is no evidence of interbank market discipline.   Then, the estimation of equation (3.1) is 
aimed at investigating the impact of interbank borrowing on bank risk, if the borrowing 
banks are unmonitored. 
 
Table 3.6 presents the results of the Hausman endogeneity test.  In general, the table 
implies that NIP is not endogenous in a bank’s riskiness, because the coefficients of itµˆ  are 
statistically not different to zero.  Intuitively, it suggests that the borrowing banks’ access to 
the interbank funding is generally not influenced by their riskiness.   However, there is one 
exception in the regression of LLP, where the coefficients of itµˆ  are statistically different 
from zero at a significance level of 10%.  This implies that the credit risk (LLP) is weakly 
endogenous in NIP in equation (3.1).   
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Estimations of equation (3.1) are presented in Tables 3.7 and 3.8.  Table 3.7 contains risk 
measures using banks’ financial accounts, while Table 3.8 contains risk measures using stock 
market data and factor models.  To control for endogeneity in the regression of LLP, a 
Panel Two-Stage Least Squares regression (2SLS) is estimated, incorporating an 
instrumental variable (IV) which is correlated with NIP, but uncorrelated with the Risk 
variable.  The chapter uses a cash-to-asset ratio as IV because banks have a stronger 
incentive to demand interbank financing if their cash ratio is low.  For the same reason, the 
section does not involve LAR, the liquidity position, as one of the risk variables to test 
market discipline.  The results in Table 3.7 show that all of the coefficients of NIP are 
statistically not different from zero.  In particular, the signs of NIP coefficients (highlighted 
in bold) imply that the change of NIP has no influence on banks’ decision to take more 
credit risk and hold less capital.  The coefficient signs are largely consistent with Demirgüç-
Kunt  and Huizinga (2009), who find banks that heavily rely on non-deposit wholesale 
funding tend to be more fragile.  Moreover, the positive sign of NIP coefficient (i.e. 
1.789706) under the regression of LLP implies that 2α  in equation (3.2) is positive; thus, 
interbank lenders generally do not risk-ration interbank loans.  The results in Table 3.8 also 
show that all of the coefficients of NIP are statistically not different from zero, implying 
that the change of NIP has no influence on borrowing banks’ over-all riskiness, 
decomposed common riskiness and specific riskiness.   
 
In summary, the panel squared regression test finds little evidence of risk sensitivity: 
interbank borrowers are generally unmonitored by their lenders.  With little lender 
accountability, our test finds that the variability of interbank exposure has no power to alter 
the risk taking activities of interbank borrowers.   
 85 
 
3.4 UK interbank market: weak risk sensitivity 
 
The empirical results of little risk sensitivity appear to be inconsistent with other empirical 
studies.  As mentioned in the literature review, Dinger and Hagen (2008) discover strong 
lender accountability in CEE countries and Furfine (2001) and King (2004), among others, 
find there is evidence of risk pricing or rationing in the US Fed market, though the impact 
of the latter is marginal.   
 
Nevertheless, it is very likely that the different results originate from the different nature of 
these markets.  In CEE countries, according to Dinger and Hagen (2008), there is a two-tier 
banking system structure due to banking specialization.  Large or incumbent banks, which 
dominate the deposit markets, are generally net lenders to the interbank market, while the 
smaller or new entrant banks, which have little access to customer deposits, but a large 
demand for non-bank loans from small and medium-sized enterprises, are generally net 
borrowers of the interbank market.  Thus, the banking specialization in CEE countries 
creates a unidirectional fund transfer from first tier large banks to second tier small banks.  
Dinger and Hagen (2008) also point out that, although the large banks enjoy implicit 
government deposit guarantees because of repeated recapitalization by the government, the 
small banks are allowed to fail.  For these reasons, lenders of the interbank market in CEE 
countries have incentives to monitor the riskiness of the borrowers 
 
In contrast, the interbank borrowers in the UK interbank market are generally large 
institutions.  Table 3.9 illustrates the net interbank borrowing position of the 12 major UK 
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banks in the order of bank size (total assets) over the sample period from 1995 to 2007.  
The interbank position (NIP) is calculated as above, as interbank liabilities minus interbank 
assets divided by total assets.  A positive NIP indicates that the bank is a net interbank 
borrower in the market, while a negative NIP indicates that the bank is a net provider of 
interbank funds.   As can be seen from the table, larger banks on the lower half of the table 
are generally net interbank borrowers, while the smaller banks on the upper half of the table 
are generally net interbank lenders.  Moreover, the UK market based in London is highly 
concentrated: over 70% of total lending between banks operating in the UK is accounted 
for by only 10 to 15 large institutions (Wells 2004, and Elsinger, Lehar & Summer 2006), 
compared to 719 in U.S. (Furfine 1999).  Therefore, the large banks serve as money centres 
which usually have systemic importance in the entire banking sector (as explained in 
Chapter 2).  Thus, the disciplining incentives of interbank lenders could be hampered by 
‘too-big-to-fail’ consideration, since the interbank lenders may expect potential bail-out of 
the large interbank borrowers. 
 
Another factor causing risk insensitivities in the UK interbank market relates to the maturity 
of interbank loans.  As mentioned by Rochet and Tirole (1996), the effectiveness of peer 
monitoring requires interbank loans to be medium- or long-term loans, so “lenders cannot 
fly by night and escape their monitoring obligations”.  In CEE countries, Dinger and Hagen 
(2008) indicate that the interbank exposures are characterized by long-term maturity.  
However, as illustrated in Figure 3.8, the majority of interbank assets or liabilities in UK are 
less than one year and more than 80% of the transactions are less than three months.  
Therefore, it is plausible that the UK has weaker lender accountability than CEE countries.  
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3.5 Risk Sensitive, but Ineffective Risk Control: a 
Theoretical Model  
 
Based on the empirical results and the analysis of the UK interbank market in section 3.3 
and section 3.4, this section develops a simple model which demonstrates that lenders’ 
monitoring incentives (proxied by risk pricing on interbank borrowing) could still fail to 
prevent the borrowing banks from investing in riskier assets.  It also demonstrates that the 
maturity of interbank liabilities or borrowings could be negatively related to the risk taking 
behaviour of borrowing banks.  In order to focus on the relationship between interbank 
borrowings and lending decisions of banks, the model assumes that banks have no equity 
and finance all assets of size 1 by interbank borrowing of the same size.  
 
It is assumed that each bank invests a portfolio of assets which may contain non-financial 
loans, interbank loans, or other financial loans.  Dependant on their riskiness, the portfolio 
assets can be categorized into: “good” assets and “bad” assets.  The return of a “good” 
asset is RG with the probability of ΠG in case it repays or 0 otherwise; the return of a “bad” 
asset is RB with the probability of ΠB in case it repays or 0 otherwise.  “Good” assets have a 
higher net present value than “bad” assets: 
 
RGΠG - 1 > RBΠB -1, ΠG >ΠB 
 
However, in order to attract investment, the “bad” assets have a higher return than the 
“good” assets: 
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1<RG < RB 
 
Depending on the maturity of assets, the portfolio assets can be further categorized into: 
“good” long-term assets, “good” short-term assets, “bad” long-term assets, and “bad” 
short-term assets.  The share of total short-term assets is Ф, while the share of total long-
term assets is 1-Ф.  However, in order to focus on the banks’ behaviour in choosing 
riskiness, the returns and expected returns of the total “good”/“bad” assets (denoted by RG, 
RB, RGΠG and RBΠB) are not affected by Ф.   
 
Lenders of interbank transactions have the incentives and the technology to screen the 
assets owned by the borrowing banks.  When pricing the portfolio loan of size 1, they 
charge more for the proportion of “bad” assets than the proportion of “good” assets, and 
require a total repayment of: 
 
δdG + (1-δ)dB 
1<dG<dB ,  0 ≤ δ ≤1 
 
where dG denotes the repayment required for the share lending to “good” assets, dB denotes 
the repayment required for the share lending to “bad” assets and δ denotes the share of 
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assets screened as “good”14.  Therefore, if δ, i.e. the share of the “good” assets, is high/low, 
a borrower is charged less/more repayment.  In addition, the net expected return of “good” 
assets in a case whereby the borrowing banks repay is higher than that of “bad” assets: 
 
(RG - dG)ΠG>(RB -dB)ΠB 
 
However, the net return of “good” assets is lower than that of “bad” assets, so that banks 
are still attracted to invest in “bad” assets: 
 
RB -dB >RG - dG>0,  
 
For sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the banks’ assets and liabilities have the same 
maturity structure.  Therefore, Ф represents the share of long-term borrowings and 1- Ф 
represents the share of short-term borrowing.  The term structure of the interbank 
borrowing rate is 1< ds < dl, where ds denotes a short-term return rate and dl denotes a 
long-term return rate, which are independent of each other.  If denoting the repayment for 
financing long-term and short-term “good” assets respectively as dGL and dGS, and denoting 
the repayment for financing long-term and short-term “bad” assets respectively as dBL and 
dBS, dG and dG can be expressed as:   
 
                                                           
14
 As the lenders have the technology to screen the assets of borrowing banks, their assessment in the asset profile of 
borrowing banks is correct. 
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   dG =ФdGL +(1-Ф) dGS=Ф(dGL - dGS)+ dGS 
   dB =ФdBL +(1-Ф) dBS =Ф(dBL - dBS)+ dBS 
 
where dBL>dBS>1, dGL>dGS>1 as long-term loans are required for higher repayment than 
short-term loans. 
 
There is only one time period of concern.  This is when the borrowing banks decide the 
investment portfolio given interbank funding.  The investment decision made by banks 
depends on whether banks’ net expected return (NER) will be maximized.  The interbank 
funding is provided on the basis that the net expected return (NER) from the portfolio 
investment by the borrowing banks is greater than 0.   
 
Proposition 1: Interbank borrowing banks tend to choose a lower δ, i.e. a higher share of 
“bad” assets to maximize their net expected return (NER) if the “bad” assets are much 
riskier than the “good” assets and the probability that both “bad” assets and “good” assets 
will repay is very small: 
 ΠG - ΠB>ΠG ΠB 
Proof: See Appendix 3.3. 
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Proposition 2: Banks can always increase their NER by increasing their share of short-term 
interbank borrowing.  If BGBG ΠΠ>Π−Π , there is a positive relationship between the 
share of short-term interbank borrowing and the tendency of borrowing banks to take more 
risk when they try to maximize their net expected return.   
Proof: See Appendix 3.3 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter finds that previous literature on market discipline either focuses on testing the 
risk sensitivity of investors or testing the unidirectional causality that runs from interbank 
borrowings to bank’s riskiness.  The chapter contends that either way of testing is not 
robust to verify the effective risk control by the interbank market.  However, the chapter 
argues that the hypothesis can be verified by a combination of the two methods applied in 
two steps. 
 
The chapter tests empirically interbank market discipline in the UK.  The empirical results 
give little support to interbank market discipline in the UK.  Firstly, it finds that the market 
investors show weak risk sensitivity.  Only a small proportion of banks monitor risk when 
extending their loans.  Secondly, it finds that banks that are monitored do not reduce their 
risk accordingly.  Thirdly, and more justifiably, it is found that some unmonitored banks 
take higher risks when they obtain more interbank funding.   
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The results of weak risk sensibility are analyzed, based on the nature of the UK interbank 
market.   Firstly, since the UK interbank market consists of a few large institutions, the peer 
monitoring incentives could be dampened because of a “too-large-to-fail” assumption.  
Secondly, as the majority of UK interbank transactions have a term of less than three 
months, the length of time to maturity is too short to satisfy the lender accountability 
required by the theory of market discipline.  Lenders can easily fly to escape their 
monitoring obligations. 
 
Moreover, the chapter explains the scenario of “ineffectiveness risk control, though 
monitored” in a simple theoretical model.  The model demonstrates that banks that have 
their risk priced by their lenders could still choose a riskier asset portfolio to maximize their 
net expected return.  This happens if the “bad” assets are much riskier than the “good” 
assets and the probability that both “bad” assets and “good” assets will repay is very small.  
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Table  3.1: Comparison of variables in the SEER rating system and in this chapter 
 
Variables in SEER  
rating system 
Effect on bank 
credit-worthiness 
Variables in this chapter Effect on bank 
credit-worthiness 
Asset 
Quality 
Loans 30-90 days past due 
Loans past due 90+ days 
Nonaccrual loans 
Other real estate owned 
Commercial & industrial loans 
Residential real estate loans 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
Loan loss provision to gross loan (LLP) - 
Capital Tangible net worth (CAR) + Capital to asset ratio (CAR) + 
Earnings Net income (ROA) + Net income to asset ratio (ROA) + 
Liquidity 
Investment securities 
Large time deposits 
+ 
- 
Cash to asset ratio (LAR) + 
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Table  3.2: Summary statistics of the risk variable based on SEER 
 
 (a) Average over 1996-2007 
 LLP CAR ROA LAR 
1996 102.88 9.15 31.60 28.62 
1997 9.23 -3.04 -3.19 -20.90 
1998 64.92 1.16 5.88 -1.76 
1999 -4.56 1.22 2.41 49.76 
2000 -35.60 3.53 8.34 -35.73 
2001 27.89 -0.84 -16.60 33.33 
2002 -75.78 -6.07 -13.97 217.09 
2003 3.87 -1.77 -40.39 -3.39 
2004 -38.97 -0.76 -22.72 30.90 
2005 -190.99 -13.55 51.86 28.06 
2006 71.26 0.01 10.12 106.18 
2007 79.84 -7.72 -13.51 5.43 
 (b) Summary statistics 
Mean -29.46 -4.67 5.84 38.18 
Median 1.29 -4.91 -0.66 4.93 
Maximum 763.06 24.69 355.28 1031.19 
Minimum -1589.92 -51.51 -83.53 -97.30 
Std. Dev. 252.72 13.12 66.40 149.77 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the banks’ annual reports. 
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Table  3.3: Summary statistics of the risk variable based on factor models 
 (a) Average over 2002-2007 
 Overall Risk Common Risk Specific Risk 
2002 14.01 55.07 -20.10 
2003 -17.74 -9.41 -10.11 
2004 -42.53 -56.06 10.01 
2005 5.09 67.91 18.84 
2006 15.52 18.32 96.82 
2007 17.66 59.99 -39.37 
 (b) Summary Statistics 
 Mean -2.36 23.84 12.06 
 Median -1.24 -0.60 -24.35 
 Maximum 61.17 331.21 508.23 
 Minimum -58.96 -87.45 -100.00 
 Std. Dev. 27.29 83.29 117.01 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on banks’ stock price from Thomson DataStream. 
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Figure  3.1: P-values of the Granger causality test between overall risk and net 
interbank positions (NIP) 
Note: Horizontal axis represents number of lags (up to 3 due to limited observations) for 
different banks. 
 
Figure  3.2: P-values of the Granger causality test between credit risk (LLP) and net 
interbank positions (NIP). 
 
Note: Horizontal axis represents number of lags (up to 3 due to limited observations) for 
different banks 
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Figure  3.3: P-values of the Granger causality test between capital to asset ratio (CAR) 
and net interbank positions (NIP). 
 
Note: Horizontal axis represents number of lags (up to 3 due to limited observations) for 
different banks 
  
Figure  3.4: P-values of the Granger causality test between net income to asset ratio 
(ROA) and net interbank positions (NIP). 
 
Note: Horizontal axis represents the number of lags (up to 3 due to limited observations) 
for different banks. 
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Figure  3.5: P-values of the Granger causality test between cash to asset ratio (LAR) 
and net interbank positions (NIP). 
 
Note: Horizontal axis represents number of lags in order (up to 3 due to limited 
observations) for different banks. 
 
Figure  3.6: P-values of the Granger causality test between common risk (COMMR) 
and net interbank positions (NIP). 
 
Note: Horizontal axis represents number of lags in order (up to 3 due to limited 
observations) for different banks. 
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Figure  3.7: P-values of the Granger causality test between specific risk (SPECR) and 
net interbank positions (NIP). 
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Table  3.4: Results that are significant at 5% level in the Granger Causality test (H0: Risk variable not Granger causes NIP) 
 Dependent variable: NIP 
Barclays  Charter  RBS  TSB Barclays  BB RBS  NR RBS HSBC 
Intercept -5.718178 
(24.92130) 
-88.99574** 
(25.54543) 
420.8679 
(104.4713)* 
216.3565 
(207.8174) 
15.53129 
(22.04540) 
-114.1248** 
(24.09293) 
168.3536 
(161.6984) 
407.6413 
(216.2108) 
-1565.512 
(299.2102) 
20.94051*** 
(1.210703) 
NIPt-1 0.015104 
(0.069695) 
0.338419 
(0.209732) 
0.640598* 
(0.185820) 
-0.063728 
(0.282189) 
0.124482 
(0.236053) 
-0.778200* 
(0.186555) 
-0.148717 
(0.221680) 
0.018332 
(0.254450) 
-0.721100 
(0.279974) 
1.058043*** 
(0.055380) 
NIPt-2 - - -1.231944** 
(0.208778) 
- -0.261086** 
(0.073266) 
- 0.151723 
(0.221786) 
-0.111457 
(0.248659) 
0.493930* 
(0.130134) 
- 
NIPt-3 - - -0.963048*** 
(0.200156) 
- - - - - 0.568144* 
(0.159084) 
- 
All riskt-1 -1.806042** 
(0.729505) 
-3.057607** 
(0.617901) 
-52.49717** 
(6.685440) 
- - - - - - - 
All riskt-2 - - 19.55055* 
(6.685440) 
- - - - - - - 
All riskt-3 - - -8.040832 
(5.832848) 
- - - - - - - 
LLPt-1 - 
 
- - -15.61628** 
(6.662353) 
- - - - - - 
CARt-1 - - - - -1.768305 
(2.029733) 
-12.45937** 
(2.116911) 
-13.33960 
(7.482159) 
- - - 
CARt-2 - - - - 4.177723** 
(1.593111) 
- 31.00312*** 
(7.332132) 
- - - 
LARt-1 - - - - - - - -3.374231** 
(0.995636) 
-27.80436* 
(7.303013) 
- 
LARt-2 - - - - - - - 12.65568** 
(3.742660) 
-81.76056** 
(9.119915) 
- 
LARt-3 - - - - - - - - -59.73589* 
(19.79436) 
- 
Commrt-1 - - - - - - - - - 0.584774*** 
(0.023598) 
R2 0.446149 0.895760 0.971225 0.474010 0.772955 0.952118 0.794266 0.773953 0.773953 0.996770 
Note: one, two and three asterisks represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  The choice of the number of lag to be presented for each bank 
depends on the Akaike info criterion (AIC). 
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Table  3.5: Results that are significant at 5% level in the Granger Causality test (H0: NIP not Granger causes risk variable) 
 
 Overall LLP ROA LAR Common 
 TSB HBOS Barclays  HSBC Cbrother HSBC HSBC 
NIPt-1 0.032310** (0.010184) 
0.040311*** 
(0.008152) 
-0.036246* 
(0.016675) 
-0.057784 
(0.268943) 
0.027322*** 
(0.002216) 
0.789320 
(0.295909) 
2.981134*** 
(0.146290) 
NIPt-2 - - - -0.696620** (0.175542) 
- 0.417337 
(0.522408) 
- 
NIPt-3 - - - - - 0.945272** (0.193969) 
- 
All riskt-1 0.069723 (0.233493) 
- - - - - - 
All riskt-2 - - - - - - - 
All riskt-3 - - - - - - - 
LLPt-1 - -0.052650 (0.181383) 
- - - - - 
ROAt-1 - - -0.380271 (0.227822) 
-0.031939 
(0.196383) 
- - - 
ROAt-2 - - - -0.498221** (0.154171) 
- - - 
LARt-1 - - - - -1.120551*** (0.048149) 
-0.684479 
(0.235329) 
- 
LARt-2 - - - - - -0.502586 (0.264155) 
- 
LARt-3 - - - - - -0.094709 (0.184784) 
- 
Commrt-1 - - - - - - -1.079635*** (0.062336) 
Intercept -11.96051 (7.935682) 
8.224334** 
(2.785264) 
-0.830326 
(5.642223) 
-13.18699 
(4.557201) 
14.59188*** 
(0.645218) 
32.31959* 
(8.840561) 
-7.491344 
(3.198158) 
R2 0.593632 0.895760 0.577135 0.880224 0.996390 0.984604 0.999218 
Note: one, two and three asterisks represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  The choice of the number of lags to be presented for 
each bank depends on the Akaike info criterion (AIC). 
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Table  3.6: Hausman endogeneity test (H0: NIP is not endogenous in a risk measure.) 
 
 Risk variables 
 All risk LLP CAR ROA LAR 
NIP -0.046490 
(0.044232) 
-0.164522* 
(0.079646) 
-0.003897 
(0.011237) 
-0.058887 
(0.042787) 
0.083218 
(0.080109) 
itµˆ  0.054863 
(0.047036) 
0.173418* 
(0.084696) 
0.000577 
(0.011949) 
0.059764 
(0.045500) 
0.024916 
(0.085188) 
Intercept 16.70794 
(11.53145) 
45.42667* 
(20.76422) 
-0.770837 
(2.929525) 
11.52210 
(11.15478) 
22.05103 
(20.88487) 
R-squared 0.132834 0.326463 0.080485 0.174111 0.625095 
Note: one, two and three asterisks represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
itµˆ represents the residual in the regression of itititit AssetAssetNIP µγγγ +++= 2321 .
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Table  3.7: Relationship between interbank position and bank risk (financial 
accounts data)  
 
  Risk variables 
 
Regressors 
LLP CAR ROA 
NIP 
1.789706 
(14.85381) 
-0.000184 
(0.000759) 
0.000463 
(0.003936) 
Assets 
-527.6338 
(4431.193) 
-1.959371 
(2.164157) 
18.90870* 
(11.37268) 
Assets2 
32.02443 
(269.2344) 
0.107070 
(0.121251) 
-0.803481 
(0.637544) 
Intercept 
1186.774 
(10007.31) 
5.029995 
(9.343376) 
-106.8223 
(48.56662) 
R-squared -671.843767 0.008208 0.049434 
No. of Banks 12 12 11 
Total panel Obs. 117 117 105 
Sample  1996-2007 1996-2007 1996-2007 
 
   
Note: One, two and three asterisks represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively.  To control for endogeneity tested above, an instrumental variable of cash ratio 
is applied in the regression with the dependent variable of LLP.   
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Table  3.8: Relationship between interbank position and bank risk (stock market 
data) 
 
No. of Banks: 10        Sample period: 2001-2007       Total panel Obs: 70       
 Overall Risk Common Risk Specific Risk 
NIP -0.000178 
(0.000495) 
-0.000217 
(0.000444) 
3.85E-05 
(0.000123) 
Assets 
-2.30E-09*** 
(6.01E-10) 
-2.10E-09*** 
(5.40E-10) 
-1.95E-10 
(1.50E-10) 
Assets2 2.92E-16*** 
(9.72E-17) 
2.97E-16*** 
(8.73E-17) 
-5.01E-18 
(2.43E-17) 
Intercept 0.002553*** 
(0.000337) 
0.002108*** 
(0.000302) 
0.000445*** 
(8.41E-05) 
R2 0.281132 0.305810 0.378425 
Note: One, two and three asterisks means significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table  3.9: Average net interbank borrowing positions (NIP) of major UK banks 
from 1995-2007 
Bank 
Interbank borrowing 
position 
Total assets 
(£ millions) 
INVESTEC 2.82% 17.63938 
RATHBONE -11.65% 714.8471 
CBROTHER -2.04% 4000.162 
BB -4.02% 36396.57 
ALLIANCE 3.01% 55103.89 
NR -0.30% 61683.66 
CHARTER -2.39% 185440.9 
TSB 1.97% 289586.3 
HBOS 5.07% 473899.1 
BARCLAYS 5.70% 696219.1 
RBS 3.96% 766790.3 
HSBC -5.30% 1355095 
Source: Banks’ annual reports. 
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Figure 8: Major UK-resident banks’ interbank loans in various maturities as a share 
of  total amount 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Annual reports of 15 UK resident banks in 2004 
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Appendix 3.1: Hurling Panel Causality Test 
 
In traditional panel causality literature before Hurling (2004), econometricians focus on 
testing the homogeneity of the coefficients on the explanatory variables (see Holtz-Eakin et 
al. 1985; Hsiao 1989; Weinhold 1996, 1999; Hurling and Venet 2001).  In Hurling and 
Venet (2001), for example, it goes through a three stage procedure to test two stationary 
variables, denoted x and y, observed on T periods and on N individuals.  In particular, he 
considers the following linear model for each individual i = 1,…,N, at time t = 1,…,T: 
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If H0 is not rejected, implying homogenous coefficients, he then proceeds to stage 2; if H0 is 
rejected, he then skips to stage 3.  In Stage 2, it tests the null hypothesis of non-causality: 
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If H0 is not rejected, the test ends and concludes x not Granger causes y, or termed by 
Hurling (2001) as Homogeneous Non-Causality (HNC); if H0 is rejected, the test ends and 
concludes x Granger cause y, or Homogeneous Causality (HC).  In stage 3, the hypothesis is: 
                                                           
15 For simplicity, individual effects ai are supposed to be fixed and it assumed that lag orders K are 
identical for all cross-section units of the panel.  
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where N1 is unknown, but satisfies condition 1/0 1 <≤ NN .  If H0 is not rejected, the test 
ends and concludes x not Granger cause y, or Homogeneous Non-Causality (HNC); if H0 
is rejected, the test ends and concludes x not Granger cause y, or Homogeneous Non-
Causality (HNC); if H0 is rejected, the test ends and concludes x Granger cause y, or 
Heterogeneous Causality (HEC).  However, the homogeneity test is unnecessary.  In 
Hurling (2008), only one stage of test, i.e. Stage 3 above, is performed. 
 
The major disadvantages of Hurling’s papers are: 
 
1. Hurling does not explain much about what it really means for HEC.    
 
Hurling (2007) admit that the rejection of the null of Homogeneous Non Causality does not 
provide any guidance as to the number or the identity of the particular panel members for 
which the null of non causality is rejected.  Simply speaking, if H0 is rejected, and X granger 
causes Y for only one cross section but not for all other cross-sections in the panel, whether 
one could conclude “X granger causes Y statistically in the whole panel”.  If not, how large 
the number of N-N1 in H1 above should be to enable to conclude “X granger causes Y”. 
 
2. Little improvement on Granger (1969).  
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Hurling (2004) does not involve any particular panel estimation.  The test statistics used in 
Hurling are in the form of:  
∑
=
=
N
i
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Hnc
TN WN
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1
,,
1
 
where Wi,T denotes the individual Wald statistics for the i
th cross-section associated to the 
individual test H0: βi = 0.  As individual test has to be conducted anyway, there is no reason 
for not to simply perform individual Granger (1969) test.   
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Appendix 3.2: the Hausman Endogeneity Test  
 
The underlying idea of the Hausman test is to compare two sets of estimates, one of which 
is consistent under both the null and the alternative and another which is consistent only 
under the null hypothesis. A large difference between the two sets of estimates is taken as 
evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis.  Here, the Pindyck and Rubinfeld version 
of the Hausman test is specified: 
 
ititititit AssetAssetNIPRisk εββββ ++++= 24321
                                                (1) 
 ititit RiskNIP υαα ++= 21                                                                                       (2) 
Step1: Estimate the equation (3) below 
 itititit AssetAssetNIP µγγγ +++=
2
321                                                                    (3) 
and retrieve the residual itµˆ  
Step2: Estimate the equation (4) below 
  itititit NIPRisk σµϖϖϖ +++= ˆ321                                                                          (4) 
and perform a t test on the coefficient of itµˆ , i.e. 3ϖˆ . 
 0: 30 =ϖH  Consistant estimators of eq(1), NIP is exogenous 
0: 31 ≠ϖH  Inconsistant estimators of eq(1), NIP is endogenous 
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Appendix 3.3: Proof of Propositions 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
The investment decision made by banks depends on whether they consider that the 
transaction will maximize banks’ net expected return (NER).  However, banks’ investment 
contains a portfolio of both “good” assets and “bad” assets, as illustrated in the table below.  
Banks’ NER must be calculated separately under the four scenarios. 
 
Table  3.10: Probability of repayment and default 
Bad 
Good 
Repay 
Probability: ΠB 
Default 
Probability: 1- ΠB 
Repay 
Probability 
ΠG 
1. All (both “good” and “bad”) 
assets repay. 
Probability: ΠG ΠB 
2. “good” assets repay and “bad” 
assets default.   
Probability: ΠG (1-ΠB) 
Default 
Probability 
1- ΠG 
3. “Bad” assets repay and “good” 
assets default.   
Probability: (1-ΠG )ΠB 
4.  All assets default. 
Probability: (1-ΠG )(1-ΠB) 
 
1. All (both “good” and “bad”) assets repay.  Probability: ΠG ΠB 
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[ ] BGBBGGS dRdRNER ΠΠ−−+−= ))(1()(1 δδ  
 
2. “Good” assets repay and “bad” assets default.  Probability: ΠG (1-ΠB) 
 
[ ] )1()0)(1()(2 BGBGGS ddRNER Π−Π−−+−= δδ  
 
3. “Bad” assets repay and “good” assets default.  Probability: (1-ΠG)ΠB 
 
[ ] BGBBGS dRdNER ΠΠ−−−+−= )1())(1()0(3 δδ  
 
4.  All assets default.  Probability: (1-ΠG)(1-ΠB) 
 
[ ] )1)(1()0)(1()0(4 BGBGS ddNER Π−Π−−−+−= δδ  
 
Since the NER has to be greater than 0, in scenario 4 where the NER is less than 0, banks 
will not be able to obtain the interbank loans.  For other scenarios: 
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(1) Under the scenario that all assets repay, a bank will be able to obtain the interbank loans 
if: 
 
[ ]
1)()(
0))(1()(
>
−−−
−
>⇒
>ΠΠ−−+−
GGBB
BB
BGBBGG
dRdR
dR
dRdR
δ
δδ
 
 
However, this is impossible because 0 ≤ δ ≤1. 
 
(2) Under the scenario that “good” assets repay and “bad” assets default, a bank will be able 
to obtain the interbank loans if: 
 
[ ]
BGG
B
BGBBGG
ddR
d
dddR
+−
>⇒
>Π−Π−+−
δ
δ 1)1()(
 
 
(3) Under the scenario that “bad” assets repay and “good” assets default, a bank will be able 
to obtain the interbank loans if: 
 
[ ]
GBB
BB
BGBBGBB
ddR
dR
dRddR
+−
−
<⇒
>ΠΠ−−++−−
δ
δ 0)1()()(
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It can be proved that
BGG
B
GBB
BB
ddR
d
ddR
dR
+−
>
+−
−
 as below: 
 
))((
)(
BGGGBB
BGBGG
BGG
B
GBB
BB
ddRddR
dRRdR
ddR
d
ddR
dR
+−+−
−−
=
+−
−
+−
−
 
 
which is always negative, since the denominator is greater than zero because RB -dB >RG - 
dG>0 and 1<dG < dB , while the numerator is always less than zero because (RG - dG)RB < 1, 
RB dB > 1. 
 
Therefore, we have to study the following two cases for δ: 
 
(A) 1≤<
+−
δ
BGG
B
ddR
d
 
 
In this case, a bank will be able to obtain an interbank deposit if only the “good” assets 
repay.  The first derivative of NER is: 
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0)( >+−=
∂
∂
BGG ddR
NER
δ  
 
Therefore, NER is increasing in δ.  The local maximum for the interval 
]1,(
BGG
B
ddR
d
+−
is at 1: 
 
)1()()1(max BGGGlocal dRNER Π−Π−==δ
 
 
(B) 
GBB
BB
ddR
dR
+−
−
<≤ δ0  
 
In this case, a bank will be able to obtain an interbank deposit if only the “bad” assets repay.  
The first derivative of NER is: 
 
0])[( <+−−=
∂
∂
GBB ddR
NER
δ  
 
Therefore, NER has a negative relationship with and is decreasing in δ.  The local 
maximum for the interval ),0[
GBB
BB
ddR
dR
+−
−
is at 0: 
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)1()()0(max GBBBlocal dRNER Π−Π−==δ
 
Comparing the local maximum at the two cases gives: 
 
)]()][()[(
)1()()1()(
BGBGGGBB
BGGGGBBB
dRdR
dRdR
Π−Π−ΠΠ−−−=
Π−Π−−Π−Π−
 
 
Since RB -dB >RG - dG>0, the first term of the multiplication is greater than zero.  The 
comparison depends on the second term. 
 
If BGBG ΠΠ<Π−Π , i.e. the difference in the riskiness between “good” assets and “bad” 
assets is not larger than the probability that both assets will repay, then banks will choose 
δ=1, i.e. invest all in “good” assets to maximize their net expected return.   
 
However, if BGBG ΠΠ>Π−Π , i.e. the difference in the riskiness between “good” assets 
and “bad” assets is larger than the probability that both assets will repay, then banks will 
choose δ=0, i.e. invest all in “bad” assets to maximize their net expected return.   
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Above all, under the monitoring mechanism through pricing, borrowing banks still tend to 
choose a lower δ, i.e. a higher share of “bad” assets to maximize their net expected return 
(NER) if the “bad” assets are much riskier than the “good” assets and the probability that 
both “bad” assets and “good” assets will repay is very small: 
 
 ΠG - ΠB>ΠG ΠB 
Specifically, they will choose a δ in the interval ),0[
GBB
BB
ddR
dR
+−
−
relative to a δ in the 
interval ]1,(
BGG
B
ddR
d
+−
, where
BGG
B
GBB
BB
ddR
d
ddR
dR
+−
<
+−
−
. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
 
The relationship between the maturity of interbank loans and the risk taking behaviour of 
borrowing banks can be studied by inserting the following expression into the NER 
expressions in proposition 1 above. 
 
   dG =ФdGL +(1-Ф) dGS=Ф(dGL -dGS)+ dGS 
   dB =ФdBL +(1-Ф) dBS =Ф(dBL –dBS)+ dBS 
 
 118 
 
As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, banks will successfully obtain interbank loans in 
two scenarios; thus, it is only necessary to analyze NERS2 and NERS3 as below: 
 
(1) 1≤<
+−
δ
BGG
B
ddR
d
, only “good” assets repay: 
 
[ ]
[ ]{ }
})(
)()({)1(
)1()0)(1()(2
BSBSBL
GSBSGSGLBSBLGBG
BGBGGS
ddd
ddddddR
ddRNER
−−−
−+−−−+Π−Π=
Π−Π−−+−=
φ
φδ
δδ
 
 
The first derivative is: 
 
)())(1(2 GSGLBSBLS dddd
NER
−−−−=
∂
∂ δδφ
 
 
which is always negative since δ-1<0, dBL>dBS, δ>0 and dGL>dGS.  Hence, NER is decreasing 
in Ф and banks will reduce the share of long-term interbank loans to maximize the NER.  
As δ has a positive relationship with NER for the interval ]1,(
BGG
B
ddR
d
+−
, it implies that 
Ф has a negative relationship with δ in maximizing NER.  This means borrowing banks will 
maximize NER by decreasing the share of long-term interbank loans and increasing the 
share of “good” assets.   
 119 
 
 
(2) 
GBB
BB
ddR
dR
+−
−
<≤ δ0 , only “bad” assets repay: 
 
[ ]
})(
})]()[({{)1(
)1())(1()0(3
BSBSBLB
BSGSBSBLGSGLBBG
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dRdNER
−−−+
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The first derivative is: 
 
)())(1(3 GSGLBSBLS dddd
NER
−−−−=
∂
∂ δδφ
 
 
which is always negative since δ-1<1, dBL>dBS, δ>0 and dGL>dGS.  Hence, NER is decreasing 
in Ф and banks will reduce the share of long-term interbank loans to maximize the NER.  
As δ has a negative relationship with NER for the interval ),0[
GBB
BB
ddR
dR
+−
−
, it implies 
that Ф has a positive relationship with δ in maximizing NER.  This means borrowing banks 
will maximize NER by decreasing the share of long-term interbank loans and reducing the 
share of “good” assets.   
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Overall, banks can always increase their NER by increasing the share of short-term 
interbank loans. If BGBG ΠΠ>Π−Π , there is a positive relationship between the share of 
short-term interbank borrowing and the tendency of borrowing banks to take more risk 
when they try to maximize their net expected return. 
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CHAPTER FOUR   
MACROECONOMIC CAUSES OF 
BANKING DISTRESS: EVIDENCE 
SINCE THE 1990s 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
In the late 1990s, especially following the Asian financial turmoil, a flourishing body of 
literature investigating the determinants of banking crises started to emerge, partly as a 
result of central banks’ effort to establish an early warning system (e.g., Caprio and 
Klingebiel 1996, 2003; Eichengreen and Rose 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
1998, 2000; Kaminsky and Reinhardt 1999; Hutchison and McDill 1999; Edison 2000).  
These papers have contributed tremendously by investigating the common 
macroeconomic roots of banking crises which occurred during the early 1980s and 1990s.  
In particular, they find that banking crises are preceded by economic recession and 
therefore can be predicted by macroeconomic indicators such as a dramatic fall in real 
GDP growth rate.  Paradoxically, other studies such as those by Honohan (1997) and 
Juan (1996) are inclined to blame factors other than macroeconomic shocks, e.g. defects 
in the banking sector itself, for the systemic banking crises.   
 
This chapter performs an empirical study verifying the macroeconomic determinants of 
banking crises proposed by earlier studies.  In practice, it finds that the earlier studies 
share a common problem in defining the dependent variable of their model – the crisis 
dummy variable.  All of the existing studies use indirect indicators to detect crises.  In 
particular, the majority follow “event studies” where a banking crisis is defined when a 
combination of events including bank closures, forced mergers and take-overs and large-
scale government bailouts become publicised in the media.  Other studies like Hagen and 
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Ho (2003) propose a weighted average to quantify the banking sector difficulties.  They 
define banking crises as significant tensions in the money market caused by bank runs, 
the drying up of interbank lending, or large-scale support by the central bank or a 
combination of the three.   However, as the latter two factors are measured by money 
market interest rates and the intervention of the central bank in terms of credit injections, 
the identified dates may merely represent normal implementation of monetary policy 
rather than banking sector problems.     
 
Both types of these studies opine that banking sector difficulties have often been widely 
identified for some time before that point.  The direct indicator reflecting deterioration of 
banks’ asset quality is not used in those studies, largely because stock market data are not 
available from emerging markets in the early 1980s and sector indices of systemic 
implications are not available until the early  1990’s, even for many of the developed 
markets.  Nevertheless, using stock indices available since the 1990s, the chapter is able to 
re-examine the macroeconomic causes through direct crisis identification.  Banking crises 
are identified by the chapter as when there is an abnormal fall in the banking industry 
stock indices, independent of general market movement.      
 
In addition to crisis identification, the chapter differs from existing studies in classifying 
the dependent crisis dummy into a pre-crisis period, a post-crisis period, and a crisis 
period.  In doing this, the chapter aims to verify the assertions of earlier studies regarding 
macroeconomic indicators prior to banking crises and investigate their movement in 
relation to the protracted post-crisis period.  As Hardy (1998) noted, some of the 
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macroeconomic variables typically display a distinctive boom and bust pattern, both in 
the lead-up to an episode of banking system distress and while the episode is unfolding.  
Moreover, the “pre-/post-crisis bias” is ignored in some existing studies, which probably 
contributes to the insignificance of the individual explanatory variables. 
 
The results of the current empirical studies corroborate the analysis of Hardy (1998) and 
indicate a “boom and bust” pattern around a crisis.  Specifically, they imply that the 
economy still “thrives” in the “pre-crisis” period in terms of increasing GDP growth.  In 
contrast to earlier empirical studies, the economic downturn in terms of a fall in GDP 
growth is generally associated with the post-crisis period.  As the “bust” parts appear to 
be shifted afterwards in this chapter, it is concluded that the inconsistency of results is 
very likely due to imprecise crisis identification of earlier studies.  The existing studies 
might often identify crises too late on the basis of indirect symptoms.   
       
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows.  Section 4.2 reviews early literature on 
macroeconomic causes of banking crises and their approaches to crisis identification. 
Section 4.3 presents the current empirical study aimed at verifying the macroeconomic 
roots of banking crises.  It uses the bank stock index to identify crises and provides a 
comparison with existing approaches.  The section also explains the multinomial logit 
model and empirical specification of the crisis analysis.  Then, empirical results are 
analyzed in detail in terms of each macroeconomic variable under investigation, 
comparing them with earlier studies.  Section 4.4 concludes. 
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4.2 Literature Review 
 
4.2.1 Macroeconomic Causes of Banking Crises 
 
Many discussions of banking distress start with an analysis of the specific characteristics 
of the bank that have failed, which involves poor risk management, malfeasant behaviour 
and the loophole of a regulatory system that permits those mistakes.  However, when 
trying to investigate systemic distress in which a substantial fraction of the banking sector 
is endangered, economists agree that this focus is incomplete and potentially misleading.  
In particular, Hausman (1996) argues that the observed shortcomings of failed banks do 
not explain the crisis, and that banks fail as the result of the crisis.  He uses a metaphor to 
support his argument: “Chains break at their weakest link……strengthening weak links in 
the chain only works if one succeeds in identifying the weakest link before it snaps, and 
even then will accomplish nothing more than causing the chain to break at another link if 
the tension on the chain is sufficiently high.”  Thus, he implies that it is more important 
to identify the tension on the chain than to identify the weakest link.  In his metaphor, 
tension placed on the chain refers to macroeconomic developments. 
 
Other studies (Gorton 1991, Honohan 1997, Hardy and Pazarbasioglu 1998, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache 1998, Kaminsky 1999) echo this argument and point out that 
banking crises are preceded by economic recession and therefore can be predicted by 
macroeconomic indicators.  Slow GDP growth is regarded in these studies as harming the 
balance sheet of banks through two channels.  One channel is through bank liabilities 
when depositors withdraw large amounts from all banks.  Gorton (1991) believes that 
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panic withdrawal by depositors is not just random manifestation of “mass hysteria”, but 
is systemically related to the aggregate information that changes their perception of risk.  
Bank runs occur as features of nearly every severe business cycle downturn because 
depositors expect a large number of banks to fail during recessions.  The other channel is 
through deteriorating bank assets, which is more acknowledged by modern theory (see 
Hardy and Pazarbasioglu 1998, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998, Kaminsky 1999) 
of bank failure.  This happens as non-performing loans increase systematically due to the 
fact that adverse shocks affect the solvency of bank borrowers, whose impact cannot be 
perfectly diversified by banks in an economy that is in general distress (Hagen and Ho 
2003).   
 
However, Honohan (1997) is sceptical that banking systems collapse because of 
macroeconomic shocks, as some of them have survived very severe macroeconomic 
shock.  He contends that the chain breaks as the result of the homogeneous weakness of 
all links.  Moreover, he considers the macroeconomic disturbances to be endogenous, 
which, to some extent, are caused by the banking systems themselves.  The systemic 
distress in the banking sector originates from the economic boom preceding business 
slowdown, where banks riding on a wave of optimism overlend to projects which have 
poor long-term prospects.  Temporary success brought in by the weight of money lent 
may bid up the asset price and thereby draw further lust from beneficiaries and would-be 
beneficiaries.  The situation does not occur as the result of activities of individual banks 
that normally learn to observe others and adopt market norms for lending.  It comes 
from the herding behaviours which lesson the usual prudent risk management and leads 
to a self-fulfilling shift in the views on sectoral creditworthiness, especially with regards to 
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the property sector.  As wealth effects generate a consumption boom, it also leads to an 
exaggerated current account deficit, then real exchange rate appreciation, a loss of 
competitiveness, and finally a slowdown in growth.   
 
With a moderate perspective, Hardy (1998) opines that, although the macroeconomic 
variables are worth watching closely, they are far from reliable.  He notes that some of 
these variables typically display a distinctive boom and bust pattern, both in the lead-up 
to an episode of banking system distress and while the episode is unfolding.   
 
“……after rising rapidly, real GDP, consumption, and, especially, investment start 
to decline; an acceleration in inflation is suddenly reversed; credit from the banking 
system to the private sector builds up rapidly, peaks, and then contracts; real interest 
rates increase steadily; and the real effective exchange rate appreciates and then 
depreciates. In the lead-up to a crisis, banks often rely increasingly on foreign 
borrowing, which then dries up.” 
 
Therefore, his study implies that banking crises are most likely associated with, but not 
necessarily preceded by, economic recession.   
 
4.2.2 Existing Empirical Studies 
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4.2.2.1 Candidate Indicators and Variables 
 
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 gave impetus to a flourishing body of empirical 
literature on the macroeconomic determinants of banking crises.  Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998), Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999), and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
show that shocks that adversely affect the economic performance of bank borrowers and 
whose impact cannot be reduced through risk diversification should be positively 
correlated with systemic banking crises.   This is because the value of banks’ assets could 
drop and fall short of banks’ liabilities (bankruptcy) when bank borrowers become unable 
to repay their debt.  The shocks associated with banking crises highlighted in these 
studies include output downturn, and declines in asset prices.  Their findings are 
consistent with earlier studies in Gorton (1988) and Caprio and Klingebiel (1996).     
 
Even in the absence of lower performance of bank borrowers, these studies find that 
high domestic real interest rates increase the possibility of banking crises (Reinhart 1999, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998, Hardy and Pazarbasioglu 1999, Hagen and Ho 
2003 etc.).  This is because, for banks, the rate of return on assets (usually at a fixed rate 
for a long-term loan) cannot be adjusted at the same pace as the deposit rate.  When there 
is an abrupt increase in the official rate, lending rates would fall short of the rate that 
banks have to pay to their depositors, thereby reducing profits or imposing losses on 
banks.  In fact, all banks are exposed to some degree of interest rate risk because maturity 
transformation is one of the typical functions of banking systems.  As pointed out by 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), banks are especially vulnerable to such risk in 
economic recession when various other problems, including a sharp decrease of asset 
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price and capital outflow, place them on the brink of insolvency.  In the circumstances, it 
is hard for banks to refinance in a market that lacks confidence.  Moreover, attempts by 
the banks to call-in loans or refuse to renew them leads to financial distress of the banks’ 
borrowers and a downturn in aggregate demand, thereby pushing banks into a vicious 
circle. 
 
However, Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998) and Honohan (2000) report a boom in bank 
lending to the private sector prior to banking crises, with a further decline during the 
crisis.   Overborrowing cycles leading to crises are also found in Kaminsky (1999), 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Hagen and Ho (2003, 2007).  Honohan (1997) argues 
that the credit expansion in the prolonged boom is often financed by additional base 
money, which is the reason why capital inflows often present in early stages.   He implies 
that, when the capital inflows come to a stop or experience a sharp unwind, the banking 
system caves in.  As Goldfajn and Valdes (1995) argue, the introduction of intermediation 
by banks in the capital flow both attracts capital inflows by offering liquidity to the 
customers and creates all its side effects: allowing possibilities of a run on their assets.   
The latter places banks under severe liquidity pressure, and thereby leads to a fire-sale of 
their assets.  Forced sale in the circumstances may not be easy, as the asset market already 
reaches an impasse.  The selling pressure in the asset market causes a sharp deflation of 
asset prices (including collaterals), and thereby pushes borrowers and banks into financial 
distress.  Eichengreen and Rose (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Zhuang & 
Dowling (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Hardy and Pazarbasioglu 
(1999) demonstrate that the vulnerability to capital outflows can be reflected in 
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overvaluation before crisis, depreciation during a crisis, and a decline in foreign currency 
reserves relative to M2 money.   
 
Moreover, as countries vary in their vulnerability to banking crises, Hardy and 
Pazarbasioglu (1999) and Hagen and Ho (2003) also take into account the institutional 
factors.  They believe that a financial sector lacking a sound legal system and the 
efficiency of law enforcement is more likely than otherwise to experience banking crises.  
These factors can be reflected by lower GDP per capita.   
 
4.2.2.2 Methodologies and Findings 
 
Based on the methodology proposed by Diebold and Rudebusch (1989), and Stock and 
Watson (1989) for leading indicators, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) propose a Leading 
Indicator approach for currency and banking crises.  They investigate empirically a list of 
candidate variables discussed above and determine the thresholds for each variable that 
signals warning for crises.  This threshold is the value of the variable that minimizes the 
ratio of false alarms to genuine alerts of banking crises over a horizon of 24 months prior 
to the crises.  However, the indicator studies do not allow for checking the individual 
contribution of each variable to the crisis and there is no way to include regional 
differences.  Later studies overcome these problems and adopt a Limited Dependent 
Model Approach for estimating the incidence of crises which can be regarded as a binary 
discrete event (1 for crisis or 0 for non-crisis).  In particular, Eichengreen and Rose 
(1998), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Hagen and Ho (2002, 2007) and 
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Hutchison and McDill (1999) use either a probit or logit model to verify the marginal 
contribution of individual indicators to banking crises.   
 
Nevertheless, the binomial model also has limitations.  Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999) 
argue that crises are often defined to start when intervention became necessary, but often 
the difficulties might have been widely recognised and have caused serious disruption for 
some time before then.   Therefore, economic behaviour in the run-up to the onset of an 
episode may differ significantly from that in tranquil times.  Taking account of this factor 
would improve the predictive power of the leading indicators independently of what only 
becomes clear in the crisis year.  Practically, they estimate a multinomial model and define 
a discrete variable that takes the value of 2 in the event of a crisis, a value of 1 in the 
previous year, and zero otherwise. 
 
Table 4.1 summarises the findings of existing empirical studies.  To facilitate comparison, 
the table lists the explanatory variables that are commonly used in these studies.  
Specifically, both indicator studies and binomial model studies find that real GDP growth 
tends to be negatively associated with banking crises.  However, estimating the 
multinomial model, Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999) find that the decrease in real output 
is insignificantly related to the incidence of pre-crisis period.  It only becomes negative 
during the crisis period.  Inconsistency in the signs of coefficients also appears in 
domestic real interest rates, overvaluation, and credit rate growth, leading to the 
occurrence of banking crises.  This indicates that sometimes lower interest rates, 
undervaluation and lower credit rate growth are found prior to or during crises, in 
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contrary to the predictions of theories explained in the previous section.  As the following 
sections develop, the chapter attributes the inconsistency largely to the differences in 
defining the start of crises.  The existing studies may identify the crises too late so the 
macroeconomic variables display their “down-turn” movement in the pre-crisis period.  
After the outbreak of crises, the acceleration in inflation reverses (as reflected in interest 
rate as well), bank credit contracts and real effective exchange rate depreciates. 
 
 
4.2.3 Identification of a Banking Crisis  
 
Correct identification of the emergence of banking crises is essential to their causality 
analysis.  This section reviews two approaches to identifying crises in existing studies: 
event studies and money market pressure index (MMP).  As will be explained below, the 
event studies which are most widely used tend to identify crises too late or too early, 
while the MMP index approach may detect events (monetary policy change) other than 
banking crises. 
 
4.2.3.1 Event Studies 
 
Event studies rely on a combination of events to define the onset of a banking crisis.  
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for instance, mark the beginning of a banking crisis by 
two types of events: “(1) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the 
public sector of one or more financial institutions; and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, 
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merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial 
institution (or group of institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes 
for other financial institutions.”  As their definition makes no distinction between bank 
fragility in general and fully-fledged crises, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)  
shortlist their results by imposing one of four conditions: “(1) the ratio of non-
performing assets to total assets in the banking system exceeded 10 percent; (2) the cost 
of the rescue operation was at least 2 percent of GDP; (3) banking sector problems 
resulted in a large-scale nationalization of banks; (4) extensive bank runs took place or 
emergency measures such as deposit freezes, prolonged bank holidays, or generalized 
deposit guarantees were enacted by the government in response to the crisis.”   
 
However, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Hagen and Ho (2004) admit that the 
disadvantage of this approach is that it may date the crises too late because the severe 
financial problems usually emerge well before any bank run, closure or merger, 
government intervention or rescue.  Hagen and Ho (2003) also point out that the 
decision is usually arbitrary on whether an event is large enough to be a systemic crisis; 
and the criteria is not always consistent across studies. As illustrated in Table 4.2, 
countries recorded as having a crisis in one study are recorded with no crisis in other 
studies.  Moreover, event studies often limit themselves to low frequency annual data, 
making it difficult to forecast future crises to a precise level. 
 
4.2.3.2 Money Market Pressure Index (MMP) 
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Hagen and Ho (2004) propose an alternative approach to enable consistency and high 
frequency data.  Motivated by approaches to identify currency crises, they detect banking 
crises when there is a sharp increase in the banking sector’s aggregate demand for central 
bank reserves.  They suggest it is very likely that high liquidity demand comes from bank 
runs, a sharp decline in the quality of bank loans, or the deadlocked status of the 
interbank market.  In these situations, they argue that central banks will either inject 
additional reserves if the short-term interest rate is targeted to be fixed, or the money 
market rate will rise if the reserves are the operating target.  Based on these assumptions, 
they develop an index of money market pressure (MMP) which measures the weighted 
average of changes in the ratio of reserves to bank deposits and changes in the short-term 
real interest rate: 
 
tRMMRtratiot RMMRratioMMP ∆×+∆×= ∆∆ ϖϖ                                                            ( 4.1) 
 
where the tratio  denotes the ratio of total reserves held by the banking system to total 
non-bank deposits in the banking sector;  in a period of high tension in the money market, 
they explain this ratio increases either because the central bank makes additional reserves 
available to the banking system, or because depositors withdraw their funds from the 
banks.  Moreover, tRMMR denotes the money market rate in real term; ∆ denotes 
difference operators; RMMRratio ∆∆ ϖϖ ,  denote the inverse of the standard deviation of the 
two components respectively.  Hagen and Ho (2004) define the onset of a banking crisis 
as a period in which the value of the MMP index exceeds its country-specific 98.5 
percentile. 
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Compared with event studies, MMP indices improve in precision and consistency while 
avoiding arbitrariness.  However, the approach has several obvious shortcomings.  Firstly, 
Hagen and Ho (2004) admit that a systemic panic run on banks is seldom witnessed in 
modern banking crises following the introduction of explicit deposit insurance (an 
assertion also made by Glick and Hutchinson (1999), Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998), 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999);  Secondly, given that bank deposits will not change 
dramatically during crises, an increase in the interbank rate and credit injection of central 
banks as components of the index may well be due to other aspects than indicators of 
interbank market dry-up and central bank’s liquidity support banking crises.  An increase 
in the money market rate could be merely a pass-through effect of monetary policy 
targeting inflation rates.  Hence, the IMP approach could mislead by inventing too many 
crises that do not exist (Type II error).   
 
4.3 An Empirical Analysis of Banking Crises 
 
4.3.1 Identifying Crises Using The Bank Stock Index 
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) state that banking crises arise directly from the protracted 
deterioration of banks’ asset quality, be it from a collapse in real-estate prices or increased 
bankruptcies in nonfinancial sectors.   Thus, changes in bank asset prices or 
nonperforming loans could be measured to indicate the beginning of the crisis.  However, 
the previous practices commonly use indirect indicators to signal a banking sector 
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problem.  Researchers justify the usage of these methods on the grounds that the direct 
indicators are either not available or are difficult to interpret in the early studies (Hagen 
and Ho 2003).  Nonperforming loans are normally released on an annual basis and the 
figure may be less informative due to banks’ incentive to hide their problems as long as 
possible.  For the sample period that starts from the early 1980’s, there seems to be no 
stock market data available in emerging markets.  Furthermore, the sector indices are not 
available until the early 1990’s even for many of the developed markets.   
 
Using stock market data since the 1990s, the following sections aim to identify the onset 
of banking through direct indicators and analyze the difference from the previous 
approaches. 
 
4.3.1.1 Bank Stock Index (IBS) 
 
 
Stock market data have been applied in many studies to signal banks’ problems (Krainer 
and Lopez 2003 and 2004; Vesala and Vulpes 2004; for example).  However, the 
application of this chapter is different from these studies in two aspects.   Firstly, it is 
concerned more with the entire banking industry than with individual banks.  Thus, the 
chapter uses bank industry indices in preference to individual bank stock prices.  
Moreover, individual banks’ balance-sheets are not involved in the causality analysis.  
Secondly, the abnormal falls in the industry indices are used to generate limited 
dependant variables in the crisis analysis model.     
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The chapter defines the falls in terms of the percentage change of the current index to its 
value in the previous period.  However, complications may arise as the industry index 
makes no distinction between general market movements and idiosyncratic single-sector 
movements.   Crises could be falsely identified if the general movement is led by sectors 
other than the banking sector.   To extract the effect, the percentage change of the 
banking industry index is regressed against that of the general market index.  The 
residuals obtained are treated as the crisis index.  The regression and the bank stock index 
(IBS) are shown in equations (4.2) and (4.3) below: 
 
tMtBt residRR ++= 21 ββ
                                                                                      ( 4.2)
 
tt residIBS =                                                                                                                                
( 4.3)
 
 
where BtR  and MtR  respectively denote the percentage change of the bank industry index 
and market index; and tresid denotes the residual values.  The onset of a banking crisis is 
identified when the IBS index is lower than its 0.5 percentile, i.e. the stock index of the 
banking industry plunges to a level lower than 99.5% of other changes in the sample 
period.   
 
The crisis threshold is tighter than that of the MMP (98.5 percentile) because relaxing it 
to 99 or 98.5 identifies too many episodes crises, while tightening the threshold tends to 
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miss some of the well-known crises recorded in event studies (such as 1997 for Thailand 
and the Philippines).     
 
Moreover, the thresholds to identify crises are country specific.  An alternative to this is 
to pool the data from all countries and apply the same threshold for all.  However, as 
indices across countries are varied in their volatility, which implies different financial and 
macroeconomic environments, pooling the panel data takes the risk of ignoring crucial 
crises in countries with relatively lower volatility.   
 
4.3.1.2 Applications 
 
 
This section compares the results of the current IBS index with those of event studies, 
the MMP index approach. Quarterly data are selected spanning from 1990Q1 to 2005Q4.  
The stock market data is collected from Thomson Datastream and MMP indices are 
calculated using the same data source as Hagen and Ho (2003, 2007), i.e. IMF 
International Financial Service.  The results are compared with a number of event studies 
and the World Bank online database up to 2003 (an update of Caprio-Klingebiel 1996, 
1999).  The choice of country is largely based on data availability, and whether the 
country has experienced banking crises during the sample period.  The choice is also 
restricted by the availability of macroeconomic explanatory variables over the sample 
period.  As a result, a small sample of nine countries is selected: Australia, Denmark, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United 
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States.  Nevertheless, the sample covers both developed and emerging economies 
diversely located.   
 
Table 4.2 presents the dates identified by the IBS indices comparing with those identified 
by event studies and the MMP approach.  All crisis dates recorded in event studies have 
been captured in the results of the IBS approach, allowing for two year lags or leads.  
Despite its drawbacks, event studies can still be used as a benchmark because the method 
provides accurate records of historical events and one can be sure that banking distress or 
crises are around the time recorded.  However, differing from the wide-scale financial 
crises in Asia around 1997 and in Latin America around 1995, the dates identified for 
developed countries are less severe in nature and should be regarded more as “distresses” 
than as crises.  Nevertheless, they have systemic implication and reflect an abnormal 
decrease in asset quality.  
 
The IBS index identifies additional crises which are not recorded in event studies.  These 
include the years of 1999 and 2002 for Australia, Denmark, and the US.  There are two 
explanations for these discrepancies.  Firstly, the sample period of many of the event 
studies is until 1997 and recorded events after that date are unavailable.  Secondly, the 
additional crises identified by IBS are “too small” in magnitude to be recorded in other 
studies such as the World Bank database, which usually requires at least 0.5% of fiscal 
cost.  Crises such as the US Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) that required a 
$3.75 billion bail-out during 1998 and 2000 are resolved by the private sector without any 
government spending.  Moreover, the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Crisis, the Russian 
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Crisis in 1998 and the burst of US dot-com bubbles from 2000 to 2002 all led to a world-
wide impact on bank loan quality during those periods.  Likewise, though not founded in 
event studies, the dates of 1994Q3 in Malaysia and 1991Q2 and 1994Q1 in the 
Philippines by the IBS approach are not identified ungrounded.  These dates are recorded 
in other literature or financial newspapers.  It is found that the financial sector in Malaysia 
experienced a capital outflow of the same level between 1994 and 1995 as in the financial 
crisis in 1997, while in the early 1990's, the Philippines faced a severe power crisis 
(Dornbusch 2001, Austria 1999, Financial Times 2008, Jakarta Post 2001). Therefore it is 
very likely that the banking sector in Malaysia and the Philippines survived a period of 
distress in 1994, without visible bank failure or government interference that could be 
recorded in the event studies.  Furthermore, these dates overlap with those identified by 
the MMP approach, suggesting “money market pressure” around the crises.  However, 
the chapter is cautious in applying the MMP, since the approach could invent false crises 
such as 1996Q3 in Australia, 2004Q1 in Denmark, 1991Q2 in Korea.  These dates only 
reflect monetary policy targeting high inflation and are misrepresented as bank crises 
(Type II error).     
 
4.3.1.3 Limitations of the IBS Approach 
 
 
There may be two possible objections to this method.  Firstly, similar to the MMP 
approach, the threshold for identifying crises in the IBS approach is arbitrary.  However, 
there is apparently no better way to resolve it.   Hagen and Ho (2004) tried to endogenize 
the choices of crisis threshold by using the Markov switching model, but find that the 
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method is sample-dependent, tends to invent many more crises, and is less robust to 
different model specifications.  The chapter repeats the endogenization process in Hagen 
and Ho (2004) and presents the results in Appendix 4.1.  As Table 4.9 indicates, the 
Markov switching model invents too many crises in the case of several countries, 
especially the UK where crises are identified in almost every period of the sample.  
Moreover, for some countries where few crises are identified, the results fail to include 
well-known crisis episodes recorded in the event study, e.g. 1997-1998 crises in Korea, 
the Philippines and Thailand are misidentified.   
 
Secondly, it could be argued that the dramatic drop in stock prices could just be due to 
irrational short sell and speculation of investors, the behavior of which has no direct link 
with the deteriorating quality of bank assets.  This occurs when, for example, information 
is released about the failure of one or two large banks or they seek a bail-out from the 
government.  As a consequence, the investors sell shares in all other banks for fear that 
the problems are linked and contagion may follow.  Nevertheless, if the self-fulfilling 
panic short-sell actually causes the prices of banks’ assets to plummet on a sector-wide 
scale, this is a de facto crisis and should be identified as such.     
 
4.3.2 Macroeconomic Causes of Banking Crises 
 
4.3.2.1 Econometric Approach  
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The chapter follows the existing studies and adopts the Limited Dependent Model 
Approach to analyze the relationship between macroeconomic variables and banking 
crises.  A traditional linear model is not appropriate here because the banking 
crises/distresses are discrete events distinct from those which can be measured by 
continuous variables.  Specifically, the chapter uses a multinomial logit model for 
estimating more than two responsive categories.  As explained in later sections, the 
responsive categories consist of four unordered nominal variables, i.e. crisis (y=1), pre-
crisis (y=2), post-crisis (y=3), and tranquil period (y=4).  Formally, the model is expressed 
as follows:  
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Equation (4.4) produces Prob(y=j), where j=1,2,…J-1 for J numbers of categories (here 
J=4) and k for distinguishing x variables.  Prob(y=J) can be derived by taking 1-
[Prob(y=1)+…+Prob(y=J-1)]. The unknown parameters β j’s are estimated by maximum 
likelihood.  The model can be also expressed in logit form: 
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where the left-hand side is a log odds ratio, and the right-hand side gives the marginal 
effect of kx on the odds indicated by )exp( jKβ .  Therefore, an estimated coefficient jkβ  
does not indicate a change in the probability of a banking crisis for a unit change in the 
value of a corresponding explanatory variable.  Instead, it measures the impact on the 
estimated Logit L, with all other kx variables held constant.  If a marginal effect on the 
probability is calculated, it is given by: 
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                                                                       ( 4.6) 
          
Thus, the marginal effect on )Pr( jy =  depends on the initial values of all explanatory 
variables in jP  (i.e. equation 4.4).   As equation (4.4) is not linear in kx , caution should 
be exerted in interpreting the magnitude of the coefficient jkβ .  This is because, as 
explained by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), when a country has an extremely 
high (or low) initial probability of crisis, a marginal change has little effect on its prospect, 
while the same marginal change has a greater effect if the country’s probability of crisis is 
in an intermediate range.  As the chapter is more interested in the direction of the change 
from kx to )Pr( jy = , it will avoid the magnitude bias and only interpret the sign of the 
coefficient jkβ .  
  
4.3.2.2 Dependant variables and Pre-/Post-crisis Bias 
 
 144 
 
Two groups of dependent variables were defined for use in the estimation process: 
 
(1)  A dummy variable (designated y1) takes 1 when banking sector difficulties 
emerged, 2 in the preceding periods, and 3 otherwise (succeeding periods 
eliminated); 
(2) A dummy variable (designated y2) takes 1 when banking sector difficulties 
emerged (identified by the IBS index), 2 in the preceding periods, 3 in the 
succeeding periods, and 4 otherwise. 
 
The approach of treating the pre-crisis period, post-crisis period and the crisis period as 
separate events has several considerations.  Firstly, the assertions of previous studies can 
be empirically verified that banking crises are preceded by economic recession and 
therefore can be predicted by macroeconomic indicators.   The existing studies (described 
in section 2) argue that, before the dramatic fall of bank asset prices, the difficulties might 
have been widely recognised and might have caused serious disruption for some time 
beforehand.  Secondly, as the post-crisis period is normally regarded as being part of the 
crisis itself, the relationship between macroeconomic variables and the incidence of this 
period is of interest.  Thirdly, Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999) and Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) point out that the economic behaviour in the run-up to and after the 
declared start of an episode may differ significantly16 from that displayed in normal times.  
Therefore, no distinction between the pre-/post-crisis periods and the non-crisis period 
                                                           
16
 However, the value of the dummy dependent variables does not depend on the significance of this difference.  
Pre-crisis, crisis, post-crisis and other periods are categorized as they vary in the position of the time-line. 
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could lead to bias in the empirical results.  The difference between the pre/post-crisis 
period and tranquil times could be averaged out and inclines to conclude insignificance of 
the individual explanatory variables in the empirical results.   
 
The four category responsive model is based on the three category model of Hardy and 
Pazarbasioglu (1999), who take the “pre-crisis” bias into consideration.  As shown in 
Table 4.3, most binomial studies ignore such bias except for Eichengreen and Rose (1998) 
and Hutchison and McDill (1999), who eliminate all observations around crises.  
However, their approach, as implied by Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999), fails to establish 
the predictive power of the leading indicators independently of what is only known in the 
crisis year Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) use two approaches to control for 
post-crisis bias and opine that both have their drawbacks.  Firstly, eliminating all 
observations following the crises tends to leave fewer observations for estimation.  
Secondly, identifying the end of crises allows the inclusion of all observations, but 
determining when a crisis ends is quite difficult and somewhat arbitrary.  Considering 
these drawbacks, Hagen and Ho (2002) set different window widths (8/12/16 quarters) 
to eliminate observations following a crisis. 
 
Based on existing studies, this chapter adopts two approaches to deal with pre/post-crisis 
bias.  The first group, as explained in statement (1), estimates a three-category logit model 
following Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999), but eliminates the post-crisis observations.  
The second group investigates a four-category logit model, as explained in statement (2).   
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However, determining the widths of windows is very difficult.  It amounts to identifying 
the start of disruption and the end of crises, the arbitrariness of which cannot be avoided 
not only in this chapter17.  The existing studies in Table 4.3 seems to display different 
opinions on how long a crisis normally lasts or whether the window is symmetrical 
around the crisis.  Nevertheless, it can be concluded, from the studies which have a clear 
figure for the window width, that these studies commonly agree that the window width 
ranges from two years (or eight quarters) to four years (16 quarters) around the onset of 
crises.  Due to the limitation of total observation, the chapter chooses a window width 
(eight quarters) within the range set to satisfy the condition that, during the sample period, 
countries have less disruption time than a non-crisis period, an assumption reasonable for 
countries in this sample. 
 
4.3.2.3 Choice of Explanatory Variables 
 
The choice of explanatory variables is both guided by existing literature discussed in 
previous sections and by data availability.  A complete description of the data and their 
sources are available in Table 4.4. Table 4.5 presents the sample mean of explanatory 
variables and their standard errors.  Five groups of variables are used as indicators of 
banking sector problems.  In the first group, the chapter uses real GDP growth rate 
(GROWTH), the domestic real interest rate (RMMR) and the inflation rate 
(INFLATION) to capture the macroeconomic environment during crises.  Slow growth 
harms the balance sheet of banks through deteriorating bank assets.  This happens 
because non-performing loans and defaults of borrowers increase systematically during 
                                                           
17
 In fact, no existing studies under investigation can avoid the arbitrariness of choosing the window width. 
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recessions.  Besides, inflation could reflect macroeconomic mismanagement which 
adversely affects the economy, and thus the banking sector.  High short-term real interest 
rates also affect banks’ balance sheets, as banks cannot adjust their lending rates (income) 
quickly enough to match the same pace as the deposit rate (cost), making banks less 
profitable or causing them to lose money.   
 
The second group of variables relates to a country’s low external competitiveness and 
vulnerability to capital outflow.  The banking crisis is usually linked with a currency crisis 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999).   As many banks denominate their liabilities in foreign 
currency (or borrow from overseas) and lend domestically, the collapse of the exchange 
rate could bring huge losses to banking sectors.  Of course, the excessive foreign 
exchange risk exposure could also affect bank borrowers.  The risk is measured by 
depreciation in the nominal exchange rate (FOREX) and the deviation of the real 
exchange rate from its trend (OVREER), i.e. over-valued currency. 
 
The third group of variables test whether systemic banking sector problems are 
associated with sudden capital outflows.  The sudden reversal of capital could place banks 
and their borrowers under severe liquidity pressure, and thereby lead to a fire-sale of their 
assets and a sharp deflation of asset prices (including collateral).  M2/reserves ratio 
(M2/reserve) is used to capture capital outflow.  The high value of this ratio around crises 
indicates increasing selling of domestic currency and therefore diminishing foreign 
reserves.  Besides, earlier studies suggest that excessive short-term foreign debt at short 
maturities (FODEBT) will increase the vulnerability of a country to external shocks.   
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The fourth group of variables describe the over-lending cycle.  According to earlier 
studies, banking crises are preceded by strong credit growth (CREDITGRO).  This is 
because, during an economic boom, banks ride on a wave of optimism, over-lending to 
projects which have poor long-term prospects.  When the economy slows down, the 
banking sectors have to face the bust of the cycle.  Moreover, the rapid growth in credit is 
usually fuelled by monetary expansion.    
 
The fifth group defines the institutional variables.  Firstly, it uses GDP per capita 
(GDPCAP) to reflect the soundness of a legal system and the efficiency of law 
enforcement.  Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Hagen and Ho (2003) argue 
that a country with a weak legal framework or/and inefficient law enforcement tends to 
breed problems in the banking sectors more easily.  Finally, the capital outflow variables 
are multiplied with regional dummy variables (emerging markets) to construct the 
regional effect factor.  Calvo and Reinhart (1999) stressed that the sudden stop or reversal 
of capital is virulent, especially in emerging markets such as the Argentinean crisis in the 
early 1980s, the Mexican crisis in 1994 and the Asian crises in 1997. 
 
4.3.3 Empirical Results 
 
Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 contain the main results of the econometric investigation.  Table 
4.6 reports the estimation result and standard errors for the dependent variable y1, which 
takes on a value of 2 in the crisis period, and 1 in the pre-crisis period.  The regressions 
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use the panel that excludes the eight quarter post-crisis observations.  Table 4.7 reports 
the same regressions for the dependent variable y2, in which post-crisis observations are 
included and take on the value of 3.  In each table, the first regression includes only the 
macroeconomic variables, while the second regression adds variables capturing 
institutional features and regional effects. 
 
4.3.3.1 Overall Performance and Prediction Accuracy  
 
The quality of model specification is assessed based on log likelihood value, Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC) and in-sample classification accuracy.  The chapter uses the 
former two to compare models with different degrees of freedom.  As a result, the 
specification in both Table 4.6 and Table 4.7, including the institutional features and 
regional effects, seems to perform better than those which only include macroeconomic 
variables (higher log likelihood value and lower AIC).  To assess the prediction accuracy, 
both tables report the percentage that are correctly classified of crisis (y=2), pre-crisis 
(y=1), post-crisis (y=3), non-crises (y=0) and the percentage of total observations that are 
correctly classified.  From both tables, it appears that the models do not perform very 
well in terms of predictions.  Although the percentages of total observation that are 
correctly classified are quite high, above 70%, the accuracy largely comes from the correct 
classification of the non-crisis (y=0) periods, the percentage of which are over 90% in 
both Table 4.6 and Table 4.7.  In contrast, the prediction accuracy for pre-crisis, crisis 
and post-crisis period is low, around 50% for the pre-crisis period in Table 4.6 and about 
25% for the pre-crisis period in Table 4.7.  In particular, the incidence of crisis breakout 
can be hardly be predicted by macroeconomic variables, with about 4% of correct 
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classification in Table 4.6 and close to 0% in Table 4.7.  Therefore, the results agree with 
the claim by Hardy (1998) that the macroeconomic variables are far from being reliable 
enough to predict the onset of banking crises.  Moreover, the higher accuracy in 
predicting pre-/post-crisis (y=1 or 3) than crisis (y=2) lies in the fact that more individual 
explanatory variables are significant (such as inflation, INFL and over-valuation of the 
real effective exchange rate, OVREER) as explained below.   
 
4.3.3.2 Performance of Individual Explanatory Variables 
 
Despite a poor overall performance and low accuracy in predicting crises, the 
econometric results indicate a “boom and bust” pattern around crises (particularly in 
GDP growth, inflation, over-valuation of REER, foreign debt), corroborating assertions 
of Hardy (1998) mentioned earlier.  Specifically, Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 suggest: 
 
 The onset of banking crises is also the turning point of the business cycle.  Banking 
distress is associated with a fall in real GDP growth.  However, the fall is not 
contemporaneously significant, but becomes apparent after the crises break out.  In 
contrast to previous studies, the probability of pre-crisis incidence is increased by a 
rise in real GDP growth.  There is a similar pattern for inflation (INFL) which rises 
before crises and falls following the outbreak of crises.   
 
 The real interest rate (RMMR) is highly significant in all the specifications and has 
the expected sign.  Thus, a high interest rate seems to be one of the most reliable 
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indicators of the banking sector.  Together with increasing inflation before crises, the 
results confirm the theories that banks are vulnerable to nominal and real interest 
rate shocks.   
 
 
 The coefficient of real effective exchange rate (PREER) is not significant but 
including this variable improves the overall performance of the models.  In addition, 
it shows the expected signs to indicate that banking crises are associated with a sharp 
decline in the real effective exchange rate.   
 
 In contrast to PREER, there is a persistent and robust tendency for the real 
exchange rate to deviate from its trend (OVREER) before the onset of crises.  The 
sign of coefficients accords with the prediction of the theory that over-valuation in 
exchange rates is a leading indicator of banking crises (positive sign) and the 
depreciation of the exchange rate from its trend (negative sign) worsens the balance 
sheets of the banking sector which is already suffering, although the latter is only 
marginally significant. 
 
 M2 to reserve ratio (M2RES) and foreign liabilities (DFODEBT) of banks, both 
indicating a capital account problem, show consistent signs of the theory of 
Honohan during the pre-crisis period.  Large foreign debt, and therefore less 
domestic currency and massive foreign reserves concentrated before crises increase 
the vulnerability of a country’s banking sector to external shocks.  However, 
although not significant, the coefficients of the two variables go in the opposite 
direction during the crisis period, indicating the actual occurrence of capital outflow, 
which is reflected in increasing M2 to reserves ratios and decreasing foreign liabilities.  
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However, the negative sign of M2 to reserves ratios in the post-crisis period is less 
likely to indicate banking sector problems.  This could be due to a decrease in M2 as 
banks are unwilling to expand credit during crises. 
 
 As expected, credit growth (CREDGRO) has a positive sign before crises and a 
negative sign following the crises.  However, the variable is only significant in Table 
4.7, indicating that there is a strong “boom and bust” pattern around banking crises.  
The pattern coincides with other variables such as GDP growth, over-valuation of 
exchange rates, and banks’ foreign debt.  This also accords with Demirgüç-Kunt  and 
Detragiache, who find that credit expansion funded mainly by capital inflows, leading 
to overinvestment, seems to be a critical factor leading up to the crisis. 
 
 The inclusion of institutional variables improves the overall performance of the 
estimations and the absolute values of estimated coefficients become larger when the 
regional variables are included.  Both banks’ foreign liabilities and M2 to Reserve 
ratios, when interacted with a dummy of developing countries (DEVDFOBEDT and 
DEVM2RES), are significant and negatively associated with pre-crises incidence.  It 
indicates that banks in emerging markets are more vulnerable to capital mobility than 
developed economies. 
 
 
 
4.3.3.3 Comparing with Existing Empirical studies 
 
The results of this chapter are compared with other studies regarding the performance of 
individual explanatory variables.  As shown in the highlighted parts of Table 4.8, it is 
found that the coefficient signs of macroeconomic variables in predicting crisis and post-
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crisis periods in this chapter tend to be in harmony with those predicting the pre-crisis 
and crisis periods in existing studies.  Thus, while the results of existing empirical studies 
imply that banking crises are preceded by recession, depreciation, undervaluation and 
capital outflow, the current empirical results imply that banking crises are succeeded by 
recession, depreciation, undervaluation, capital outflow.  In contrast, the chapter finds 
that the economy still “thrives” in the “pre-crisis” period in terms of increasing GDP 
growth. 
 
The inconsistency in results is very likely due to imprecise identification of crises in 
previous studies.  In the majority of existing studies, as reckoned by Hardy (1998), a crisis 
is defined as starting when intervention became necessary, but often the banks’ asset 
deterioration is widely known for some time before then, which is reflected in the stock 
prices.   The lateness in crisis identification shifts the “boom and bust” pattern forward, 
either causing the illusionary “recession” before crises or resulting in insignificance of 
explanatory variables.  Moreover, “pre-crisis bias” is rarely addressed in existing studies, 
as explained earlier, and also contributes to the inconsistency in results. 
 
4.4 Conclusion  
 
Existing empirical studies have generally attributed macroeconomic roots to banking 
sector fragility.  They conclude that banking crises/distresses are preceded by 
deteriorating macroeconomic conditions and therefore can be predicted by 
macroeconomic indicators such as a dramatic fall in the real GDP growth rate, a fall in 
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the exchange rate and capital outflow.  Their results were applied pervasively by central 
banks to establish an early warning system of future distress.   
 
However, in an episode of banking system distress, macroeconomic variables not only 
show downward movement, but also display upward movement.  The boom and bust 
pattern is displayed both in the lead-up to a crisis and after the crisis begins unfolding.  
Therefore, the results of the existing studies are crucially dependant on correct crisis 
identification of historical crises.  However, the existing studies share a common problem 
in the dependent variable of their model.  They all rely on indirect events or indices such 
as bank closures, government intervention and money market pressure, to identify 
historical bank crises/distress, while they opine that banking sector difficulties have often 
been widely recognised for some time before then.  The problems originate from a 
deterioration of bank asset quality, the data of which are often not available during the 
sample period of existing studies.  Thus, the results of the existing studies can be subject 
to important caveats. 
 
Using direct stock market data to identify crises, this chapter performs an empirical study 
verifying the macroeconomic determinants of banking crises proposed by earlier studies.  
The results corroborate the “boom and bust” pattern around crises.  In particular, it is 
found that the economy still thrives in the “pre-crisis” period in terms of increasing GDP 
growth.  This is in contrast with earlier empirical studies, which conclude that the 
downward movements precede the onset of crises.  However, it is discovered that the 
economic downturn in terms of a fall in GDP growth is generally associated with the 
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post-crisis period.  As the “bust” parts appear to be shifted afterwards in this chapter, it is 
concluded that the inconsistency of results is very likely due to the imprecise crisis 
identification of earlier studies.  The existing studies often identify crises too late on the 
basis of indirect symptoms. 
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Table  4.1: Key results of empirical studies of determinants of banking crises 
 
Empirical 
studies 
 
 
 
Indicator 
studies 
Binomial Model Multinomial Model 
KR 1999 ER 1998 DD 1998 HH 2003 HM 1999 HP 1999 
Macroeconomic Environment Pre-crisis Crisis 
Real GDP 
growth 
<0.14 
-* 
(contemp.) 
-*** 
(contemp.) 
-*** 
(lagged 1q) 
-*** 
(contemp.) 
Insig. 
(contemp.) 
-*** 
(contemp.) 
Inflation   
+** 
(contemp.) 
+*** 
(lagged 1 
q) 
-Insig. 
(contemp.) 
-* 
(contemp.) 
+*** 
(lagged 2y) 
-*** 
(contemp.) 
Domestic 
real interest 
rate 
>0.80 
 
+*** 
(contemp.) 
-**/Insig. 
(lagged 1 
q) 
Insig. 
(contemp.) 
+ 
(lagged 1y) 
+ 
(contemp.) 
External factors  
Depreciation 
>0.10  
Insig. 
(contemp.) 
+*/Insig. 
(lagged 1 
q) 
Insig. 
(contemp.) 
+*/Insig. 
(contemp.) 
-** 
(contemp.) 
Overvaluatio
n  
+* 
(contemp.) 
 -* 
(lagged 1 
q) 
   
M2/Reserves 
>0.9  
+** 
(contemp.) 
    
Short-term 
foreign debt  
Insig. 
(contemp.) 
   +*/Insig 
(contemp.) 
-Insig 
(contemp.) 
Credit boom and bust  
M2 Multiplier >0.9  
-* 
(contemp.) 
    
Credit 
growth 
>0.95 
Insig. 
(contemp.) 
+** 
(lagged 2y) 
-Insig. 
(contemp.) 
(lagged 2q) 
-*/Insig. 
(contemp.) 
 
-Insig 
(contemp.) 
(lagged 1y) 
 
-Insig. 
(contemp.) 
 
Institutional factors 
 
GDP /capita   -* Insig.    
Estimation 
method 
 Probit Logit Logit Probit Logit 
Note: one, two and three asterisks indicate significant levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.  
Insig., contemp. and q represent respectively insignificance, contemporaneous, and quarter. 
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Table  4.2: Comparison of banking crisis dates identified between 1990 and 2005 
 Event Study MMP IBS 
 
Caprio & 
Klingebiel 
(1996) 
Demirgüc-
Kunt 
& Detragiache 
(1998) 
Kaminsky & 
Reinhart (1999)  
(Beginning)- 
(Peak) 
Bordo & 
Schwarz 
(2000) 
Glick & 
Hutchison 
(2001) 
World 
bank 
database 
(2003) 
Calculated 
based on 
Hagen & 
Ho (2007) 
This 
Chapter 
Frequency Annual Annual Monthly Annual Annual Annual Quarterly Quarterly 
Australia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1991-1992 96Q3 
01Q4 
91Q1 
99Q3 
Denmark n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1990-1992 93Q1 
00Q3 
04Q1 
93Q1 
99Q1 
02Q1 
Korea n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1997-2002 91Q2 
97Q4 
97Q1 
Malaysia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1997-2001 91Q3 
93Q3 
95Q1 
97Q2 
94Q3 
98Q1 
Mexico  1995 1994 Oct 1992-Mar 1996 1994 1995-97 1994-2000 94Q4 
99Q4 
93Q1 
99Q1 
The 
Philippines 
n/a n/a Jul 1997-Ongoing No 1997 1998- 90Q1 92Q1 
97Q3 
91Q2 94Q1 
98Q1     
02Q1 
Thailand  n/a No May 1996-Ongoing 1997 1997 1997-2002 97Q3 97Q2  
00Q1 
The UK No No n/a n/a No 1990s 95Q4 91Q1 94Q3 
99Q1 
The US  1984-91 1981-92 n/a n/a n/a 1988-1991 01Q4 
 
91Q1 
99Q1 02Q1 
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Table  4.3: Comparison of existing studies and this chapter in dealing with pre-crisis and post crisis bias  
 
Logit model Literature Pre-crisis obs. Post-crisis obs. Summary 
Binomial 
ER 1998 & 
HM 1999 
3 years eliminated 3 years eliminated 
Eliminating all obs. around 
crises 
DD 1998 
Unconsidered/treated as tranquil All obs. eliminated 
Ignoring “pre-crisis” bias 
Unconsidered/treated as tranquil Identify the end of crises 
HH 2002 Unconsidered/treated as tranquil 
8/12/16 quarters after crisis 
eliminated 
Multinomial 
HP 1999 2 year Unconsidered/treated as tranquil Ignoring “post-crisis” bias 
This 
chapter 
8 quarters 
8 quarter obs. eliminated Considering both “pre-
crisis” and “post-crisis” 
bias Categorise 8 quarters after crisis 
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Table  4.4: Description of explanatory variables and their relative value compared to a non-crisis period. 
Explanatory variables Definition & Source 
1. Macroeconomic indicators 
 
GROWTH 
Gross Domestic Production (IFS 99BVPZF) divided by GDP deflator (IFS line 99BIPZF) in annual 
percentage changes. 
 INFLATION CPI (IFS line 64...ZF) in annual percentage changes. 
                                                   PRMMR        Money market rate (IFS line 60B..ZF) minus inflation rate in percentage change over the previous year.   
2. External competitiveness 
 PREER Real Effective Exchange Rate (IFS line  ...REUZF) in percentage, change over past two years 
 
OVREER 
Over-valuation of the real effective exchange rate or REER (IFS line  ...REUZF) from trend (use HP 
filter).  For Thailand that REER is not available, real exchange rate per US dollars (IFS line ae) adjusted 
for CPI (IFS line 64...ZF)  is used.   
3. Capital outflow 
 M2RES M2/Reserves.  M2 (IFS lines 34 plus 35) converted into dollars (using IFS line ae) divided by IFS line 
lL.d 
 
PFORDEBT 
Foreign liabilities of domestic commercial banks (IFS line 26C..ZF) in percentage change over the 
previous years. 
4. Over-lending cycle 
 
CREDITGRO 
Credit growth rate.  The ratio of Claims on Private Sector (IFS line 22D..ZF) deflated by CPI (IFS line) 
to real GDP. In annual percentage changes 
5. Institutional & regional factor  
 GDP/CAP Real GDP per capita (Population IFS line 99Z) 
 DEVDFODEBT_ PFORDEBT multiplied by regional dummy for emerging markets. 
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Table  4.5: Sample Mean of Explanatory Variables 
 Non-crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis 
DFODEBT_ 16.5362 26.5234 14.8841 5.3861 
 (24.3026) (32.5035) (24.3066) (20.0882) 
GDPCAP_ 0.0366 0.0462 0.0424 0.0423 
 (0.0451) (0.0572) (0.0549) (0.0563) 
GROWTH_ 0.2997 -1.7701 -4.0607 -2.1859 
 (3.943) (5.7099) (8.6112) (6.7508) 
INFL_ 3.8808 5.9564 6.9311 5.3931 
 (3.5986) (5.6811) (8.9298) (7.2655) 
M2MULTI_ 1029.1136 107.1294 83.7662 124.6779 
 (2502.282) (445.4181) (349.6669) (468.702) 
M2RES_ 2.6447 2.7582 2.7671 2.3304 
 (5.0806) (4.7839) (5.0832) (4.366) 
OVREER_ -0.3335 1.3524 -1.1397 -1.4429 
 (4.5086) (7.0682) (8.1409) (6.6429) 
PCREDGRO_ 8.0438 18.6996 8.8656 3.1755 
 (12.4973) (42.3993) (13.6389) (11.2916) 
PREER_ 1.1008 1.8221 -2.9875 0.7712 
 (5.8408) (11.7985) (10.9427) (13.4184) 
RMMR_ 2.6984 4.9736 4.0352 3.2273 
 (3.0156) (6.6251) (4.7438) (3.2663) 
NO. period 231 177 24 144 
T-critical  1.97 2.07 1.98 
Note: standard errors are given in parentheses. 
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Table  4.6: Multinomial regressions excluding post-crisis observations.  
 y1=1 y1=2 y1=1 y1=2 
C 
-1.808007*** 
(0.235931) 
-2.758652*** 
(0.484413) 
-2.700013*** 
(0.347408) 
-3.145884*** 
(0.841050) 
GROWTH_ 
0.041581 
(0.044849) 
-0.211915** 
(0.096044) 
0.161506*** 
(0.057432) 
-0.164183 
(0.111191) 
INFL_ 
0.147985*** 
(0.043602) 
-0.008336 
(0.104459) 
0.328617*** 
(0.067050) 
0.076967 
(0.143373) 
RMMR_ 
0.217689*** 
(0.034057) 
0.161508*** 
(0.059989) 
0.258262*** 
(0.036536) 
0.178993** 
(0.074375) 
PREER_ 
-0.021043 
(0.017016) 
-0.066677 
(0.049250) 
-0.028724 
(0.018086) 
-0.075028 
(0.056235) 
OVREER_ 
0.074386*** 
(0.028607) 
0.058258 
(0.062823) 
0.103676*** 
(0.029984) 
0.074822 
(0.069220) 
M2RES_ 
-0.029482 
(0.021501) 
0.003553 
(0.046875) 
-0.051911** 
(0.024292) 
0.004036 
(0.047959) 
DFODEBT_ 
0.004790 
(0.004175) 
-0.014473 
(0.015353) 
0.039287*** 
(0.013164) 
-0.001985 
(0.023236) 
PCREDGRO_ 
0.007704 
(0.006223) 
-0.020449 
(0.024527) 
0.008495 
(0.007097) 
-0.020286 
(0.029682) 
CORR_   
0.175267 
(0.215913) 
0.146956 
(0.558334) 
GDPCAP_   
1.979930 
(2.200976) 
1.682726 
(5.139886) 
DEVDFODEBT_   
-0.034899*** 
(0.013069) 
-0.012466 
(0.042969) 
% Total correct 72.75 95.18 73.61 95.24 
% Y=1 or 2 correct 45.76 4.17 51.41 4.17 
% non-crisis correct 88.67 100.00 85.63 99.79 
Included Obs 504 504 
Number of crises 24 24 
Log likelihood -341.4532 -326.3305 
Akaike info 
criterion 
1.434338 1.406074 
Note: one, two and three asterisks indicate significant levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
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Table  4.7: Multinomial regressions include post-crisis observations 
 y2=1 y2=2 y2=3 y2=1 y2=2 y2=3 
C 
-2.045573*** 
(0.235855) 
-3.043043*** 
(0.451259) 
-0.544027*** 
(0.173050) 
-2.809442*** 
(0.331816) 
-3.148192*** 
(0.865785) 
-0.623926** 
(0.23842) 
GROWTH_ 
0.072697 
(0.043842) 
-0.116289 
(0.085713) 
-0.147788*** 
(0.022551) 
0.175393*** 
(0.055117) 
-0.111000 
(0.103863) 
-0.144131* 
(0.022762) 
INFL_ 
0.102177** 
(0.043322) 
-0.044505 
(0.081004) 
-0.080615 
(0.019724) 
0.243033*** 
(0.061488) 
-0.019972 
(0.128364) 
-0.07053*** 
(0.022794) 
RMMR_ 
0.139666*** 
(0.032139) 
0.005829** 
(0.064351) 
0.015938** 
(0.034790) 
0.179364*** 
(0.033674) 
0.015587** 
(0.080300) 
0.027329*** 
(0.035190) 
PREER_ 
-0.012269 
(0.014626) 
-0.046134 
(0.045759) 
0.016577 
(0.012060) 
-0.015366 
(0.014216) 
-0.050260 
(0.061680) 
0.016499 
(0.010854) 
OVREER_ 
0.070755** 
(0.026283) 
0.050153 
(0.062168) 
-0.063158 
(0.022325) 
0.096028*** 
(0.027042) 
0.057507 
(0.071953) 
-0.063119 
(0.020326) 
M2RES_ 
-0.021019 
(0.021179) 
-0.012150 
(0.046238) 
-0.005852 
(0.025298) 
-0.038015** 
(0.023662) 
0.014648 
(0.048198) 
-0.008615 
(0.025425) 
DFODEBT_ 
0.009852 
(0.004359) 
-0.007040 
(0.015553) 
-0.018035*** 
(0.005187) 
0.037090*** 
(0.012397) 
-0.011421 
(0.022866) 
-0.009985 
(0.010780) 
PCREDGRO_ 
0.014688 
(0.008652) 
-0.006749 
(0.023072) 
-0.047211*** 
(0.009491) 
0.017058 
(0.009738) 
-0.006301 
(0.030514) 
-0.04779*** 
(0.010074) 
GDPCAP_    
2.004695 
(2.167019) 
1.127717 
(4.949160) 
-0.492290 
(2.095535) 
DEVDFODEBT_    
-0.029266*** 
(0.012171) 
0.004902 
(0.046237) 
-0.011796** 
(0.013578) 
DEVM2RES_    
-0.286811*** 
(0.109494) 
-0.187006 
(0.212924) 
-0.098249 
(0.101499) 
% Total correct 75.00 96.30 80.68 75.93 96.30 79.78 
% Y=1, 2 or 3 
correct 
23.16 0.00 24.31 29.94 0.00 18.75 
% non-crisis 
correct 
94.48 100.00 97.69 93.21 100.00 97.22 
Included Obs 648 648 
Number of crises 24 24 
Log likelihood -591.1529 -570.1085 
Akaike info 
criterion 
2.156781 2.125377 
Note: one, two and three asterisks indicate significant levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
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Table  4.8: Comparison of results with existing studies 
Macroeconomic 
Variables 
Binomial Model Multinomial Model Multinomial Model  
This chapter 
ER 1998 DD 1998 HH 2002 HM 1999 
HP 1999 
Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-
crisis 
Crisis Post-
crisis 
Real GDP growth 
-* -*** 
(contemp.) 
-*** 
(lagged 1q) 
-*** 
(contemp.) 
Insig. -*** +** -Insig -** 
Inflation 
 +** 
(contemp.) 
+*** 
(lagged 1 q) 
-Insig. -* 
(contemp.) 
-*** +** -Insig -** 
Domestic real 
interest rate 
 +*** 
(contemp.) 
-**/Insig. 
(lagged 1 q) 
Insig.   +** +Insig +Insig 
Depreciation  Insig. +*/Insig. Insig. +*/Insig. -** -Insig -Insig +Insig 
Overvaluation +*  -* 
(lagged 1 q) 
   +*** +Insig -*** 
M2/Reserves  +** 
(contemp.) 
    -Insig +Insig -Insig 
Short-term foreign 
debt 
Insig.    +*/Insig -Insig +*** -Insig -* 
M2 Multiplier 
 -* 
(contemp.) 
       
Credit growth 
Insig. +** 
(lagged 2y) 
Insig. 
(lagged 2q) 
-*/Insig. 
 
-Insig 
(contemp.) 
(lagged 1y) 
 
-
**/Insig. 
+** -Insig -*** 
GDP /capita  -* Insig.    +Insig +Insig +Insig 
Note: one, two and three asterisks indicate significant levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Appendix 4.1 
 
Crisis Identification by Markov switching model 
 
The Markov switching model is used here to find a crisis threshold that maximises the log 
likelihood function of the Bank Stock Index (IBS).  The model starts with assuming 
different means (
tSβ as below) and variances ( 2tSσ ) in two regimes (St), i.e. crisis (St =1) and 
a tranquil period (St =0).  It is expected that crisis periods may have a lower mean and a 
larger variance than the tranquil periods.  The index is formulated below: 
),0(~, 2
tttt SSSStt
NeeIBSy σβ +==
                                                              ( 4.7) 
ttS SSt 10 )1( βββ +−=                                                                                        ( 4.8) 
ttS SSt
2
1
2
0
2 )1( σσσ +−=
                                                                                      ( 4.9) 
1,0 orSt =                                                                                                          ( 4.10) 
Therefore, under regime 1, parameters are given by 1β  and 21σ , and under regime 0, 
parameters are given by 0β  and 20σ .  In this case, the log likelihood function is given by: 
∑
=
−
==
T
t
tttt SyfyfL
1
1 )|(ln()|(ln ψ
                                                                  ( 4.11) 
where 
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where 1−tψ  refers to information up to time t-1.  The log likelihood function then is given 
by: 
∑∑
=
−−
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11
1
)}|(),|(ln{ln
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T
t
SfSyfL ψψ
                                                     ( 4.13) 
However, to maximise the equation (4.13) with respect to
2
1
2
010 ,,, σσββ , the weighting 
factors, ]|0Pr[ 1−= ttS ψ  and ]|1Pr[ 1−= ttS ψ  need to be calculated.  Without a priori 
assumptions about the stochastic behaviour of the St variable, this will not be possible.  The 
simplest first-order Markov switching model assumes that St is dependent upon St-1.  The 
paper employs the iteration procedure of Kim and Nelson (1999) to deal with the 
unobserved St.  Furthermore, it modifies the Eviews program by Ho (2004) to suit the 
situation for this paper.  Ho (2004) uses a grid search to start the estimation.  The final 
estimate is the one with highest likelihood value.  The banking crisis dates identified are 
listed in the following table.  The results verify the conclusion in Ho (2004).  The method 
invents too many crises for some countries, for example, the UK has crises in almost every 
period of the sample.  Moreover, for countries that have had a few crises, the results fail to 
include the most well-known crisis episodes in the data, for example, the 1997-1998 crisis in 
Korea, the Philippines and Thailand. 
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Table  4.9: Banking crisis dates identified by simple Markov-switching model. 
Country Identified Banking Crises 
Australia             1991Q3 1992Q1 1992Q3 1993Q2
 1993Q4 1994Q1 1994Q4 1995Q2
 1995Q4 1996Q4 1997Q1 1997Q3
 1997Q4 1998Q3 1999Q1 1999Q2
 2000Q1 2000Q3 2001Q1 2001Q3
 2002Q1 2002Q3 2003Q3 2004Q2
 2005Q1 2005Q2 2005Q4 2006Q2
 2007Q3 
Denmark             1990Q2 1990Q4 1991Q2 1991Q4
 1992Q2 1992Q4 1993Q2 1993Q4
 1994Q2 1994Q4 1995Q2 1995Q4
 1996Q2 1996Q4 1997Q2 1997Q4
 1998Q2 1998Q4 1999Q2 1999Q4
 2000Q2 2000Q4 2001Q2 2001Q4
 2002Q2 2002Q4 2003Q2 2003Q4
 2004Q2 2004Q4 2005Q2 2005Q4
 2006Q2 2006Q4 2007Q2 2007Q4 
Korea             1999Q1 
Malaysia             1993Q4 1994Q1 1994Q2 1994Q3
 1998Q1 1998Q2 1998Q3 1998Q4
 1999Q1 1999Q2 1999Q3 1999Q4
 2000Q1 2000Q2 2000Q3 2000Q4 
Mexico             1990Q2 1990Q3 1990Q4 1991Q1
 1991Q2 1991Q3 1991Q4 1992Q1
 1992Q2 1992Q3 1992Q4 1993Q1
 1993Q2 1994Q2 1995Q1 1995Q2
 1995Q3 1999Q1 1999Q2 1999Q3
 1999Q4 2000Q1 2000Q2 2001Q4 
The Philippines             1994Q2 
Thailand             1999Q2 
The UK             1990Q2 1990Q3 1990Q4 1991Q1
 1991Q2 1991Q3 1991Q4 1992Q1
 1992Q2 1992Q3 1992Q4 1993Q1
 1993Q2 1993Q3 1993Q4 1994Q1
 1994Q2 1994Q3 1994Q4 1995Q1
 1995Q3 1995Q4 1996Q1 1996Q2
 1996Q3 1996Q4 1997Q1 1997Q2
 1997Q3 1997Q4 1998Q1 1998Q2
 1998Q3 1998Q4 1999Q1 1999Q2
 1999Q3 1999Q4 2000Q1 2000Q2
 2000Q3 2000Q4 2001Q1 2001Q2
 2001Q3 2001Q4 2002Q1 2002Q2
 2002Q3 2002Q4 2003Q1 2003Q2
 2003Q3 2003Q4 2004Q1 2004Q2
 167 
 
 2004Q3 2004Q4 2005Q1 2005Q2
 2005Q3 2005Q4 2006Q1 2006Q2
 2006Q3 2006Q4 2007Q1 2007Q2
 2007Q3 2007Q4 
The US             1991Q1            1999Q1 
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The previous three chapters investigate empirically various topics regarding the systemic 
risk of the banking sector and conclude that pre-2007 risk assessment models underestimate 
the systemic risk of the banking sector and justify an overhaul in terms of: assessing the 
contagion impact of the interbank market; testing market discipline of interbank lending 
and verifying macroeconomic indicators of banking crises.   
 
Specifically, Chapter 2 indicates that wide-scale contagion is more likely than the previous 
studies suggest.  The results agrees to the argument put forward by Allen and Gale (2000) 
and Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) who regard the interbank exposure or the credit 
linkage between banks as a source of contagion.  Default of any banks in the netting system 
is likely to trigger a chain reaction of defaults, resembling the fall of dominoes.  And the risk 
of interbank contagion is sensitive to the pattern of linkages/market structure.  Before the 
current global crisis occurs, central banks in various countries especially in Europe 
(Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Denmark, UK, Belgium) applies a network approach to 
track the reverberation of a credit event or liquidity squeeze throughout the banking system 
via direct linkages in the interbank market.  All of them find only limited or low contagion 
impact.  However, the author find that their results are crucially subject to various 
assumptions such as the evolution of market structures, the choice of data, default rate, and 
other factors that could lead to bias to the result in one or mixed direction.  Most 
significantly, the author compares the simulation using consolidated data to those using 
unconsolidated data in other studies.  This means that the thesis takes account of the fact 
that the subsidiaries and their headquarters normally stand or fall together, which is 
generally ignored by previous literatures.  As the banking industry becomes increasingly 
integrated and concentrated---large banks usually owning a significant number of 
subsidiaries, using unconsolidated data simulation would seriously mislead central banks’ 
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view in assessing the systemic implications of financial linkages.  The results of the thesis 
show that the contagion impact in the UK interbank market using consolidated data is 
much severe, i.e. 89.48% of the total balance sheet assets are affected in the worst scenario 
at a LGD rate of 100%, compared with 25.25% in Wells (2004) who uses unconsolidated 
data.  The inconsistency is analyzed in a pseudo-four-bank illustration.  It shows that the 
average interbank exposure relative to tier-I capital is larger in the system of consolidated 
exposure than that of unconsolidated exposure.  The author assesses two years before 2004 
and finds a similar wide-scale contagion between 2004 and 2003, accounting for 90% of 
total banking sector assets, but a limited impact in 2002, accounting for only 12.57%.  This 
is attributed to higher interbank exposure relative to Tier-1 capital in 2003 and 2004 
compared to 2002.   Given more data available, the future work would make more years 
comparable.   
 
As bilateral exposure data of individual banks are not released to the public, the thesis has 
to follow the previous literature which applies Entropy Maximization approach.   Although 
the approach is sensible in that it assumes that the bilateral exposure is in proportion and 
subject to the size of the creditor and borrowing bank’s total interbank exposure to the 
market, it has the limitation in assuming that banks seek to maximize the dispersion of their 
interbank activity, i.e. banks spread their lending as evenly as possible among all the other 
banks.  Relationship banking is ruled out in which banks normally have a few fixed clients 
to transact with.  Although this thesis tries to overcome this limitation by varying the 
weights in the “matrix” that allows testing alternative market structures/relationship 
banking, it is optimal to perform the simulation based on actual data.  Mistrulli (2005) has 
compared results using EM and actual data and concludes that EM approach that resembles 
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complete market results tend to under-estimate the extent of contagion as many countries 
are featured by money centre structure.  However, he also indicates that under certain 
circumstances, depending on the structure of the interbank linkages, the recovery rates of 
interbank exposures and banks’ capitalisation the maximum entropy approach overestimate 
the scope for contagion. 
 
Moreover, future studies would compare the results using EM (network approach) with 
other three approaches summarized in the IMF Global Financial Stability Report (2009), i.e. 
co-risk model, distress dependence matrix, and the default intensity model.  The network 
approach distinguish from others in that it offers important insights on which institutions 
are critical for financial stability and how the structure of the interbank market affects the 
scope for contagion; the co-risk model exploits market data to assess systemic linkages 
among financial institutions under extreme events; the distress dependence matrix examines 
pairs of institutions’ probabilities of distress, taking into account a set other institutions; and 
the default intensity model measures the probability of failures of a large fraction of 
financial institutions due to both direct and indirect systemic linkages.  As indicates in the 
Report (2009) and Upper (2003), although each approach by itself has considerable 
limitations and has different research focus, together they represent a set of valuable 
surveillance tools and can form the basis for policies to address the too-connected-to-fail 
problem in various settings such as stress testing, allocating scarce supervisory resources, 
analysing the costs and benefits of regulating. 
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Together with Chapter 2, Chapter 3 corroborates Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000)’s 
argument that interbank do not always co-operate properly, especially during crises, when 
all banks find it optimal to withdraw bank loans for fear that other banks will not be able to 
honour their obligations if their depositors withdraw all their wealth.  As Figure 5.1 shows, 
the UK financial market comes to a deadlock in providing liquidity not only in the current 
crisis close to 2007, but also in late 90s when US Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) 
and Russian Rupee collapse and the US dot-com bubbles start to burst.  Even during 
“peace” time between 2000 and 2006, the results of Chapter 3 indicate that the interbank 
market does not discipline.  With increasing liquidity during this period, the riskiness of 
banks virtually mounts as well. 
Figure  5.1 Financial market liquidity in UK 1992-2007 
 
Sources: Bank of England (April 2007 Report, Box 2: Financial market liquidity, page 18.), 
Bloomberg, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Debt Management Office, London Stock Exchange, 
Merrill Lynch, Thompson DataStream and Bank calculations.   The liquidity index shows the 
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number of standard deviations from the mean.  It is a simple unweighted average of nine liquidity 
measures, normalised on the period 1999-2004.  
 
This is against the argument proposed by Rochet and Tirole (1996) who argue that by 
generating incentives for peer monitoring, the existence of interbank exposure may facilitate 
prudent market behaviour and reduce the risk of bank failure and systemic distress.       
 
Chapter 3 challenges the results of many pre-2007 models which corroborate Rochet and 
Tirole (1996) and conclude that the existence of interbank exposure may facilitate prudent 
market behaviour and reduce the risk of bank failure and systemic distress.  It finds that 
there are crucial limitations of these studies in defining how market disciplines.   Furfine et 
al on US market check lenders’ risk sensitivity but do not demonstrate that monitoring 
incentives can effectively control the risk of the borrowing banks.  Dinger and Hagen on 
European market confirm negative correlation between the risk and their interbank 
borrowing position, without first confirming the monitoring incentives of the lenders.  The 
correlation could be spurious and the reduction of bank risk could well be due to factors 
other than interbank borrowing.   
 
The author insists a two-step procedure to test the interbank market discipline.  The 1st step 
tests risks sensitivity or the monitoring incentive of the interbank lending banks; the 2nd step 
tests the effectiveness of risk control under monitoring.  The approach applied on UK 
interbank market find little evidence of market discipline in UK.  Specifically, the results 
show weak risk sensitivity and no effectiveness of risk control.  The chapter finds that the 
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weak lender accountability is due to two factors.  First, many of the large banks are net 
interbank borrowers and therefore the disciplining incentives could be hampered by ‘too-
big-to-fail’ consideration; second, more than 80% of the transactions are less than three 
months, so the lenders can fly easily and escape their monitoring obligations.  In a 
theoretical model to explain the ineffectiveness of risk control, the author justifies the two-
step approach to test market discipline.  The model demonstrates that even with peer 
monitoring, banks financed by interbank fund could choose a riskier asset portfolio to 
maximize their net expected return.  This happens when: the “bad” assets are much riskier 
than the “good” assets and the probability that both “bad” assets and “good” assets repay is 
very small. 
 
For future work, the author is very keen to look at the short-term interbank market 
performance in UK as well as long-term effect, provided with longer sample period and 
shorter data frequency.  Co-integration test and error correction model can be applied to 
verify the relationship between the riskiness of a bank and its net interbank lending position.  
However, the author foresees the similar difficulties of applying to panel data, because co-
integration test is devised initially to test two non-stationary time series variables and may 
have the same limitation as Granger test.  As explained in Chapter 3, the existing 
econometric panel variants of those tests provide no indication as to the number or the 
identity of the particular panel members for which the null hypothesis is rejected.  
Moreover, it is also possible in the future studies to investigate risk pricing in the UK 
interbank market, if public data regarding the individual interbank rate data are available.   
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In addition, although Chapter 3 measures the riskiness of a bank from different sources, i.e. 
market level and supervisory level, there is certainly avenue to look at new risk measures.  
For example, the World Bank has updated the new z-score measurement for banks in 2009 
report by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga.  Furthermore, when assessing banks’ riskiness 
based on their capital adequacy ratio, future studies have to take account and adjust for the 
difference between Basel I and Basel II.  Nevertheless, this is not a significant issue to this 
thesis, as UK banks do not start to formally apply Basel II until 2007 while the sample 
period of Chapter 3 is mostly governed by Basel I except for the year of 2007.  Last, more 
thought will be given in the future study to extend years to include current credit crunch 
and test if they constitute a structural difference.  Crisis years can be incorporated as 
dummies to see the different performance. 
 
Furthermore, reputation and counterparty risk have featured greatly in discussions of the 
breakdown of interbank lending and this suggests that the effectiveness of peer monitoring 
might be impaired as a result of 'opacity' (asymmetric information).  This also conflicts with 
the argument of Rochet and Tirole (1996) and Calomiris (1998) who assume banks possess 
the technology to differentiate the risks of other banks.  Future work will be developed on 
Anderson and Mullineux (2009) who suggest that in order to reduce perceived counterparty 
risk, bank regulators must cut through the opacity of banks’ balance sheets lest interbank 
lending which, in ordinary times, channels loanable funds to the most eager borrowers dries 
up. 
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Chapter 4 fits well with the current policy debate regarding “wait and clean up versus 
preventive action”.  In the context of current crisis, it seems that Greenspan and Bernanke 
are wrong arguing “market efficient” and that it is better to clean up after the mess, rather 
than spoil the party.  Indeed the current crisis tends to revive the reputation of Minsky, who 
together with William McChesney Martin argued that central banks should take away the 
'punch bowl' before the party gets started, tend to be right.  Perhaps most significantly, 
Chapter 4 indicates that we do not always need a deterioration of economic conditions to 
cause a crisis, indeed the 'Great Moderation' in the US and the 'NICE' decade in the UK 
may have caused it (by encouraging over borrowing and over lending and the under pricing 
of risks i.e. a credit boom).  And the results are also consistent with Honohan (1997) who is 
sceptical that banking systems collapse because of macroeconomic shocks, as some of them 
have survived very severe macroeconomic shock.  Chain breaks as the result of the 
homogeneous weakness of all links.   
 
However, the controversy over whether macroeconomic variables are worth watching 
closely in predicting future banking crises originates the fact that some of these variables 
typically display a distinctive boom and bust pattern, both in the lead-up to an episode of 
banking system distress and while the episode is unfolding.  In contrast to almost all 
existing studies, the chapter finds that economy still “thrives” in the “pre-crisis” in terms of 
increasing GDP growth while the recession in terms of a fall in GDP growth is generally 
associated with the post-crisis period.   And the thesis find the inconsistency with the earlier 
empirical studies is very likely due to crisis identification.   Earlier studies that use “event 
studies” could identify crises too late on the basis of indirect symptoms, such as bank 
closures, forced merger and take-overs and large-scale government bailout.  They admit 
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themselves that banking sector difficulties exist for some time before that point.  Base on 
those “late detection”, the macroeconomic variables display their “down-turn” movement 
in the pre-crisis period.  Stock market indices are used to replace the old methods because it 
is commonly agreed in the existing literature that banking crises occur from the protracted 
deterioration of banks’ asset quality (which consequently causes banks to halt to trust each 
other and drive up the interest rate premium in various markets).  The collapse in the 
banking sector stock in 2007 is shown in Figure 5.2.     
 
Figure  5.2 UK banks average equity prices 1992-2007 
 
Sources: Bloomberg and Bank Calculations  
(a) Rebased to 100 on 2 January 2002 
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However, the stock market data was largely unavailable for the sample period and targeting 
countries for previous studies.  Data of non-performing loans is not a good alternative 
because they normally released on an annual basis and figures may be less informative due 
to banks’ incentive to hide their problems as long as possible.  Banking crises are defined in 
this thesis as when the stock market indices of banking sector are lower than its historical 
0.5 percentile independent of the effect of the general market movement.  The threshold is 
somewhat arbitrary.  However, the thesis finds no better way to resolve it and opens an 
avenue for future studies.   Moreover, future work will extend Chapter 4 to test if the 
macroeconomic disturbances to be endogenous, an argument of the current “Minsky 
moment” which emphasizes those crises, to some extent, are caused by the banking systems 
themselves.   
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